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Abstract
In this thesis, I argue that the obligatory nature of agreement in ϕ-features (henceforth,
ϕ-agreement) cannot be captured by appealing to “derivational time-bombs”—elements of the
initial representation that cannot be part of a well-formed, end-of-the-derivation structure,
and which are eliminated by the application of ϕ-agreement itself (as in Chomsky’s , 
uninterpretable features approach, for example). Instead, it requires recourse to an operation—
one whose invocation is obligatory, but whose successful culmination is not enforced by the
grammar.
I then discuss the implications of this conclusion for the analysis of defective intervention
by dative nominals. These results lead to a novel view of the interaction of ϕ-agreement with
case, furnishing an argument that both ϕ-agreement and so-called “morphological case” must
be computed within the syntactic component of the grammar.
Finally, I survey other domains where the same operations-based logic proves well-suited
to model the empirical state of aﬀairs; these include Object Shift, the Definiteness Eﬀect, and
long-distance wh-movement.
The thesis examines data from the Kichean languages of the Mayan family (primarily from
Kaqchikel), as well as from Basque, Icelandic, and French.
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The thesis, in the form of a haiku
Agreement can fail,
You just have to attempt it.
No "crashes" arise.
 THE THESIS, IN THE FORM OF A HAIKU
Overview
The central question investigated in this thesis is how the obligatory nature of agreement in
ϕ-features (henceforth, ϕ-agreement) is enforced by the grammar, and the main claim is that
a theory that models ϕ-agreement as an operation—one whose invocation is obligatory, but
whose successful culmination is not enforced by the grammar—fares better than alternative
accounts.
First, I examine ϕ-agreement in the Agent-Focus construction of the Kichean languages
(Mayan; Dayley , , Mondloch , Norman and Campbell , Smith-Stark ).
The behavior of this construction demonstrates the inadequacy of accounts that enforce the
obligatoriness of ϕ-agreement through “derivational time-bombs”: elements of the initial
representation that cannot be part of a well-formed, end-of-the-derivation structure, and
which are eliminated by the application of agreement itself—including, but not limited to,
Chomsky’s (, ) uninterpretable features approach. The core insight is that there are
empirical patterns that cannot be handled without recourse to agreement being attempted,
and failing, in an utterance that is nonetheless grammatical (a result that is independently
supported by the analysis of Basque unergatives, in Preminger , to appear).
Next, I examine the typology of defective intervention by dative nominals, showing that it
not only provides converging evidence for failed agreement in grammatical utterances, but
also favors an account of ϕ-agreement as an operation proper (rather than, say, a violable
constraint). Building on Bobaljik’s () observation that ϕ-agreement is case-discriminating,
I show that the typology of quirky-subject and non-quirky-subject languages arises from
movement to canonical subject position relying or not relying on this ϕ-agreement operation
to identify the moving noun-phrase, and that this correctly derives the typology of when
defective intervention does and does not give rise to outright ungrammaticality.
Bobaljik shows that the notion of case that is relevant to the case-discrimination property of
ϕ-agreement is so-called “morphological case” (Marantz ), rather than abstract case. The
fact that ϕ-agreement feeds movement to canonical subject position, as noted above, means
that ϕ-agreement must operate within syntax (contra Bobaljik’s own claim). Taken together,
these results mean that the calculus that gives rise to “morphological case” must operate within
syntax, as well (and that the term “morphological case” is therefore a misnomer). Converging
evidence for this conclusion is presented from Baker and Vinokurova’s () analysis of case
in Sakha (Turkic).
 OVERVIEW
A purely syntactic implementation of the calculus that leads to “morphological case” is
then proposed, which has the added benefit of potentially deriving the disjunctive case hierarchy
of Marantz  from the way arguments are introduced into syntactic structure.
From a broader perspective, the logic of operations—which ϕ-agreement is shown to adhere
to—might appear to cast ϕ-agreement as an “outlier” among other syntactic phenomena; and
crucially, relegating ϕ-agreement to some other component of the grammar is impossible,
given that it relies on case and feeds syntactic movement. However, it turns out that the logic
of operations is not all that rare among syntactic phenomena, in the first place: long-distance
wh-movement, the interaction ofObject Shift and specificity, and the interaction of subjecthood
and the Definiteness Eﬀect, all prove to be amenable to similar treatment—as operations that
must be invoked, but whose failure is tolerated by the grammar.
Chapter 
Failed agreement, and why we should be
interested in it
.. What we mean when we say “agreement”
This thesis deals with agreement. Traditionally, this term was used to refer to a certain kind of
relation between verbs, or verb-like elements, and core clausal arguments (usually nominals).
In the linguistic literature of the last couple of decades, however, the use of this term has
expanded: agreement, or the theoretical machinery used to derive it (for example, Agree;
Chomsky , ), has been exploited to account for a much wider array of phenomena.
Examples include: noun-modifier concord (e.g. Carstens , Mallen ); negative concord
(e.g. Zeijlstra ); fake indexicals (e.g. Kratzer ); and even deriving Binding Theory
itself (e.g. Reuland , Rooryck and Vanden Wyngaerd in press). It is an open question,
in my view, whether these phenomena are best captured in terms of agreement proper (see
Norris , to appear for some discussion). Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, I adopt
the following more narrow working definition:
() “agreement” (or “ϕ-agreement”):
The appearance of a morpheme on a verb or TAM marker, whose form co-varies with
the ϕ-features of (at least) one nominal argument in the clause.
where: ◦ TAM = tense/aspect/mood
◦ ϕ-features = person, number, gender, etc.
.. Agreement and the logic of obligatoriness
Agreement has consequences for grammaticality. This is a relatively obvious claim, and indeed
one need not look too far to find evidence for it; consider the following, rather trivial example:
() a. ha-necig-im
the-representative-pl
dibr-u
spoke-pl
(Hebrew)
‘The representatives spoke.’
b. * ha-necig-im
the-representative-pl
diber
spoke(sg.M)
 AGREEMENT AND THE LOGIC OF OBLIGATORINESS
The question I would like to pose in this thesis is a deceptively simple-looking one: What is it
in the grammar that assigns grammatical status to a sentence like (a), but ungrammatical
status to a sentence like (b)?
... The Obligatory Operationsmodel
I will argue that the correct answer to the question posed above, regarding how the obligatory
nature of ϕ-agreement is enforced by the grammar, is in terms of an obligatory ϕ-agreement
operation (or by other names, an obligatory “transformation” or “rule”)—the overt product of
which, in an example like (a), is the agreement marker “-u” (‘-pl’) on the verb.
The ungrammatical status of a sentence like (b), then, is the result of failing to invoke
the ϕ-agreement operation, despite the fact that it is obligatory. In other words, (b) is
ungrammatical because there is no derivation that leads to this particular string, in which
all operations that are obligatory have been invoked.
This model requires a grammar where operations can be specified as obligatory, which
means that the grammar must be able to refer to the operations, directly.
It is important to note that in this kind of a model, just because an operation is obligatory,
this does not mean that it applies in every derivation; operations have structural conditions on
their application. Consider, for example the final devoicing operation, given in ():
() final devoicing1
C
[-son]
→ [-voice] / #
The fact that an operation (or “rule”) like () fails to eﬀect any change to word-medial
obstruents—or to words that end in a vowel, for that matter—is considered immaterial in
evaluating the status of () as obligatory or optional. The obligatoriness of an operation like ()
can only be evaluated with respect to structures that meet the relevant structural conditions
(in this case, the existence of an obstruent in a word-final position).
I will refer to this as the obligatory operations approach.
... The Derivational Time-Bombsmodel
Perhaps the most popular approach to agreement is one that enforces its obligatory nature by
means of a crash-inducing representational device.
Suppose that the initial representation of a sentence like () contains an element (or a
“feature”) that cannot be part of a well-formed, end-of-the-computation structure; and that the
agreement relation has the eﬀect of eliminating this oﬀending element from the representation.
Assuming that ϕ-agreement is the only thing capable of eliminating this particular oﬀending
element, the result will be that ϕ-agreement cannot be avoided (in a well-formed utterance).
This is a sub-case of a class of grammatical theories in which the generative engine
is not “crash-proof” (cf. Frampton and Gutmann ); instead, these theories employ a
logic that can be described as (over-)generation-followed-by-filtration: the grammar generates
1As an aside, it is the case that many phonologists no longer think of phenomena like final devoicing
in these terms; however, the final devoicing rule is used here only for the purpose of illustrating the
operations-based logic, and therefore whether or not it ends up being the correct account for a given
phonological phenomenon is not directly relevant.
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representations that may contain oﬀending elements of the sort discussed above; the
derivational engine is free to deploy whatever operations it has at its disposal, at any stage,
and these operations might have the eﬀect of eliminating these oﬀending elements; finally,
those derivations which culminate in a structure that is not well-formed (i.e., one that retains
oﬀending elements) are filtered out. This logic is employed extensively in Chomsky and Lasnik
, but can be traced back at least as far as Perlmutter .
A concrete example of a treatment of ϕ-agreement along these lines is the uninterpretable
features approach of Chomsky (, ). It is based on the idea that agreement probes—
for example, the Infl0 node in (), below—enter the derivation bearing a set of ϕ-features
that are uninterpretable (meaning, literally, that they cannot be interpreted at the semantic
interface). Being uninterpretable, these features would cause semantic ill-formedness if they
were allowed to remain on the agreement probe, at the point at which the structure containing
the agreement probe were subjected to semantic interpretation. In this system, ϕ-agreement
is taken to be a response to this state of aﬀairs: it renders the ϕ-features on the probe
interpretable (or perhaps, deletes them altogether).
() InflP
· · ·
vP
· · ·subjDP
· · ·
Infl0
[L]
⇒
InflP
· · ·
vP
· · ·subjDP
· · ·
Infl0
[L]
Consequently, agreement must apply in a structure like () (or a sentence like ())—because if
it did not apply, the uninterpretable feature would persist, and would lead to ill-formedness.
In this model, there is still an operation (Agree, per Chomsky , ), needed for Infl0
and its nominal target (subjDP, in ()) to enter into a formal relation. Crucially, however, the
status of this operation as obligatory is never specified directly. Its obligatoriness is derivative—
a result of the ill-formedness of the elements (“features”) that its invocation eliminates from
the representation. Thus, in such a model, the ungrammatical status of a sentence like (b)
is not a (direct) reflex of the failure of Agree to apply; its direct cause is the uninterpretable
feature(s) on Infl0 not having been tended to.
I will refer to this as the derivational time-bombs approach—the intuition being that the
oﬀending element (e.g. an uninterpretable feature) is a “time-bomb” that had better be defused
by the time the derivation culminates, if well-formedness is to be achieved.
It should be noted that this approach is a sub-case of a family of models that relate
ϕ-agreement to grammaticality in a bi-conditional manner (perhaps with some provisions
for constructions or languages where no overt agreement is ever observed, such as English
infinitives or Mandarin Chinese). Thus, unification-based theories of grammar (e.g. HPSG,
LFG), insofar as they posit ϕ-features as part of the set of features that must undergo
unification between the predicate and its argument(s), fall under the same umbrella (in this
case, the “time-bomb” would be any failure to comply with the logic of unification, as it
pertains to ϕ-features).
 FAILED AGREEMENT
... The Violable Constraintsmodel
We might view the obligatory nature of agreement in terms of a constraint, and opt for a
constraint-based formalism to capture it. Perhaps the best studied family of constraint-based
formalisms (in the domain of theoretical linguistics) are those based in violable constraints; and
among these, perhaps the best known is Optimality Theory (OT) (McCarthy and Prince ,
Prince and Smolensky ). The obligatory nature of agreement could then be derived from
a constraint along the lines of ():
() HaveAgr: Assign one violation mark for every failure to represent the ϕ-features of
the designated argument on a finite verb.
Abstracting away, for now, from interactions with other constraints and phenomena, we would
arrive at the following trivial schema for enforcing agreement:
() the-representative-pl spoke- HaveAgr
a. + the-representative-pl spoke-pl
b. the-representative-pl spoke(sg.M) *!
In this model, the ungrammaticality of a sentence like (b) is the result of selecting a sub-
optimal candidate, such as candidate (b) in ().
The reader will notice that evaluating HaveAgr, in terms of the analysis presented in
§.., amounts to counting the heads that bear unchecked uninterpretable features.2 This
equivalence—while potentially useful, computationally—does not render the two models
identical: in a violable constraints model, HaveAgr (or the need to minimize the number
of unchecked uninterpretable features) could be suspended in favor of a more highly-ranked
constraint. No mitigation of this sort is possible in the derivational time-bombs model.
.. Failed agreement
The alternatives surveyed in §..–§.. were raised, in this context, as ways to enforce the
normally obligatory nature of agreement. When it comes to failed agreement, however, it turns
out that they do not all fare equally.
Let me first explain what the term failed agreement is meant to refer to:
() failed agreement (a descriptive characterization)
An utterance which is grammatical despite failing to adhere to what is otherwise an
obligatory pattern of agreement (in the language in question), and for which there is
no grammatical variant where agreement proceeds normally.
2Alternatively, it amounts to counting the uninterpretable features themselves, if one adopts a system
where diﬀerent ϕ-features can be checked independently from one another; see §. for an example of such a
system.
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This definition excludes, for example, “slips of the tongue” or other production errors—or even
instances where a lack of agreement is tolerated by the hearer due to a processing diﬃculty—
since for all of these, an alternative utterance will exist where agreement is not disrupted.
Consider how each of the models presented in §..–§.. might contend with failed
agreement. Under the obligatory operations approach (§..), failed agreement is predicted to
exist precisely (and only) when the structural conditions on the operation of ϕ-agreement are
not met. Thus, in this model, we are in need of a theory of the structural conditions on the
application of ϕ-agreement.
Under the violable constraints model (§..), failed agreement would be taken as
compliance with some constraint whose violation would be more costly than violating the
agreement-enforcing constraint, HaveAgr—given in (), and repeated here:
() HaveAgr: Assign one violation mark for every failure to represent the ϕ-features of
the designated argument on a finite verb. [=()]
We could then derive failed agreement as follows:
() SomeConstraint HaveAgr
a. + non-agreeing candidate *
b. agreeing candidate *!
What we need, under the violable constraints model, is a theory of the set of possible
constraints whose violations might be more costly than violating HaveAgr, and would
consequently inhibit agreement in a particular structure.
Under the derivational time-bombs model (§..), the situation is quite diﬀerent. Suppose
that the normally obligatory nature of ϕ-agreement is indeed a matter of the representation
containing a derivational time-bomb—a component of the representation which cannot be
part of a well-formed end-of-the-computation structure, and which can be eliminated from the
representation only by the agreement relation. If so, then in a derivation where ϕ-agreement
has not obtained, the “time-bomb” should remain in its non-“defused” state; this, in turn,
should give rise to ungrammaticality.3
What the derivational time-bombs approach categorically excludes, then, is a grammatical
utterance in which the same derivational time-bomb is present in the initial representation,
but ϕ-agreement has not obtained. This suggests that we might be able to tease apart these
diﬀerent models—or at least, distinguish between the derivational time-bombs model and the
other two—through a careful examination of cases that appear to instantiate failed agreement.
A case-study involving data of this type will be the focus of chapters –.
3The same result carries over to unification-based approaches (e.g. HPSG, LFG), where this state of aﬀairs
would amount to a failure to unify the ϕ-features of the predicate with those of its argument(s). This scenario
would therefore be predicted to result in ungrammaticality on these approaches, as well; see §...
 FAILED AGREEMENT
Chapter 
Omnivorous agreement in the Kichean
Agent-Focus construction
In this chapter, I take a detailed look at a particular construction in the Kichean languages (of
the Mayan family), which exhibits so-called omnivorous agreement eﬀects. This construction,
known as Agent-Focus, will turn out to be a useful proving ground for the diﬀerent models of
agreement outlined in chapter . First, however, we must acquaint ourselves with the behavior
of the Agent-Focus construction itself, which is the topic of this chapter.
I will argue that person and number in Kichean are separate ϕ-probes (independent
evidence for this separation, from within the Mayan language family itself, is presented in
the appendix, §.A). Each probes separately, and each is specified—unlike their counterparts
in more familiar languages/constructions—to look only for the marked member of their
respective feature-geometries (namely, [participant] and [plural], respectively). This yields a
behavior that while unusual for ϕ-agreement, is quite familiar from other empirical domains,
for example wh-probing: just as a wh-probe is able to skip noun-phrases that do not bear a
[wh] feature, these person and number probes are able to skip arguments that do not bear
[participant]/[plural] features.
Furthermore, I will demonstrate that “skipping” of this sort (i.e., agreement with a lower
target in lieu of a structurally closer one that lacks the relevant features) cannot be successfully
reanalyzed in terms of agreement with both arguments (i.e.,Multiple Agree), at least not in this
empirical domain.
Finally, I will provide evidence that the actual agreement markers found in the presence
of st/nd-person arguments (i.e., bearers of [participant]) in the Agent-Focus construction,
as well as in other instances of absolutive agreement in Kichean, are not the exponence of
the person and number probes themselves; instead, they are the product of clitic-doubling,
triggered when the st/nd-person argument is probed by the person probe (as in Béjar and
Rezac’s  account of indirect object agreement). I will show that the same is not true of the
rd-person agreement markers, which are the exponence of the number probe itself. This, I
will demonstrate, explains an interesting distinction in the actual morpho-phonological form
of these agreement markers—namely, that the st/nd-person markers resemble the strong
pronouns in the language (because they are clitics; literally, reduced pronouns), whereas the
rd-person agreement markers do not.
 AN INTRODUCTION TO OMNIVOROUS AGREEMENT: NUMBER IN GEORGIAN
Thus, the featural properties of the person and number probes, in conjunction with existing
proposals on the nature and distribution of clitic-doubling (Béjar and Rezac , Preminger
), yield an account of both the distribution and the morpho-phonological forms of the
relevant agreement markers.
I begin with an introduction, by way of Georgian number agreement, to the concept of
omnivorous agreement (§.). The rest of the sections in this chapter are devoted to the Kichean
Agent-Focus construction, concentrating first on person agreement (§.), then extending the
discussion to include number agreement (§.), arriving finally at a comprehensive account of
agreement in this construction, as well as in regular intransitives/transitives in Kichean (§.).
Once the analysis of Kichean Agent-Focus is in place, the stage will be set for a critical
comparison of diﬀerent models of agreement (chapter ).
.. An introduction to omnivorous agreement: Number in Georgian
I use the term omnivorous agreement following Nevins (), where it defined as follows:
() omnivorous agreement
Any scenario where the marked member of a given agreement paradigm (e.g. a marker
of verbal ϕ-agreement indicating the plurality of a nominal argument) can be triggered
by the relevant feature whether it appears on the subject or on the object, or both.
Perhaps the best-known example of omnivorous agreement comes from number agreement in
Georgian (Anderson , Béjar , Halle and Marantz , Nevins ):
() g-xedav
Obj-saw
‘I saw you(sg.) / He saw you(sg.).’
() g-xedav-t
Obj-saw-pl
‘I saw y’all / We saw y’all / He saw y’all / We saw you(sg.).’
As shown in (), the suﬃx “-t” can reflect plurality of the subject, of the object, or of
both arguments (and thus satisfies the definition of omnivorous agreement in ()). Note
that the person features of the subject are not overtly expressed, which gives rise to some
of the ambiguity attested in (–); crucially, however, () is ambiguous beyond the person-
features of the subject, with respect to which of the two core arguments are plural (the subject,
the object, or both)—and it is this ambiguity that one would characterize as omnivorous
agreement in number features.1
There is, however, at least one important confound. First, notice that certain interpretations
are missing from (). Some of these are ruled out on binding-theoretic grounds (“y’all saw
you(sg.)”, etc.); but some binding-theoretically possible combinations still cannot be expressed
using the “-t” suﬃx: these are the ones involving a rd-plural subject:
1Other examples of omnivorous number agreement have been reported for Barceloní Catalan (a DO-IO
interaction, rather than subject-object); the Soazza and Eastern Abruzzese dialects of Italian; Onondaga;
and others. See Nevins () for details and discussion.
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() g-xedav-t
Obj-saw-pl
*‘They saw you(sg.) / They saw y’all.’ (unavailable interpretations)
To achieve these interpretations, the verb must carry a diﬀerent suﬃx, “-en”:
() g-xedav-en
Obj-saw-plSubj
‘They saw you(sg.) / They saw y’all.’
The suﬃx “-en” is a specialized form of verbal agreement for rd-plural subject; this much is
clear. Crucially, however, it does not appear alongside the regular plurality-indicating suﬃx
“-t” (to form the unattested *“xedav-t-en” or *“xedav-en-t”), but in its place.
We could characterize this state of aﬀairs as one in which “-t” and “-en” are competing
for a single position, where only one of them can be overtly expressed. Whether this is due
to phonological processes preventing faithful expression of the segmental material from both
suﬃxes, or—in the spirit of the analysis of these data by Halle and Marantz ()—due to
the most featurally-specific aﬃx winning out, it is clear that some “competition” of this sort is
taking place.
This poses a problem for viewing this pattern as omnivorous agreement proper: once we
allow for multiple morphemes to compete for a slot in the verbal complex where only one
is expressed—whether such competition is phonologically- or morphologically-mediated—
nothing prevents a competition-based analysis for the original pattern in (–), as well.
Suppose there is a morpheme indicating plurality of the subject (a), and a morpheme
indicating plurality of the object (b), both of which compete for the suﬃx slot (as with “-en”,
above):
() a. [+pl, +nom] → /-t /
b. [+pl, +acc] → /-t /
If these two morphemes happen to be homophonous (certainly not an unreasonable
hypothesis, when dealing with inflectional paradigms), we will get the impression of
omnivorous agreement.
There are, it turns out, patterns of omnivorous agreement that are resistant to this kind
of confound. I turn to one such pattern—omnivorous person-agreement in the Agent-Focus
construction in Kichean—in the following section.
.. Person agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus construction
... Some basic facts about Kichean, and about Agent-Focus in Kichean
The remainder of this chapter discusses data from Kaqchikel, K’ichee’ and Tz’utujil, three
Mayan languages of the Kichean branch, spoken in Guatemala. The Kichean branch, narrowly
defined, also includes the language Achi’, not discussed here; the superordinate branch, known
as Greater Kichean, also includes the languages Q’eqchi’, Uspantek, Poqomchi’, Poqomam,
Sakapultek, and Sipakapense (Campbell and Kaufman ).
 PERSON AGREEMENT IN THE KICHEAN AGENT-FOCUS CONSTRUCTION
According to recent estimates, Kaqchikel has approximately , speakers; K’ichee’ has
approximately ,, speakers; and Tz’utujil has approximately , speakers.2
Like other languages in the Mayan family, these languages are head-marking—i.e., there is
no overt case-marking on full noun-phrases—and exhibit an ergative agreement pattern (the
examples below are from Kaqchikel; “Ø” indicates a phonologically-empty exponent):3,4
() transitive
a. rat
you(sg.)
x-Ø-aw-axa-j
prfv-sgabs-sg.erg-hear-act
ri
the
achin
man
‘You(sg.) heard the man.’
b. ri
the
achin
man
x-a-r-axa-j
prfv-sg.abs-sg.erg-hear-act
rat
you(sg.)
‘The man heard you(sg.).’
() intransitive
a. ri
the
achin
man
x-Ø-uk’lun
prfv-sg.abs-arrive
‘The man arrived.’
b. rat
you(sg.)
x-at-uk’lun
prfv-sg.abs-arrive
‘You(sg.) arrived.’
As can be seen in (–), the single argument of the unaccusative (“uk’lun” ‘arrive’) receives
the same marking as the object of the transitive (“axa” ‘hear’): Ø (empty) for sg arguments,
“-a(t)-” for sg ones; while the subject of the transitive receives a diﬀerent marking: “-r(u)/u-”
for sg arguments, “-a(w)-” for sg ones. Note that the absolutive agreement marker in Kichean
precedes the ergative one; thus, in the transitive verb, one finds a ‘-<obj>-<subj>-’ order of
agreement markers.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there is a construction known as Agent-
Focus in the Kichean languages, which turns out to provide a unique proving ground for
various theoretical treatments of agreement. This construction is in some sense a response
to a restriction preventing A-bar dependencies from being established that target ergative
2<http://www.ethnologue.com/show_family.asp?subid=-> (retrieved May th, ).
3Data in this chapter that are not otherwise attributed come from my meetings with Ana Lopez de Mateo,
a speaker of the Patzún variety of Kaqchikel; similar patterns have been noted in the literature on Kichean and
other Mayan languages (Aissen to appear, Davies and Sam-Colop , Dayley , , Mondloch ,
Norman and Campbell , Pye , Smith-Stark , Stiebels ). Unless otherwise stated, everything
presented in this section holds of Kaqchikel, K’ichee’ and Tz’utujil equally.
One diﬀerence I did find in Kaqchikel was a strong preference for SV(O) word-order in declaratives—a
departure from the verb-initial word order that is pervasive across the Mayan family (including in K’ichee’
and Tz’utujil, for example; see Dayley , Mondloch , Norman and Campbell , among others).
Another diﬀerence is that in the absolutive antipassive (exemplified in (), below, for K’ichee’), this dialect
of Kaqchikel seems to generally disallow realization of the demoted Patient—whether it is oblique or not.
Whether these properties extend to all speakers of the Patzún variety of Kaqchikel remains to be seen.
4The morphological structure of the verbal forms in (–) is actually more complex than presented here,
in particular with regard to the suﬃxes on the verbal stem known as “status suﬃxes”. See Aissen (to appear)
and Henderson (to appear) for details.
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arguments. This restriction is not unique to the Kichean languages; it is found inmany (though
not all) ergative languages, in and outside of the Mayan family.5
Before turning to the Agent-Focus construction itself, I note that the Kichean languages
have other means of circumventing this restriction, as well; all that is needed is that the
External Argument surface as something other than an ergative noun-phrase. One way of
achieving this is by using an antipassive construction, where the Patient will show up as an
oblique phrase (if at all)—and as a result, the External Argument will be absolutive, rather than
ergative (as evinced by the fact that the head-marking that co-indexes the External Argument
on the verb, in this case, is identical to the head-marking that co-indexes the object in a regular
transitive; cf. (a–b)):
() xac˘i:n
who
s˘-Ø-c˘ap-an
prfv-sg.abs-capture-ap
[ c˘-e:h
sg.poss-rn
le:
the
ts’unun
hummingbird
] (K’ichee’)
‘Who caught the hummingbird?’ [Sam-Colop :, via Campbell :]
However, by far the most common way for speakers of Kichean to realize an External
Argument so that it does not end up as ergative—and thus, to allow the formation of A-bar
dependencies targeting the External Argument—is by using Agent-Focus, the construction
which will be at the center of the discussion in this chapter and the next. This construction is
characterized by a particular suﬃx (glossed here as ‘af’) on the verb.6
While sometimes called the Focus Antipassive or the Agentive Antipassive, Agent-Focus is
actually not an antipassive at all—as argued in detail by Smith-Stark (), Craig (), and
Aissen (to appear). While antipassives normally involve “demotion” of the Patient (the original
direct object), this is not the case here; in this construction, both core arguments (Agent and
Patient) are not demoted, and can appear as full-fledged, non-oblique noun-phrases:7
() ja
foc
ri
the
tz’i’
dog
x-Ø-etzela-n
prfv-sg.abs-hate-af
ri
the
sian
cat
‘It was the dog that hated the cat.’
() ja
foc
ri
the
xoq
woman
x-Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-sg.abs-see-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was the woman who saw the man.’
Let us now turn to the issue that is at the center of this section—namely, the behavior of
verbal agreement in this construction. For expository purposes, the current discussion will be
5Even those Mayan languages that lack this prohibition exhibit the same ergative agreement alignment
that was demonstrated for Kaqchikel in (–). See Stiebels , and references therein, for the distribution
of these eﬀects across the Mayan family. See also Coon, Mateo Pedro, and Preminger in prep., where it is argued
that this prohibition—in Mayan—is best characterized not as a property of the ergative argument itself, but
rather as a restriction against extracting anything but the direct object out of a transitive verb-phrase, based on
the fact that the distribution of this prohibition across the Mayan family correlates with the structural height
of absolutive case/agreement (as detailed in Tada ).
6In Kaqchikel, this suﬃx comes in two forms, “-ö” and “-n”; in K’ichee’, the forms are “-ow” and “-n”;
and in Tz’utujil, they are “-o(w)” and “-n”.
7A related fact, which constitutes an argument in its own right against viewing Agent-Focus as an
antipassive, is that either the Agent or Patient may control agreement on the finite verb, given the right
argument/person combination (Aissen to appear); see below for a detailed discussion of agreement in the
Agent-Focus construction.
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limited to instances where both core arguments are singular; the discussion will be expanded
to include plural noun-phrases in §..
The behavior of agreement in Agent-Focus clauses is strikingly diﬀerent from agreement
in regular transitive clauses (exemplified by (a–b), above). Instead of the two agreement
morphemes carried by a regular transitive verb (an absolutive one and an ergative one), the
Agent-Focus verb carries only a single agreement marker, taken from the absolutive series.
This immediately raises the question of which of the two core arguments (the subject and
the object, both of which are non-oblique) will be co-indexed by this single agreement marker.
This problem, and the intricate ways in which Kichean goes about solving it, were originally
observed in work by Dayley (), Mondloch (), Norman and Campbell (), and
Smith-Stark ().
Consider first the pair in (–):
() ja
foc
rat
you(sg.)
x-at/*Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/*sg.abs-hear-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was you(sg.) that heard the man.’
() ja
foc
ri
the
achin
man
x-at/*Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/*sg.abs-hear-af
rat
you(sg.)
‘It was the man that heard you(sg.).’
In (), the Agent is nd-person and the Patient is rd-person; in (), the reverse is true—
the Agent is rd-person and the Patient is nd-person. Crucially, however, the agreement
morphology borne by the verb is the same in both sentences: the agreement-slot in between
the aspectual prefix (“x-” ‘prfv-’) and the verbal stem (“axa” ‘hear’) contains the “-at-” infix,
glossed here as ‘sg.abs’, in both cases.8
The same behavior is attested when one of the arguments is st-person and the other is rd-
person: the verb will carry the st-person agreement marker “-in-” regardless of whether the
st-person argument is the Agent or the Patient:
() ja
foc
yïn
me
x-in/*Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/*sg.abs-hear-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was me that heard the man.’
() ja
foc
ri
the
achin
man
x-in/*Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/*sg.abs-hear-af
yïn
me
‘It was the man that heard me.’
The reader might wonder regarding the fate of Agent-Focus clauses where one argument is
st-person and the other is nd-person; such combinations, it turns out, are impossible in this
construction—an issue to which I return, shortly (see the discussion of (), below).
Given the facts surveyed here, and following the discussion in §., we could say that in
the Agent-Focus construction, the Kichean languages exhibit omnivorous agreement in [person]
features—or omnivorous person, for short (for a discussion of “salience”-based approaches to
these eﬀects, and why such approaches are problematic, see §..). Within the Mayan family,
8Thanks to Lauren Eby Clemens for bringing the existence of such patterns, originally in K’ichee’, to my
attention; and to Robert Henderson, for teaching me that this pattern extends to Kaqchikel, as well.
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this behavior is not absolutely unique to the Kichean languages; see Stiebels  for a recent
review of these and similar eﬀects across the Mayan family. The Kichean pattern, however,
has certain properties that make it an especially interesting proving ground for theories of
ϕ-agreement.
For example, the Kichean languages provide a way to rule out an account of the kind
sketched in §. for Georgian number-agreement, where what looks like omnivorous agreement
is actually handled in terms of competition—whether morphological or phonological—of two
agreement markers for a single slot in the verbal complex. The reason is as follows: the form
of the nd-singular object agreement marker in Kaqchikel is “-a(t)-”, exactly the marker that
shows up in (–) (which is why it is glossed here as ‘sg.abs’). The form of the nd-
singular subject agreement marker, however, is “-aw-”; and as demonstrated by (a) (repeated
below), “-aw-” has no problem appearing in the precise phonological environment instantiated
in (–)—namely, between the aspectual prefix (“x-” ‘prfv-’) and the verbal stem (“axa”
‘hear’).
() a. rat
you(sg.)
x-Ø-aw-axa-j
prfv-sgabs-sg.erg-hear-act
ri
the
achin
man
‘You(sg.) heard the man.’
Thus, if patterns like (–) were the result of a subject agreement marker and an object
agreement marker competing for a single slot in the verbal complex, we would falsely predict
a kind of pseudo-Kaqchikel, where in the Agent-Focus construction, “-aw-” would surface when
the subject was nd-person, but “-a(t)-” would surface when the object was nd-person.
One might consider the possibility that both noun-phrases in the Agent-Focus construction
are simultaneously marked with absolutive case; and that as a result, both arguments trigger
agreement using the series of morphemes that includes “-a(t)-”, rather than the one that
includes “-aw-”. It is doubtful that such an account could be maintained, however, given
that the Kichean languages are what Legate () terms “ABS=NOM” languages (Coon,
Mateo Pedro, and Preminger in prep., building on Tada ). In “ABS=NOM” languages,
absolutive case is assigned by Infl0, and does not have the distribution of “default” or freely-
available case. Instead, such languages are characterized by a one-to-one relation between the
presence of Infl0 and the presence of an absolutive noun-phrase—as evidenced, for example,
by the unavailability of absolutive case in non-finite clauses (see Aldridge , Legate ).
It would therefore be entirely unexpected that a single clause would contain two noun-phrases
whose abstract case was absolutive.
This, of course, raises the question of what the case-markings of the subject and the object
in the Agent-Focus construction actually are. Coon, Mateo Pedro, and Preminger (in prep.)
provide an argument that in the Agent-Focus construction, the object receives structural case
from a dedicated head (whose overt realization is the Agent-Focus suﬃx), and the subject is
left to bear absolutive.
The point here, however, is that any analysis that assumes two absolutive noun-phrases,
where there is only one Infl0 to be found, is highly unlikely for Kichean. Since both arguments
trigger the same “absolutive” agreement morphology, however, we must derive this pattern of
omnivorous agreement from something other than such competition between morphemes.
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There is another fact that suggests an account of these omnivorous person eﬀects that is not
based in morpheme competition of this sort. It turns out that the person values of the two core
arguments in the Agent-Focus construction cannot freely combine; in particular, the following
restriction is observed:
() Agent-Focus person restriction
In the Agent-Focus construction in Kichean, at most one of the two core arguments can
be st/nd-person. [Davies and Sam-Colop , Dayley , Norman and Campbell ,
Smith-Stark , Stiebels ]
Thus, the examples in (–) are ungrammatical regardless of the agreement marker chosen
to occupy the agreement-slot:
() * ja
foc
rat
you(sg.)
x-in/at/Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/sg/sgabs-hear-af
yin
me
Intended: ‘It was you(sg.) that heard me.’
() * ja
foc
yin
me
x-in/at/Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/sg/sgabs-hear-af
rat
you(sg.)
Intended: ‘It was me that heard you(sg.).’
This state of aﬀairs diﬀers from the omnivorous number pattern found in Georgian, and
discussed in §.; there, the appearance of the plural marker was compatible not only with
the subject or object being plural, but also with both the subject and object being plural.
Note, however, that this is a distinction between person and number, not between Kichean
and Georgian. As will be shown in §.–§., number agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus
also exhibits omnivorous agreement eﬀects, but is like the Georgian pattern in §. in allowing
plural subjects and objects in the same clause. I return to the nature of this diﬀerence in §...
Returning to the Agent-Focus person restriction, diﬀerent languages in the Kichean branch
choose diﬀerent options to realize intended meanings like the ones in (–). Tz’utujil makes
use of the absolutive antipassive (cf. the K’ichee’ (), above)—a construction in which the
Patient is realized as an oblique phrase, and is therefore ineligible for agreement:
() atet
you(sg.)
x-at-ch’ey-o
prfv-sg.abs-hit-af
[ w-xiin
sg.gen-of
] (Tz’utujil)
‘It was you(sg.) who hit me’ [Dayley :]
In Kaqchikel, on the other hand, the prohibition against A-bar operations targeting the ergative
noun-phrase appears to simply be lifted when such argument combinations arise—i.e., when
both the subject and the object are st/nd-person:
() ja
foc
rix
y’all
x-ix-qa-tz’et
prfv-pl.abs-pl.erg-see
‘It was y’all who we saw.’ [class-notes from Field Methods class;9 MIT, ]
Let us set aside, for now, the question of which alternative means are used in each
language to express these interpretations (which are rendered impossible in the Agent-Focus
construction due to ()). Instead, let us concentrate on the restriction in (), itself: if the
9<http://fieldwork.mit.edu/wiki/Kaqchikel#Contexts_of_AF> (retrieved April th, ).
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omnivorous person eﬀects in Kichean were simply the result of competition among multiple
morphemes for a single slot in the verbal complex, then we would expect the combination
of one st-person argument with another nd-person argument to result in the same sort of
competition, between a st-person agreement marker and a nd-person agreement marker.
However, as shown in (–), this is not the case: no choice of agreement marker salvages
st-person/nd-person argument combinations (in the Agent-Focus construction). Of course,
it is logically possible that the source of the restriction in () would be extrinsic to the
mechanism responsible for the omnivorous person eﬀects, in the first place; nevertheless, an
account that derives the two from the same underlyingmechanismwould clearly be preferable.
An account of this sort will be presented in §.., below.
... Relativized probing
.... What’s good for [wh] is good for [participant]
I have been using the term omnivorous agreement, following Nevins (), to characterize the
behavior of person-agreement in the Agent-Focus construction in Kichean. That is because
this agreement system exhibits a property that is often not found in the domain of verbal
agreement: informally, we could characterize this property as the ability to skip over the
subject—if it does not bear the right feature-combination—en route to the object. This was
demonstrated in examples like () and (), above.
There is another perspective one could take on these facts, though, that makes them seem
much less exceptional. Consider the behavior of a wh-probe on C0, in examples like (a–c):
() a.
[
C0 [who]<+wh> gave [this dish] to [Bob]
]
−→
[
C0 [who]<+wh> gave [this dish] to [Bob]
]
−→ Who gave this dish to Bob?
b.
[
C0 [John] gave [what]<+wh> to [Bob]
]
−→
[
C0 [John] gave [what]<+wh> to [Bob]
]
−→ What did John give to Bob?
c.
[
C0 [John] gave [this dish] to [who]<+wh>
]
−→
[
C0 [John] gave [this dish] to [who]<+wh>
]
−→ Who did John give this dish to?
In each of the sentences in (a–c), there are (at least) three target XPs that the wh-probe is in
principle able to reach; and some of these targets are closer to the probe, in structural terms,
than others are. Crucially, the probe has the ability to skip over targets that do not bear the
right feature-combination—in this case, [wh]—en route to a target that does. This observation
is hardly new, of course; it is simply the “relativized” part of Relativized Minimality (Rizzi ,
Frampton ) at work.
Now consider the agreement patterns of Agent-Focus in Kichean—as discussed in §..,
and exemplified by (–), repeated here:
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() ja
foc
rat
you(sg.)
x-at-axa-n
prfv-sg.abs-hear-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was you(sg.) that heard the man.’
() ja
foc
ri
the
achin
man
x-at-axa-n
prfv-sg.abs-hear-af
rat
you(sg.)
‘It was the man that heard you(sg.).’
Let us assume that at the relevant stage of the derivation of these examples, both the subject
and the object are located below Infl0—an almost unavoidable assumption, given some
version of the vP/VP-Internal Subject Hypothesis. If so, both this Agent-Focus pattern and the
interrogative C0 pattern discussed above involve a probe (Infl0 in one case, C0 in the other)
that is looking for target XPs that bear a particular feature ([participant] in one case, [wh] in
the other), and is able to skip over XPs that lack the relevant feature.10 A pair like (–) can
therefore be analyzed in the same way as (a–c):
() a.
[
Infl0 [you]<+prtc.> V0 [the man]
]
−→
[
Infl0 [you]<+prtc.> V0 [the man]
]
−→ ()
b.
[
Infl0 [the man] V0 [you]<+prtc.>
]
−→
[
Infl0 [the man] V0 [you]<+prtc.>
]
−→ ()
I therefore propose that the derivation of these omnivorous person eﬀects is essentially the
same as that of their wh-probe counterparts: the ϕ-probe—namely, Infl0—is specified for the
[participant] feature; it will therefore ignore DPs that do not bear this feature, much like an
interrogative C0 will ignore XPs that do not carry the [wh] feature. I will refer to this property
of interrogative C0 and Kichean Infl0 as relativized probing, following the use of the term
“relativized” by Rizzi ().
At this point, one might wonder about indirect objects in Kichean, and their eﬀects
on agreement in the Agent-Focus construction (in other words, regarding the [participant]-
probing counterpart of (c), above). It turns out that Kichean does not have true indirect
objects; Source/Goal arguments in Kichean can be realized only as oblique phrases, headed by
a preposition which takes a relational noun as its complement:11
() a. Juan
Juan
x-Ø-u-ya’
prfv-sg.abs-sg.erg-give
ri
the
wuj
book
[ch-a
prep-rn
xta
clf
Maria]
Maria
‘Juan gave the book to Maria.’
b. Juan
Juan
x-Ø-u-ya’
com-sg.abs-sg.erg-give
ri
the
wuj
book
[cha-w-a]
prep-sg.gen-rn
‘Juan gave the book to you(sg.).’
10The notation [participant] refers to the relevant feature in the ϕ-geometry that distinguishes “speech act
participants”—i.e., st/nd-person arguments—from rd-person noun-phrases (following Harley and Ritter
, and much subsequent work). See §..., below, for further discussion.
11Examples (–) are Kaqchikel data due to Robert Henderson (p.c.).
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When the indirect object is rd-person, it appears as a complement to the relational noun,
as in (a); when the indirect object is pronominal, it appears as possessor agreement on
the relation noun, as in (b) (note that across the Mayan family, ergative agreement and
possessive/genitive agreement are identical).
Since the Source/Goal argument is oblique, it does not interact with the agreementmarking
on the finite verb. This is already seen in (a–b), where the change from a rd-person Goal
to a nd-person one is not reflected in the verbal morphology. The same is true in the Agent-
Focus construction in Kichean: the Source/Goal argument does not interact with agreement
on the Agent-Focus verb. Thus, even if it is the only argument that is not rd-person, the
Source/Goal argument fails to trigger st/nd-person agreement on the Agent-Focus verb:
() Ja
foc
ri
the
Juan
Juan
x-Ø-y-on
prfv-sg.abs-give-af
ri
the
wuj
book
[cha-w-a]
prep-sg.gen-rn
‘It was Juan that gave the book to you.’
The agreement morphology on the Agent-Focus verb in () (“x-Ø-y-on” ‘prfv-sg.abs-give-
af’) is identical to the agreement morphology on an Agent-Focus verb with only a subject and
object, both of which are rd-person—cf. (–), repeated here:
() ja
foc
ri
the
tz’i’
dog
x-Ø-etzela-n
prfv-sg.abs-hate-af
ri
the
sian
cat
‘It was the dog that hated the cat.’
() ja
foc
ri
the
xoq
woman
x-Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-sg.abs-see-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was the woman who saw the man.’
In summary, Source/Goal arguments in Kichean are irrelevant to the Infl0 probe (both in
regular finite clauses, and in the Agent-Focus construction), just as any other oblique phrase
would be.
Cross-linguistically, not all Source/Goal arguments behave in this fashion, of course. In
many languages, Source/Goal arguments (along with other dative nominals) exhibit a more
complex interaction with ϕ-probing, known as defective intervention, which I set aside for the
purposes of this chapter (and the next). This more complex pattern will be the central topic of
chapter .
.... Feature relativization in a feature-geometric approach
Before turning to more detailed derivations of examples like (a–b), I would like to briefly
discuss the status of this relativized probing proposal with respect to the cross-linguistic
typology of agreement. At first glance, it might seem like this proposal—while assimilating
ϕ-agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus clauses to probing by interrogative C0—makes this
particular instance of ϕ-agreement out to be a complete outlier; after all, from a typological
perspective, omnivorous agreement patterns are the exception, not the norm. We might
therefore ask why the eﬀects of relativized probing are absent in the usual case, where
ϕ-agreement targets the subject and cannot target the object under any circumstances.
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The answer, I believe, is that they are not absent; relativized probing is alive and well in
the standard subject-agreement paradigm—the relevant probe is simply feature-relativized to
a higher point in the ϕ-geometry, one that can be satisfied by a larger set of potential targets.
Consider examples like the following:
() There seems/??seem [to every attorneyi] to be [some client of hisi who is innocent].
Examples like this illustrate a familiar point: probing by Infl0 in English—presumably
responsible for rd-singular agreement on the verb “seem”—is capable of skipping certain
nodes, such as the dative experiencer in () (the variable-binding relation is there to verify
that the subject is c-commanded by the dative experiencer).12 The same point can be made
with unselected PPs, as well:
() There are/??is likely [in every class] to be [two troublemakers].
In fact, even in a much simpler example, where there is no intervening PP, any rudimentary
investigation of the syntactic structure reveals that there are several nodes along the syntactic
spine that must be skipped by the ϕ-probe en route to its eventual target:
() There are/??is [vP/VP likely [TP to [vP/VP be [two troublemakers] here]].
The underlined nodes in () are bona fide syntactic projections, closer to the ϕ-probe than the
actual target (“two troublemakers”), and yet the ϕ-probe is able to skip them when searching
for an agreement target.13
These eﬀects are perhaps most naturally handled in terms of categorial distinctions
(namely, the Infl0 probe searching for a DP, rather than a TP, vP/VP, or PP). If, however,
category-membership is nothing but featural specification (Chomsky b, among many
others), then the essential structure of examples like (–) is no diﬀerent than the
wh-probing or Agent-Focus examples we have been looking at: they all involve a probe which
12Recent work by Hartman (, to appear) suggests that examples like () might constitute the
exception, and that PP arguments other than the to-experiencer of “seem” and “appear” do intervene in
English—just as they do in French, Italian, Spanish, Greek, and other languages (Anagnostopoulou ,
Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir , Rizzi , Torrego , among others; see chapter  for a more detailed
discussion of defective intervention by dative nominals). If this is true, then () is not directly relevant to
the argument in the main text; but note that the more general point made with regard to (), about skipping
other projections along the clausal spine, holds of () as well.
13The argument in the main text goes through even if ϕ-agreement in expletive-associate constructions
like (–) is handled by agreement of Infl0 with the expletive “there”, rather than agreement directly with
the associate. If the expletive is base-generated alongside the associate and subsequently moves to the matrix
subject position (Hartmann , Hazout , Hoekstra and Mulder , Kayne , Moro , ,
, Williams , among others), then the probe that dislocates the expletive must be able to skip the
dative experiencer (in ()) or the adjunct (in ()), and the same relativized probing property holds; but even
if the expletive is base-generated in its surface position, there must be some mechanism that transmits the
ϕ-features of the associate to the expletive (since it is the features of the associate that ultimately determine
the form of the finite verb in (–); see, for example, Chomsky , Den Dikken , Lasnik and Saito
). This transmission mechanism will itself need to be feature-relativized in the same way, to prevent
transmission of the features of the dative/adjunct instead of the features of the actual associate.
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is specified to look for a particular feature, and this probe is able to skip potential targets when
these targets do not bear the feature in question.
It is important to note that the eﬀect demonstrated in (–) for English is present in
Kichean, as well, as shown by the invisibility of oblique Source/Goal arguments for agreement
purposes (see §...). In other words, the kind of “skipping” we find in English is replicated
in Kichean; the eﬀect in Kichean is simply stronger, in that it extends beyond PPs, to include
rd-person DPs as well. We can therefore characterize the “skipping” eﬀects found in English
as a subset of those found in Kichean.
This subset-superset relation between the relativized probing eﬀects found in English and
in Kichean suggests a way of capturing the diﬀerence between the two kinds of languages
based on the notion of a feature geometry. Suppose, following Harley and Ritter (), that the
domain of ϕ-features is internally structured. Let us assume the following feature geometry, a
simplified version of the ϕ-feature geometry proposed by Harley and Ritter (see also McGinnis
, Béjar and Rezac ):
() a simplified ϕ-feature geometry
[ϕ]
[number]
[plural]
[person]
[participant]
[author]
( ) ( )
The feature [plural] is what distinguishes plural noun-phrases from singular ones. The feature
[participant] is what distinguishes st/nd-person pronouns from rd-person pronouns and
other noun-phrases (as assumed in §...), and the feature [author] further distinguishes
st-person from nd-person; since [participant] dominates [author], the latter cannot arise
without the former, ruling out the logically incoherent “non-participant author”. The root of
the feature geometry, [ϕ], is the node shared by all nominals. The remaining nodes, [person]
and [number], are included here only for completeness, and can be ignored for the time being
(see §. for the significance of these nodes).
Crucially, the nodes in this feature-geometry are privative features. Thus, a st-person plural
noun-phrase (“we/us”) would carry [participant], [author], and [plural] features; a nd-person
plural noun-phrase (“y’all”) would carry [participant] and [plural] features, but no [author]
feature; a st-person singular noun-phrase (“I/me”) would carry [participant] and [author]
features, but no [plural] feature; and so forth.
Following Béjar and Rezac (), I assume that this feature-geometry is relevant not only
to the morphological realization of nominals—as proposed by Harley and Ritter—but is also
the way ϕ-features are represented within syntax proper.
If English Infl0 is relativized to the root of the geometry, any ϕ-bearing phrase would
constitute a viable target (i.e., any DP, but not PPs); and since the subject is always closer
to Infl0 than the object, the object will never be targeted for ϕ-agreement. Thus, while English
does not have omnivorous agreement in the sense of agreement with objects in lieu of certain
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subjects, English Infl0 can be seen as omnivorous with respect to [ϕ]: it skips phrases such as
PPs, whose head does not carry it.14
Unlike its English counterpart, Infl0 in Kichean is relativized to [participant] (as argued in
§..., above). It therefore skips not only non-DPs (as its English counterpart does), but also
DPs that are non-st/nd-person—giving rise to what has been characterized as omnivorous
agreement (agreement with objects in lieu of certain subjects).15
On this feature-geometric view of ϕ-agreement, the reason the kinds of phrases skipped by
the ϕ-probe in English are a subset of the kinds of phrases skipped by the ϕ-probe in Kichean
is because the node English Infl0 is relativized to dominates the node to which Kichean Infl0 is
relativized, within the ϕ-feature geometry.
Once we adopt a feature-geometric approach to ϕ-features in syntax (or in fact, any
approach that takes ϕ-features in syntax to be privative, rather than bivalent), we must modify
our notion of valuation. In this type of system, valuation involves the copying of privative
features (if present) from the nominal to the ϕ-probe, rather than the copying of [+/−] values.
We must therefore ask ourselves how a probe with unvalued ϕ-features (say, before it has
actually probed) diﬀers from a probe that has entered into a successful ϕ-agreement relation
with a nominal that happens not to be specified for [participant], [plural], and so forth.
This question can be answered straightforwardly, however, if valuation is itself a feature-
geometric process, and involves copying snippets of ϕ-geometry, rather than copying
individual features. Suppose that instead of “unvalued ϕ-features”, ϕ-probes enter the
derivation with a placeholder for a piece of ϕ-feature-geometry; and that valuation is simply
the process of copying the snippet of ϕ-geometry borne by a nominal onto the ϕ-probe:
() valuation as a ϕ-geometric notion
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·DP
[
[ϕ]
]
· · ·
Infl0
[ ] ⇒
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·DP
[
[ϕ]
]
· · ·
Infl0
[
[ϕ]
]
On this view of valuation, relativized probing would amount to specifying what the root of the
piece of ϕ-geometry copied onto Infl0 would have to be. In English, any piece of ϕ-geometry
14Though see §.., for a more nuanced view of whether or not P0/PPs carry ϕ-features.
15As Gillian Gallagher and David Pesetsky have independently pointed out to me, the term omnivorous
agreement might not be such a good fit for this phenomenon. The agreement probe, in these cases, is not
behaving like an “omnivore” at all; rather, it is being extremely picky, willing to go to the end of the “buﬀet
line” (or to the end of the clausal structure) to find what it is looking for (e.g. plural number). It might therefore
make more sense to call this “vegan agreement”, or something along those lines. I will, however, keep to the
term omnivorous agreement, in the interest of not introducing new terminology where previous terminology
already exists.
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rooted in [ϕ] would be able to be copied onto Infl0, meaning any nominal could be used for
valuation:
() ϕ-geometric valuation: English
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·DP
[
[ϕ]
]
· · ·
Infl0[ϕ][ ] ⇒
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·DP
[
[ϕ]
]
· · ·
Infl0[ϕ][
[ϕ]
]
In Kichean, on the other hand, only pieces of ϕ-geometry rooted in [participant] would be able
to be copied onto Infl0, meaning only st/nd-person nominals could be used for valuation:
() ϕ-geometric valuation: Kichean
(
[prtc] = [participant]
)
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·DP

[ϕ]
[prtc]

· · ·
Infl0[prtc][ ]
⇒
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·DP

[ϕ]
[prtc]

· · ·
Infl0[prtc][
[prtc]
]
An “unvalued” ϕ-probe, in this approach, would be one whose placeholder has not been filled
with a snippet of ϕ-geometry.
Note that this modification to the mechanism of valuation does not fundamentally change
the question posed in chapter , regarding how the obligatoriness of ϕ-agreement is enforced
by the grammar. For example, the uninterpretable features approach (Chomsky , )—
an instance of the more general derivational time-bombs model—could easily be adapted to
state that ϕ-geometric placeholders are uninterpretable (and cause ungrammaticality unless
filled), whereas actual snippets of ϕ-geometry are interpretable (and therefore do not cause
ill-formedness).
The significance of the feature-geometric approach is in unifying the patterns of which
nodes can and cannot be skipped by the ϕ-probe in a language like English with those
found in a language like Kichean. I will therefore continue to use, in prose, non-geometric
shorthand such as “unvalued ϕ-features” and “probing for [participant] features” as stand-ins
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for the relevant feature-geometric notions (in this case, “empty ϕ-geometric placeholders” and
“probing for a piece of ϕ-geometry rooted in [participant]”, respectively).
In summary, we have examined the omnivorous person eﬀects found in the Kichean Agent-
Focus construction. In §..., these eﬀects were assimilated to the behavior of interrogative
C0 (in particular, its ability to skip non-wh phrases). This property—namely, the ability of a
probe to skip targets that lack the feature it is looking for—was termed relativized probing
(following the use of the term “relativized” in Relativized Minimality; Rizzi ).
In this sub-section we have gone further, in assimilating the categorial relativization of
probes like English Infl0 (i.e., the targeting of DPs but not PPs) to the same relativized probing
mechanism. Such categorial relativization is in need of an account, one way or another; but
given the idea that categorial membership is nothing more than featural specification, the
division between categorial relativization and other kinds of relativization (such as carrying or
not carrying a [wh] feature) is theoretically immaterial, in the first place—strengthening the
need for a unified account.
If ϕ-features are organized in a feature-geometry (Harley and Ritter , McGinnis ,
Béjar and Rezac ), then relativized probing accounts naturally for the subset-superset
relations among the kinds of phrases skipped by diﬀerent probes: if a probe like English Infl0 is
relativized to [ϕ], which dominates the [participant] node to which Kichean Infl0 is relativized,
then the kinds of phrases skipped by the former will be a proper subset of the kinds of phrases
skipped by the latter.
From this perspective, the singling out of patterns like the Kichean one examined here (as
well as the Georgian pattern examined in §.) as “omnivorous agreement” is misleading; on
the current view, all probes are “omnivorous”—it is just that diﬀerent probes are relativized
to diﬀerent features, resulting in diﬀerent patterns of what is and is not skippable.
.... The derivation of omnivorous person in Agent-Focus
Let us now turn to a more detailed illustration of the relevant derivations in Agent-Focus
clauses in Kichean. Given a clause structure along the lines of (), below, the subject is closer
to the [participant] probe (i.e., Infl0) than the object is:
() basic clause structure
InflP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
objV0
· · ·
subj
· · ·
Infl0
[participant?]
The probe therefore inspects the subject first. If the subject is st/nd-person—and thus, bears
a [participant] feature—the probe will find what it is looking for on the subject, and the object
will not be probed:
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() scenario A: st/nd-person subject
InflP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
objV0
· · ·
subj1st/2nd
· · ·
Infl0
[participant?]
This is akin to the behavior of the interrogative C0 probe in cases where the subject is a
wh-phrase—as in (a), above.
If, on the other hand, the subject is rd-person, the [participant] probe will ignore it
(much like interrogative C0 skipping a non-wh constituent), and move on to inspect the object.
Thus, the probe will able to reflect [participant] features found on the object just as it would
[participant] features found on the subject:
() scenario B: rd-person subject, st/nd-person object
InflP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
obj1st/2ndV0
· · ·
subj3rd
· · ·
Infl0
[participant?]
Thus, the agreement markers found in an example like () and in an example like ()
(agreement with a nd-person subject, and with a nd-person object, respectively) are quite
literally instances of the same features being expressed on the same probe; they just happen to
have been found on diﬀerent noun-phrases, in each of the two cases.
Recall that the forms of the agreement markers in the Agent-Focus construction do not
depend on whether it was the subject or object that bore the relevant person features (contra
the hypothetical—and unattested—pseudo-Kaqchikel, discussed in §.., which would exhibit
omnivorous person eﬀects, but where the form of the resulting agreement markers would still
vary depending on whether the relevant features were found on the subject or on the object).
Under this approach, the reason for this is that there is simply no “record” on the probe of
where it happened to find the features that it was seeking.
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The reader will also notice that this result would not change if we were to follow Béjar
and Rezac’s () Cyclic Agree proposal in assuming that the relevant ϕ-probe is not Infl0,
but instead some node located between the subject and object—such that the object is probed
first, and the subject is probed (via Cyclic Expansion) only if the features sought were not
found on the object. The logical progression outlined in (–) would run in reverse, but
would generate omnivorous person eﬀects all the same. Given this equivalence, and in the
interest of establishing a parallelism with wh-probing (as detailed in §..., above), I will
adhere throughout this thesis to the account where both potential targets are situated below
the ϕ-probe—though as far as I can tell, nothing crucially hinges on this choice.
An important benefit of the relativized probing account proposed here involves the person
restriction presented in () (and demonstrated in (–), above)—repeated here:
() Agent-Focus person restriction
In the Agent-Focus construction in Kichean, at most one of the two core arguments can
be st/nd-person. [Davies and Sam-Colop , Dayley , Norman and Campbell ,
Smith-Stark , Stiebels ]
On the current relativized probing approach, the probe only ever enters into an agreement
relation with one nominal target; in particular, when Infl0 exhibits agreement with the object,
it is because it has skipped the subject altogether (in much the same way that a C0 dislocating
a wh-phrase in object position skips a non-wh subject altogether).
It is often argued that speech-act participants (i.e., st/nd-person pronouns) must be
formally licensed by entering into an agreement relation with an appropriate functional
projection. This assumption is part and parcel of virtually every syntactic account of the Person
Case Constraint (PCC), for example (see §.. for an description of the PCC). For concreteness,
I will adopt Béjar and Rezac’s () formulation here:
() Person Licensing Condition (PLC)
Interpretable st/nd-person features must be licensed by entering into an Agree
relation with an appropriate functional category. [Béjar and Rezac ]
Given that () is motivated independently of Kichean in general and the Agent-Focus
construction in particular, we can apply it to the data at hand: to license both a st/nd-
person subject and a st/nd-person object in the same derivation, both DPs would have to
enter into an agreement relation. Suppose that the object is st/nd-person. Given (), this
means the object must enter into an agreement relation. Recall that given the current proposal,
Agent-Focus clauses that exhibit agreement with the object involve a probe that has skipped
the subject altogether.16 If so, the subject in the same clause cannot be of the kind that requires
its own licensing by way of agreement—in other words, it cannot be st/nd-person.
Conversely, if the subject is st/nd-person (i.e., the subject bears [participant], and is
therefore the kind of target that the probe is searching for), standardminimality considerations
apply. As a result, the single argument with which the probe enters into an agreement relation
must be the subject. Consequently, the object cannot be of the kind that requires its own
licensing by way of agreement—in other words, it cannot be st/nd-person.
16On the possibility that the ϕ-probe could exhibit overt agreement with the object, but also have entered
into an agreement relation with the subject (i.e.,Multiple Agree), see §..., below.
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Thus, the relativized probing approach sketched here, coupled with common assumptions
regarding the licensing of speech act participants (such as the PLC, in ()), derives the
restriction in () on argument/person combinations in the Agent-Focus construction.
In summary, I have argued in §..–§.. that the Kichean Agent-Focus construction
exhibits so-called “omnivorous person” eﬀects because of a ϕ-probe that is relativized to probe
specifically for [participant] features, resulting in rd-person arguments being skipped, just as
non-wh phrases are skipped by an interrogative C0 probe.
Non-DPs are also skipped by this ϕ-probe, just as they are in more familiar languages. Both
facts, I have argued, can be captured by specifying relativized probing according to a ϕ-feature
geometry (Harley and Ritter , McGinnis , Béjar and Rezac ). The more familiar
pattern involves relativized probing for [ϕ] (the feature that distinguishes nominals from
non-nominals), while “omnivorous person” is simply relativized probing for the [participant]
daughter-node of [ϕ], within the ϕ-feature geometry.
Finally, I have argued that the Agent-Focus person restriction in ()—the requirement
that at most one of the arguments in the Agent-Focus construction be st/nd-person—is
derivable on the current account, given fairly standard assumptions regarding the licensing
of st/nd-person arguments. In particular, the fact that the argument not agreed with in
this construction is actually skipped by the ϕ-probe entirely, coupled with the requirement
that st/nd-person arguments must be agreed with (the PLC, in ()), derives the observed
restriction.
There are obviously several issues that remain to be addressed, at this point—including a
discussion of Agent-Focus clauses involving two rd-person arguments, and the behavior of
number agreement the Agent-Focus construction. Before turning to these, however, I wish to
address several alternative analyses of this omnivorous person pattern, and discuss how each of
them fares.
... Some alternative approaches
.... Multiple Agree
The discussion in §.. took it for granted that what looks like a probe skipping a potential
target XP is really that. Probes like an interrogative C0 looking for [wh]-bearing XPs, or an Infl0
looking for [participant]-bearing DPs, appear to enter only into a single agreement relation—
with the appropriate target they eventually find.
This assumption can be questioned, however. There are proposals in the literature that
appeal to a one-to-many agreement relation between probes and goals, dubbedMultiple Agree
(Anagnostopoulou , Hiraiwa , , among others). In the spirit of these proposals,
one might hypothesize that the derivation of Agent-Focus clauses involving a rd-person
subject and a st/nd-person object involvesMultiple Agree of Infl0 with both core arguments:
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() InflP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
obj1st/2nd· · ·
subj3rd
· · ·
Infl0
There are several reasons to doubt such an analysis of omnivorous person in the Agent-Focus
construction, some of them theoretical and some empirical.
On the theoretical side, those cases thatMultiple Agree has been put forth to account for all
adhere to a particular restriction regarding the feature combinations borne by the diﬀerent
targets involved—namely, that the second target in a Multiple Agree relation cannot carry
ϕ-featural content that is not already present on the first target. This restriction is used by
Anagnostopoulou (), for example, in her account of the Person Case Constraint (PCC), to
rule out rd-person indirect objects (which lack [participant] features) occurring with st/nd-
person direct objects (which carry [participant] features), in configurations where the indirect
object is structurally higher than the direct object:
() a restriction on Multiple Agree (Anagnostopoulou )
Q
β1st/2nd
α3rd
F0
However, modulo diﬀerences in labeling, this is exactly the structural configuration we are
faced with in an example like (), repeated below as (): the probe dominates two possible
targets, the higher of which is rd-person (in this case, the subject), and the lower of which
is st/nd-person (in this case, the object). Crucially, the omnivorous person eﬀects, which
Multiple Agree would be an attempt to derive, still obtain in an example like ()—despite its
incompatibility with the restriction in ().
() ja
foc
ri
the
achin
man
x-at-axa-n
prfv-sg.abs-hear-af
rat
you(sg.)
‘It was the man that heard you(sg.).’ [=()]
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Thus, if the Multiple Agree relation responsible for omnivorous person in the Agent-Focus
construction is to be understood as the sameMultiple Agree relation proposed in the literature
(which obeys the restriction in ()), it cannot account for the observed facts in Kichean.
It is conceivable (if not theoretically pleasing) that there would be a second one-to-many
agreement relation—call it Multiple Agree2—that is not subject to the restriction exemplified
by (). Let us consider what the properties of Multiple Agree2 would have to be, in order
to account for the facts at hand. If Multiple Agree2 encounters a rd-person target first, it
keeps probing; a subsequent st/nd-person target will overwrite the values on the probe. If
it encounters a st/nd-person target first, it does not keep probing—or at least, subsequent
rd-person targets will not aﬀect the features on the probe (otherwise a st/nd-person subject
with a rd-person object would result in ‘sg.abs’ agreement, contra to fact; see (), above).
As far as I can see, this renders Multiple Agree2 almost identical to Single Agree, given
relativized probing (§..). This, coupled with the ad-hoc nature of Multiple Agree2 (in
particular, the ways in which it diﬀers from any kind ofMultiple Agree operation implicated in
the literature) might already constitute an argument againstMultiple Agree2.
Its theoretical status aside, there is an empirical argument against Multiple Agree2 as an
account of agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus construction. The argument comes from
the Agent-Focus person restriction presented in (), above (and demonstrated in (–)),
which prohibits more than one st/nd-person argument from appearing in the Agent-Focus
construction. In §.., I showed how a relativized probing account, where the probe only ever
enters into a relation with a single argument in the clause, is able to derive this restriction.
In particular, given that account, when the probe exhibits overt agreement with the object,
it has skipped the subject altogether. I then showed how given an independently motivated
assumption such as Béjar and Rezac’s () Person Licensing Condition (PLC), this relativized
probing account was able to derive the Agent-Focus person restriction.
The same cannot be done using Multiple Agree2: if the probe is able to agree with more
than one argument, then more than one argument can enter into an agreement relation with
the relevant functional category. If so, given the PLC, more than one argument should be
allowed to be st/nd-person, contra to fact (see the discussion of (), in §..).17
We could instead attempt to eschew the PLC, and derive the Agent-Focus person restriction
directly from the condition onMultiple Agreementioned earlier—namely, the requirement that
the second target in aMultiple Agree relation not bear any ϕ-featural content not already borne
by the first target. We have already seen that Kichean Agent-Focus can have a rd-person
subject with a st/nd-person object, in apparent violation of this requirement; but suppose
for a moment that rd-person targets were, in some sense, “ignored” for these purposes—
and that the eﬀects of this requirement were thus restricted to combinations of st-person and
nd-person arguments.
Given the ϕ-feature geometry presented in §.., the ϕ-features borne by nd-person
arguments (namely, {participant}) that is a proper subset of the ϕ-features borne by st-person
17One could entertain an elaboration of the PLC (in ()), whereby the agreement relation that licenses a
st/nd-person pronoun must have a distinct overt reflex—and that this is why Multiple Agree2 with both the
subject and the object cannot license both arguments, PLC-wise. I hope the reader would agree that at this
point, we will have reached a reductio of the Multiple Agree approach, where the “Multiple” part has been
voided of any testable consequence whatsoever.
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ones (namely, {participant, author}). Therefore, we would expect a nd-person argument to
be able to serve as the second target in a Multiple Agree relation where the first target was
a st-person argument; but this is not the attested behavior when it comes to the Agent-
Focus person restriction: the restriction is entirely symmetric, ruling out combinations of a
st-person subject with a nd-person object, as well as combinations of a nd-person subject
with a st-person object.
The same problem arises in an alternative ϕ-geometry, where nd-person arguments are
distinguished from st-person ones by an [addressee] feature borne by the former, but not by
the latter. In other words, to derive the Agent-Focus person restriction fromMultiple Agree, we
need a ϕ-geometry where neither st-person arguments nor nd-person ones bear a subset of
the ϕ-features of the other.
Conceivably, we could adopt a ϕ-geometry that includes both an [author] feature and an
[addressee] feature; thus, st-person arguments would be specified for {participant, author},
while nd-person ones would be specified for {participant, addressee}. The problem with this
alternative is the one identified by McGinnis (): in no language that lacks a distinction
between st-person inclusive and st-person exclusive, is the nd-person plural pronoun used to
refer to pluralities that include both the addressee and the speaker. Aϕ-geometry that includes
both [author] and [addressee] nodes, however, aﬀords this possibility;18 therefore, McGinnis
argues, the unmarked ϕ-geometry includes only an [author] node below [participant], and
an [addressee] node is only added by the learner in the face of positive evidence—namely,
a distinction between st-person inclusive and st-person exclusive. Crucially, Kichean lacks
such a distinction, meaning it cannot have both an [author] node and an [addressee] node in
its ϕ-geometry.
To summarize, a Multiple Agree approach to agreement in the Agent-Focus construction
would have to posit a new kind of one-to-many relation, which I have dubbedMultiple Agree2,
that diﬀers from the Multiple Agree relation found in the literature. The properties that one
would need to assume forMultiple Agree2 render it nearly indistinguishable from Single Agree,
given relativized probing (§..)—with one exception: Multiple Agree2 fares worse than Single
Agree in deriving the Agent-Focus person restriction.
It is beyond the scope of the current work to address the question of whetherMultiple Agree
is ever an available operation (see Haegeman and Lohndal  for discussion); the point of
this sub-section is merely to argue that it is not the correct account of agreement with Infl0 in
the Kichean Agent-Focus construction.
18To see this, suppose that the lexical entry for “we” was specified as {plural, participant}, while the lexical
entry for “y’all” was specified as {plural, participant, addressee}. Given a system where more specified lexical
entries take precedence over less specified ones (as is the case in Distributed Morphology, for example; Halle
and Marantz ), we predict that “y’all” would be used to refer to any plurality that includes the addressee.
It is conceivable, of course, that it is merely an idiosyncratic fact about the lexical entries of English pronouns
that “we” is specified for {plural, participant, author}, while “y’all” is specified only for {plural, participant};
but the fact that there is no language where pluralities that include both the addressee and the speaker are
collapsed with “pure” nd-person pluralities suggest that this is more than an idiosyncrasy—which is the core
of McGinnis’ () argument.
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.... Feature percolation
There is an approach to the omnivorous person eﬀects found in the Agent-Focus construction
that I have not discussed so far, involving so-called feature percolation. Suppose that features
from a given XP could, under certain circumstances, make their way (or “percolate”) onto the
YP node most closely dominating XP (see Chomsky , Cowper , Gazdar et al. ,
Grimshaw , Kayne , Webelhuth , among others):
() feature percolation
YP
XP{α,β, ...}
· · ·
Y0 ⇒
YP{α,β, ...}
XP{α,β, ...}
· · ·
Y0
It is not entirely clear that feature percolation is a needed or attested part of the syntactic
apparatus (see Heck , Cable , ). However, if it is, one might use it to derive
what looks like omnivorous agreement in the following fashion:
() omnivorous agreement as feature percolation: step 
vP
v’
VP
objϕ2V
0
v0
subjϕ1 ⇒
vPf (ϕ1, ϕ2)
v’
VP
objϕ2V
0
v0
subjϕ1
In the first step, features from both the subject and the object percolate to a node that
dominates both core arguments, as in (). Here, I have chosen vP as the dominating node
in question, though not much depends on this particular choice.
The precise feature-specification that results on vP will depend on how ϕ1 and ϕ2, the
feature-specifications of the subject and object, are combined to form a single feature bundle—
an issue to which I will return shortly. However, given that features from both the subject and
the object are now potentially present on vP, agreement of Infl0 with vP may result in the
appearance of omnivorous agreement—since the actual ϕ-features that find their way to Infl0
may have originated on either the subject or the object (the defining property of omnivorous
agreement).
() omnivorous agreement as feature percolation: step 
InflP
vPf (ϕ1, ϕ2)
v’
VP
objϕ2V
0
v0
subjϕ1
Infl0f (ϕ1, ϕ2)
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The crucial question then becomes what the function f (ϕ1, ϕ2) in (–) is, that combines
the feature bundles on the subject and object into a single feature bundle. The function in
question must be able to distinguish a pair of feature bundles like () from a pair like ()—
since the former is possible in the Agent-Focus construction, but the latter is not:
() subjectϕ1 objectϕ2
rd-person: Ø st-person:
{
participant
author
} (possible)
() subjectϕ1 objectϕ2
nd-person: {participant} st-person:
{
participant
author
} (ruled out)
In this system, [participant] and [author] features on the subject and object are never licensed
by direct agreement (cf. §..), since Infl0 never enters into agreement with the subject and
the object themselves; it only enters into an agreement relation with the node to which their
features have percolated (in this rendition, vP). If there is any agreement-based licensing of
these features, under this approach, it must take place at this higher node (vP); and since this
node invariably enters into an agreement relation with Infl0 (regardless of whether it is the
ϕ-features of the subject or the object that end up overtly represented on the probe), licensing
should always go through.
We would therefore need to stipulate an independent condition that governs which pairs
of feature bundles can and cannot enter into f (ϕ1, ϕ2), such that () is ruled out and () is
ruled in, for example. The condition required here is formally identical to the one required
by the Multiple Agree account (§...). Consequently, this account would raise the same
problems—namely, recourse to an extrinsic condition that amounts to listing admissible and
inadmissible combinations—in contrast to the Single Agree approach sketched in §.., which
derives these eﬀects with recourse only to the independently motivated PLC.
.... A positional account of omnivorous agreement
Another alternative to the relativized probing account presented in §.. is to assume that
agreement always targets the closest target—that is to say, “minimality, non-relativized”—
and that the omnivorous agreement eﬀects observed in Kichean Agent-Focus are the result
of [participant]-bearing arguments always moving closer to the probe than their non-
[participant] counterparts.
Consider Agent-Focus configurations where the verb ends up agreeing with the object—
namely, combinations of a rd-person subject with st/nd-person object. Suppose that in
these structures, the object moves across the subject prior to probing by Infl0:
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() InflP
FP
F’
vP
v’
VP
tobjV0
v0
subj
F0
obj
Infl0
If so, when Infl0 probes, it will target the object by virtue of minimality/Closest, and no
recourse to relativized probing is necessary:19
() InflP
FP
F’
vP
v’
VP
tobjV0
v0
subj
F0
obj
Infl0
Subsequent movement could undo the [object » subject] order created by (), so we might not
expect to see this order in the spelled out string.20
While I am not aware of any evidence in Kichean in favor of movement of the kind shown
in () (i.e., movement of the object across the subject, when the object but not the subject is
st/nd-person), that does not mean it does not occur. However, this analysis—even if true—
does not really do away with relativized probing (§..); it simply relegates it from Infl0 to
whatever triggers the movement of the object in ()—in this rendition, F0. The reason is that
F0 must be able to skip the subject and instead attract the object to [Spec,FP], exactly when the
object but not the subject carries a [participant] feature; but it must not do so when the subject
does carry a [participant] feature (otherwise, we would predict that Infl0 would invariably
exhibit object-agreement, contra to fact). In other words, this makes probing by F0 out to be
omnivorous.
19Here and throughout, I use Closest as a cover-term for the Minimal Link Condition (Chomsky b, et
seq.), or whatever alternative mechanism derives the same eﬀects (see also Richards ).
20For example, the variety of Kaqchikel discussed here exhibits Verb-Second behavior (Lauren Eby Clemens,
p.c.); in Kaqchikel, then, subsequent movement to the clause-initial, pre-verbal position may or may not undo
the [object » subject] order shown in (–), depending on which phrase it is that is fronted.
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To put it another way: this alternative involves a selective movement operation, whose
application facilitates a treatment of agreement by Infl0 as determined by minimality/Closest
alone, with no recourse to relativized probing by Infl0; but relativized probing is then required
to handle the behavior of the syntactic probe responsible for moving the relevant argument to
its closest-to-Infl0 position. Moreover, the same conclusions that will be argued in chapter 
to follow from the behavior of the ϕ-probe (Infl0) can be drawn on the basis of the behavior
of the movement probe (F0), if the alternative sketched here turns out to be independently
preferable.
Given that I know of no positive evidence in favor of this alternative (i.e., in support of
movement of the kind shown in ()), I will—at least for expository purposes—continue to
follow the variant presented in §.., rather than the alternative sketched here.
At this juncture, we have completed an initial analysis of the omnivorous person eﬀects
found in Kichean Agent-Focus. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, the behavior of
this construction with respect to failed agreement will prove crucial in teasing apart diﬀerent
possible accounts of the obligatory nature of agreement.
In fact, the ingredients needed to embark on such a discussion are now in place; however,
we have restricted our investigation so far to instances of the Agent-Focus construction where
all the arguments are singular. Therefore, in the interest of completeness, I turn first to the
analysis of number agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus.
.. Number in Kichean Agent-Focus
... The basic pattern
So far, we have been looking only at Agent-Focus clauses involving singular noun-phrases as
arguments. Let us now consider the behavior of number agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus.
In regular transitive clauses—those that do not involve Agent-Focus—Kichean exhibits
full number agreement with both core arguments (the subject and the object). The ergative
and absolutive agreement paradigms have diﬀerent forms depending on the plurality of the
corresponding arguments:
() Kaqchikel ergative agreement paradigm
sg pl
st -n/w- -q(a)-
nd -a(w)- -i(w)-
rd -r(u)/u- -k(i)-
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() Kaqchikel absolutive agreement paradigm
sg pl
st -i(n)- -oj-
nd -a(t)- -ix-
rd -Ø-21 -e-
This is demonstrated below using all four possible combinations involving a nd-person
subject and a st-person object (note that in Kichean, as in many other Mayan languages, the
absolutive agreement marker precedes the ergative one, resulting in an ‘-<obj>-<subj>-’ order
of agreement markers before the transitive verb; see Tada , Woolford ):
() a. x-in-aw-axa-j
prfv-sg.abs-sg.erg-see-act
‘You(sg.) heard me.’
b. x-oj-aw-axa-j
prfv-pl.abs-sg.erg-see-act
‘You(sg.) heard us.’
c. x-oj-iw-axa-j
prfv-pl.abs-pl.erg-see-act
‘Y’all heard us.’
d. x-in-iw-axa-j
prfv-sg.abs-pl.erg-see-act
‘Y’all heard me.’
As noted in §.., the Agent-Focus construction is characterized—among other things—
by the presence of only one agreement marker, taken from the absolutive series of morphemes,
despite the appearance of a non-oblique subject and a non-oblique object.
If we view the “omnivorous person” eﬀects discussed in §. as a response to this
constriction, in the domain of person agreement, then we might expect a similar response
in the domain of number agreement. In other words, we might expect Kichean Agent-Focus
to exhibit “omnivorous number”, as well. If we look at Agent-Focus clauses involving only
rd-person arguments, this is precisely what we find:22
() Ja
foc
rje’
them
x-e/*Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/*sg.abs-see-af
rja’
him
’It was them who saw him.’
() Ja
foc
rja’
him
x-e/*Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/*sg.abs-see-af
rje’
them
’It was him who saw them.’
21I will argue in chapter  that in Kichean, there is no rd-person singular absolutive marker per se, and
the absence of phonological material in what we would descriptively call the “sg cell” of this paradigm arises
as the result of a failure to locate an agreement target bearing [participant] or [plural] features.
22As pointed out to me by Robert Henderson (p.c.), the behavior of plural agreement with inanimate
absolutives in Kaqchikel follows a more complicated pattern, and appears at least in some cases to be optional.
I therefore concentrate on animate arguments, here. Thanks to Daeyoung Sohn for help with these data.
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As (–) show, the Agent-Focus verb will exhibit plural agreement regardless of whether
the plural argument is the subject or the object (precisely the definition of omnivorous number,
following Nevins ; see §.).
Crucially, however, these eﬀects seem to disappear in the presence of st/nd-person
arguments; in particular, if there is an argument that controls overt person agreement on the
Agent-Focus verb (in the manner discussed and analyzed in §.), the same argument also
determines number agreement on the verb—regardless of the plurality of the other argument
in the clause. Thus, a rd-plural argument will fail to trigger plural agreement on the verb in
the presence of a st-singular or nd-singular argument, regardless of which of the two is the
subject and which is the object:
() a. Ja
foc
rje’
them
x-i-tz’et-ö
prfv-sg.abs-see-af
yïn
me
’It was them who saw me.’
b. * Ja
foc
rje’
them
x-oj/Ø/e-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/sg/pl.abs-see-af
yïn
me
() a. Ja
foc
yïn
me
x-i-tz’et-ö
prfv-sg.abs-see-af
rje’
them
’It was me who saw them.’
b. * Ja
foc
yïn
me
x-oj/Ø/e-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/sg/pl.abs-see-af
rje’
them
() a. Ja
foc
rje’
them
x-a-tz’et-ö
prfv-sg.abs-see-af
rat
you
’It was them who saw you.’
b. * Ja
foc
rje’
them
x-ix/Ø/e-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/sg/pl.abs-see-af
rat
you
() a. Ja
foc
rat
you
x-a-tz’et-ö
prfv-sg.abs-see-af
rje’
them
’It was you who saw them.’
b. * Ja
foc
rat
you
x-ix/Ø/e-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/sg/pl.abs-see-af
rje’
them
It is not the case, however, that st/nd-person arguments inhibit plural agreement altogether;
if the st/nd-person argument itself is plural, it will trigger plural agreement, regardless of
the number features of the other core argument (for the sake of brevity, only the counterpart
of () is given here; other combinations behave analogously, and the full range of logical
combinations is summarized in (), below):
() a. Ja
foc
rja’
him
x-oj-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl.abs-see-af
röj
us
’It was him who saw us.’
b. * Ja
foc
rja’
him
x-i/Ø/e-tz’et-ö
prfv-sg/sg/pl.abs-see-af
röj
us
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The full paradigm of agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus construction, as a function of
the ϕ-features of the subject and the object, is given below:
() full agreement paradigm for Kichean Agent-Focus
{subj, obj} ϕ-features ⇒ agreement morphology
on the Agent-Focus verb
{sg, sg} ⇒ sg
{pl, sg} ⇒ pl
{pl, pl} ⇒ pl
{sg, sg} ⇒ sg
{sg, sg} ⇒ sg
{pl, sg} ⇒ pl
{pl, sg} ⇒ pl
{sg, pl} ⇒ sg
{sg, pl} ⇒ sg
{pl, pl} ⇒ pl
{pl, pl} ⇒ pl
Notes:
a. In the notation {ϕ1, ϕ2}, above, which of the ϕ-feature specifications belongs to the
subject and which to the object is fully commutative.
b. Combinations not listed here are ruled out either on binding-theoretic grounds (e.g.
{sg, pl}), or due to the Agent-Focus person restriction (e.g. {sg, sg}; see (), in §..).
The facts summarized in () have led some scholars to claim that agreement in the Kichean
Agent-Focus construction obeys a “salience” hierarchy (Dayley , Mondloch , Norman
and Campbell , Smith-Stark ; and see Stiebels  for a recent review):
() “salience” hierarchy in Kichean Agent-Focus
st/nd-person≫ rd-plural≫ rd-singular
The theoretical status of scales (or “salience” hierarchies) such as (), as explanations for
patterns of agreement, will be addressed in detail in §... For the time being, however, I wish
to highlight a specific drawback of viewing agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus through the
prism in (): it misses an important fact about the morpho-phonology of agreement in Agent-
Focus clauses, and of absolutive agreement in Kichean in general: st/nd-person absolutive
agreement markers in Kichean bear a striking similarity to the corresponding strong pronouns,
while the rd-person ones do not (the relevant data are presented in §.., below).
The reason an approach based on () cannot capture these morpho-phonological
distinctions is because () is designed to factor out the choice of which argument will be
targeted from ϕ-agreement itself. In other words, () treats agreement in Agent-Focus
clauses with diﬀerent ϕ-featural combinations as a uniform phenomenon, but for the choice
of agreement target. An examination of the morpho-phonology of the resulting agreement
markers reveals that this is not the case. This is the topic of the next sub-section.
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... The morpho-phonology of Kichean agreement morphology
As noted above, some (but not all) absolutive agreement markers in Kichean bear a striking
resemblance to the corresponding strong pronouns. Take Kaqchikel, for example—compare
the series of absolutive agreement markers in Kaqchikel to the corresponding strong pronouns:
() a comparison of strong pronouns and absolutive agreement morphemes
abs
agreement
marker
strong
pronoun
sg -i(n)- yïn
pl -oj- röj
sg -a(t)- rat
pl -ix- rïx
sg -Ø-23 rja’
pl -e- rje’
In the st/nd-person, the strong pronouns are identical to the absolutive agreement
morphemes but for the addition of an initial approximant (the liquid “r-” or the glide “y-”).24
Notice that with the exception of the st-singular (“yïn”), all Kaqchikel pronouns—even those
in the rd-person—begin with “r-”, which is likely a truncated version of the determiner “ri”.
Assuming that this is indeed the source of this initial approximant, we could then say that
st/nd-person absolutive agreement morphemes in Kaqchikel are determiner-less versions of
the strong pronouns.
This is, admittedly, a small sample to begin with; the comparison of st/nd-person
pronouns and their absolutive agreement counterparts involves four pair-wise comparisons,
and one of them—the st-singular pronoun “yïn”—shows a slight deviation from the general
pattern. Therefore, it is instructive to consider what a paradigm in which such similarity were
not found would look like, to convince ourselves that there is indeed something significant
about (). Fortunately, Kaqchikel itself aﬀords us an adequate control, in the form of the
series of ergative agreement morphemes:
23See fn. .
24I suspect that this has been noticed by virtually every scholar who has ever worked on Kichean; the first
mention of it that I was able to locate, with the help of Robert Henderson, is by Kaufman (). A similar
observation is reported by Woolford (:fn. ), in support of her argument that the absolutive agreement
morphemes in Kichean are clitics.
OMNIVOROUS AGREEMENT IN THE KICHEAN AGENT-FOCUS CONSTRUCTION 
() a comparison of strong pronouns and ergative agreement morphemes
erg
agreement
marker
strong
pronoun
sg -n/w- yïn
pl -q(a)- röj
sg -a(w)- rat
pl -i(w)- rïx
sg -r(u)/u- rja’
pl -k(i)- rje’
When juxtaposed with (), it becomes quite clear that the similarities in () are more than a
coincidence.
I will assume here that the change in the quality of the approximant in the st-singular
pronoun “yïn” (from “r-” to “y-”) has a phonological source, at least diachronically; in any
event, even with this minor complication, the st-singular conforms to the more general
pattern whereby the absolutive agreement morpheme is identical to the strong pronoun with
its initial approximant truncated. The exceptions to this generalization are the rd-singular
and rd-plural forms, repeated here:
() strong pronouns and absolutive agreement morphemes – rd-person
abs
agreement
marker
strong
pronoun
sg -Ø-25 rja’
pl -e- rje’
There is no trace of the [a] vowel of the rd-singular pronoun “rja’” in the rd-singular
absolutive agreement morpheme; and we can be reasonably certain that the issue is not a
phonological one, since as shown by the rd-plural absolutive agreement morpheme, a lone
vowel can survive in the phonological environments occupied by the absolutive agreement
marker. Moreover, the consonant [j ], found in both rd-person pronominal forms, is not found
in either of the rd-person absolutive agreement morphemes.
It is clear, then, that the rd-person absolutive agreement morphemes do not stand in the
same relation to their pronominal counterparts as the st/nd-person ones do. On the other
hand, in contrast to their st/nd-person counterparts, these rd-person forms might contain
hints of independent number morphology. To see this, consider first the st/nd-person forms
once more:
25See fn. .
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() strong pronouns and absolutive agreement morphemes – st/nd-person
abs
agreement
marker
strong
pronoun
sg -i(n)- yïn
pl -oj- röj
sg -a(t)- rat
pl -ix- rïx
One of the interesting properties of the forms in () is that there is no identifiable “plural
morpheme”; the alternation between singular and plural forms in () is entirely suppletive.
In (), on the other hand, we may be able to identify an “-e” suﬃx which indicates
plurality: in the agreement morphology column, this suﬃx turns the (empty) “-Ø-” rd-
singular marker into “-e-”, the rd-plural marker; in the pronoun column, it turns “rja’”
(‘him’) into “rje’” (‘them’), perhaps via an intermediate step of [a]-deletion. There is also
evidence from otherMayan languages that the so-called rd-person plural absolutive agreement
marker is really just a generic plural marker: in Tzotzil (a Mayan language of the Tseltalan
family), for example, the pl absolutive marker “-ik” can also be used to encode the plurality
of nd-person plural arguments, in the event that person agreement with those arguments has
been spelled out elsewhere (see Aissen , Woolford to appear; see §.A for details).
We have seen that st/nd-person absolutive agreement markers in Kichean are simply
reduced forms of the corresponding pronouns, while the rd-person ones are not. Moreover,
we have seen that the diﬀerence between the rd-person plural absolutive agreement marker
and its singular counterpart might be analyzable as an independent plural morpheme in the
language (namely, “-e-”), whereas the st/nd-person absolutive agreement markers encode
number in an entirely suppletive fashion, with no identifiable sub-part corresponding to the
singular/plural distinction.
The absolutive agreementmarkers that arise when the agreement target is a st/nd-person
argument thus diﬀer, in their morpho-phonological properties, from the markers that arise
when the target is a rd-person argument.
An analysis of agreement in Kichean should account for this; in the next section, I
present an account that derives these distinctions, arguing that the st/nd-person absolutive
agreement markers arise through clitic-doubling of the relevant argument (which is why they
are, quite literally, reduced pronouns), whereas the rd-person ones are just the spellout of a
particular ϕ-probe. Importantly, the account does not require any new syntactic machinery,
and is based entirely on the results of §., when combined with Béjar and Rezac’s ()
proposal on person and number agreement.
.. A derivational account of absolutive agreement in Kichean
Consider once more the possibility of analyzing agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus using
scales or “salience” hierarchies, of the kind given in () and repeated here:
() “salience” hierarchy in Kichean Agent-Focus
st/nd-person≫ rd-plural≫ rd-singular
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In such an approach, the choice of which argument will be agreed with is an autonomous
component of ϕ-agreement, governed by a mechanism along the lines of (). In other words,
ϕ-agreement is treated as a uniform phenomenon, but for the choice of agreement target.
Recall the distinctions observed in §..: the st/nd-person agreement markers resemble
the corresponding strong pronouns, whereas rd-person ones do not; st/nd-person ones
encode number suppletively, while rd-person ones may not. To explain these distinctions,
an approach along these lines would not only have to stipulate () itself26—it would need a
separate stipulation to account for why the first member of the hierarchy gives rise to diﬀerent
morpho-phonology than the other two members of the hierarchy do.
The same morpho-phonological distinctions in the form of the absolutive agreement
markers are found in regular transitives and intransitives in Kichean (i.e., outside of the Agent-
Focus construction)—since after all, Agent-Focusmakes use of the standard series of absolutive
agreement paradigm in each Kichean language. If these morpho-phonological distinctions
come from (), it would be unexpected to find them in a domain where there are no actual
hierarchy eﬀects to speak of, and the subject and object are each rigidly co-indexed by a single
agreement marker—as is the case with regular transitives and intransitives in Kichean.
If, on the other hand, these morpho-phonological distinctions have a diﬀerent underlying
source, then it is worth wondering whether this same source can also account for the very
eﬀects that () was posited to account for—rendering () redundant (as well as any attempt
to derive () from other sources, such as Stiebels  for example). In the sub-sections that
follow, I propose an account of exactly this sort for the interaction of person and number in
Kichean Agent-Focus—one that does notmake reference to scales or “salience” hierarchies, and
which derives the observed morpho-phonological distinctions in the forms of the absolutive
agreement markers in Kichean in and outside of the Agent-Focus construction.
The proposal is closely based upon Béjar and Rezac’s () account of the Person Case
Constraint (PCC), a phenomenon which has already been mention in connection with the
Agent-Focus person restriction (in §..), and will be explained in detail below. There are,
of course, many competing accounts of the PCC in the literature, each with its own advantages
and disadvantages, and its own particular set of stipulations (a non-exhaustive list includes
Adger and Harbour , Anagnostopoulou , , Bonet , , Nevins , ,
Richards , Walkow to appear). What is interesting about Béjar and Rezac’s account, for
the current purposes, is this: despite the fact that the Kichean data at hand is superficially
quite diﬀerent from PCC-related interactions among multiple internal arguments, it turns out
that their account derives the behavior of agreement in the Agent-Focus construction—with
hardly any modifications that have not already been motivated in the course of the discussion
in §..
In other words, I will show that given the results of §., combined with Béjar and Rezac’s
account, the behavior of agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus construction falls out naturally.
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the importance—in this context—of having an
adequate account of agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus is to set the stage for a comparison
among the diﬀerent models of agreement surveyed in chapter , a comparison that will be
carried out in detail in the next chapter.
26See §.., on why the scale in () cannot actually be a matter of cognitive salience.
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... The PCC, and Béjar and Rezac’s () account of it
The Person Case Constraint (PCC) is the name for a family of restrictions involving the person
features of arguments in relation to one another, usually aﬀecting the two internal arguments
of a ditransitive. In this sub-section, I present first a description of the PCC itself, and then
Béjar and Rezac’s () account of it.27
I will illustrate the PCC using Basque, which exhibits the so-called “strong” version of the
constraint:
() the “strong” PCC in Basque
In Basque clauses in which a dative argument is higher than the absolutive argument
(which includes all Basque ditransitives), the absolutive must be rd-person.
[see Rezac b; definition of “strong” PCC follows Bonet :]
The eﬀects of () are most strikingly illustrated using what Rezac (b) calls applicative
unaccusatives: verbs that take two internal arguments, but no external argument. These verbs
come in two types in Basque: one type in which the dative argument is structurally higher than
the absolutive one, and another type in which these hierarchical relations are reversed. The
latter option arises only with applicative unaccusatives, never with true (triadic) ditransitives
(Rezac b:).
Rezac provides a battery of diagnostics that elucidate which of the two hierarchical
configurations is realized with a given applicative unaccusative verb (Rezac b:–).
Using these diagnostics, the Basque verb “gusta” (‘like’) can be shown to be a dative-over-
absolutive verb; as such, it exhibits the PCC eﬀect described in (): the absolutive argument
of “gusta” must be rd-person, as in ().
() Miren-i
Miren-dat
gozoki-ak
sweet-artpl(abs)
gusta-tzen
like-impf
Ø-zai-zki-o.
.abs-√ -pl.abs-sg.dat
‘Miren likes candy.’
() */?? Ni
me(abs)
Miren-i
Miren-dat
gusta-tzen
like-impf
na-tzai-Ø-o.
.abs-√ -sg.abs-sg.dat
‘Miren likes me.’ [Albizu :, Rezac :]
As shown by Albizu () and Rezac (b), these applicative unaccusatives provide a
particularly vivid illustration of the deeply syntactic nature of the PCC. That is because the
very same auxiliary form that is impossible in () can be used felicitously with an absolutive-
over-dative verb, where it successfully expresses the very same ϕ-feature combination that it
fails to express in ():
() Ni
me(abs)
Peru-ri
Peru-dat
hurbildu
approach
na-tzai-Ø-o.
.abs-√ -sg.abs-sg.dat
‘I approached Peru.’ [Rezac b:]
27The Person Licensing Condition (PLC), referenced in §.., is part of Béjar and Rezac’s () account, as
will be shown below.
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The fact that the very same auxiliary that is ruled out by the PCC in () can be used felicitously
in () all but eliminates any possibility of accounting for the PCC as a morphological filter
(cf. Bonet , ).
There are other properties of the Basque data in (–) that are worth noting, especially
for readers more familiar with the Indo-European pattern. As argued by Arregi and Nevins
(, in prep.) and in Preminger , the dative and ergative agreement morphemes on
the Basque auxiliary come about by way of clitic-doubling of the relevant full noun-phrase (e.g.
“Peru-ri” ‘Peru-dat’, in ()); but unlike the patterns of clitic-doubling familiar fromRomance
or Greek for example, these instances of clitic-doubling are not conditioned by any semantic
property of the noun-phrase in question. The dative argument can be animate or inanimate,
new or given, specific or non-specific, etc.; it will undergo clitic-doubling all the same. The
only conditions on clitic-doubling in Basque are structural ones (roughly, the availability of a
clausemate host; see Preminger ).
The agreement morphemes identified by Arregi and Nevins and in Preminger  as
clitics obey none of the semantic restrictions on clitic-doubling that are familiar from Indo-
European, yet they exhibit all of the morpho-syntactic properties known to distinguish
cliticization from agreement (see Anagnostopoulou , Arregi and Nevins in prep., and
references therein). What this suggests is that the semantic properties associated with clitic-
doubling in Indo-European (see Suñer , and subsequent literature) are not intrinsic
properties of clitic-doubling, per se. Instead, the availability of clitic-doubling seems to vary
cross-linguistically from completely impossible (English, some varieties of Italian, etc.), to
semantically restricted (Spanish, Greek), to completely unrestricted (Basque).28
A related diﬀerence between the Basque pattern and some of the more familiar Indo-
European patterns concerns the obligatoriness of clitic-doubling: the dative clitics found in
Basque, including in () and (), are in no way optional. The presence of these clitics on the
finite auxiliary is a necessary condition for grammaticality, regardless of whether or not the full
noun-phrase is pro-dropped. Cross-linguistically, obligatory clitic-doubling is not unique to
Basque; as noted by Arregi and Nevins (in prep.), it is also attested with strong object pronouns
in Spanish (Jaeggli , Suñer ), as well as with all subjects in certain Northern Italian
dialects (Poletto ).
This is why, traditionally, the morphemes that arise as the result of this process are
sometimes referred to as “indirect object agreement”, to highlight their obligatory nature.
Turning now to Béjar and Rezac’s () account (henceforth, B&R): the point of departure
is the idea that the ϕ-probe for person probes separately from—and prior to—the ϕ-probe
for number. The ability of person and number to probe separately from each other has been
argued for—in one form or another—by many authors, including Anagnostopoulou (),
Béjar (), Chomsky (), Laka (a), Shlonsky (), Sigurðsson (), Sigurðsson
and Holmberg (), and Taraldsen ().
28A way of making sense of languages like Spanish or Greek, against the backdrop of this typology, is by
recasting the semantic properties in question in structural terms. Clitic-doubling in Romance, for example,
seems to be conditioned by the specificity of the doubled noun-phrase (Suñer ); if specific noun-phrases
are located higher in the structure than non-specific ones (following Diesing ), then even the sensitivity
of clitic-doubling to the specificity of the doubled noun-phrase can be thought of purely in terms of locality
(crucially, locality restrictions on clitic-doubling are observable even in Basque, where the semantic restrictions
on clitic-doubling are absent; see Preminger ).
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The order of probing, in B&R’s system, is achieved by extrinsically ordering the diﬀerent
ϕ-features that occupy a single syntactic head, such that person is ordered before number.29
Here, I deviate from their implementation slightly, by simply placing the two probes on
separate syntactic heads (see also Béjar ): pi0 will be the head that probes for person
features, and #0 will be the head that probes for number features. If we assume pi0 must
be merged before #0, then by virtue of cyclicity, pi0 must probe first. To some extent, this is
an expository issue: we have replaced one stipulation, involving the order in which multiple
features located on a single head engage in probing, with another stipulation, namely the order
in which pi0 and #0 must be merged. Note, however, that stipulations regarding the order of
merger of diﬀerent heads are commonplace in syntactic theory (cf. the ordering of functional
projections along the spine of a single clause).
Note also that within a feature-geometric approach to ϕ-features, of the kind pursued
in §.., the existence of ϕ-probes that probe only for person features or only for number
features is just another instance of relativized probing. Recall the ϕ-feature geometry
presented in §..., following Harley and Ritter (), McGinnis (), and Béjar and
Rezac (), and repeated here:
29At first glance, there seems to be an inherent tension between Béjar and Rezac’s () proposal and that
of Sigurðsson andHolmberg (). While both argue for a separation between person and numberϕ-probes—
and Sigurðsson and Holmberg go as far as to place the two in separate syntactic heads, which they label Pn0
and Nr0—the internal ordering seems to be at odds. As noted above, Béjar and Rezac argue that person probes
before number. Sigurðsson and Holmberg’s Nr0, on the other hand, is merged before Pn0; and so, by virtue of
cyclicity, Nr0 probes first.
I am not entirely convinced, however, that this tension is real. Both sets of authors are interested in
explaining why dative noun-phrases intervene in person probing, but not number probing. For Béjar and
Rezac, this is achieved by person probing first, and triggering clitic-doubling of the dative, rendering it
invisible by the time number probes (this will be described in more detail, below). For Sigurðsson and
Holmberg, this is achieved by the dative intervener moving to a position higher than Nr0, but still lower
than Pn0. So in one account, the intervener stays in situ, and number intervention is avoided through clitic-
doubling; and in the other, the intervener moves across one of the probes, and therefore avoids intervening
for the purposes of that probe. The two sets of authors are obviously addressing diﬀerent data sets: PCC
eﬀects in Indo-European, as well as Basque and Georgian, for the former, and agreement with low nominatives
in Icelandic, for the latter; and it is independently observable that clitics occur in PCC contexts, and that
Icelandic datives undergo A-movement.
However, it might be the case that the two approaches are more similar than they first seem to be. First, as
Boeckx () and Anagnostopoulou () have noted, the desideratum is quite similar: an argument that is
separated from the ϕ-probe by a dative (the Theme of a ditransitive, or a low nominative in Icelandic) can be
agreed with for number, but not for person. If a coherent view of clitic-doubling as XP movement is possible
(as has been argued by Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou , Anagnostopoulou , Sportiche , ,
among others), then we might be able to view these two seemingly opposed analyses as merely notational
variants of one another: in both cases, the intervener moves to a position where it can no longer be probed by
number (in the PCC case, this is because it has adjoined to a head on the clausal spine; in the Icelandic case,
it has simply moved across the probe itself); and so, when number probes, the intervener acts as if it is simply
not there.
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() a simplified ϕ-feature geometry [=()]
[ϕ]
[number]
[plural]
[person]
[participant]
[author]
Given (), if a ϕ-probe can be relativized to the [participant] node (as was argued in §..
to be the case in Kichean), as well as to the [ϕ] node (as was argued to be the case in English),
then the possibility of a probe being relativized to the [person] node (which corresponds to
Béjar and Rezac’s  “[pi]” node), or to the [number] node (which corresponds to Harley
and Ritter’s  “[individuation]” node), should be equally available—giving rise to the
person and number probes pi0 and #0, described above.
We are now in a position to present B&R’s analysis of the PCC (which as mentioned earlier,
will serve as the basis for a unified account of person and number agreement, once we return
to Kichean Agent-Focus). Consider the base-generated structure of a verb-phrase with two
internal arguments (as is the case in ditransitives, or in applicative unaccusatives), in which the
dative argument is structurally higher than the Theme:30
() two internal arguments: base-generation
ApplP
dat-argAppl’
Appl0VP
V0theme
Next, pi0 is merged, and probes for person features. The presence of a dative argument that is
structurally closer than the Theme results in defective intervention:
30Since diagrams like () are meant to represent the structure of Basque sentences like (–), these
structures are head-final—though nothing in the analysis hinges on this.
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() two internal arguments: person probing
piP
pi0ApplP
dat-argAppl’
Appl0VP
V0theme
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It is cross-linguistically quite common for dative nominals to be unable to transfer their actual
ϕ-feature values to the clausal ϕ-probe. This issue will be taken up in more detail in chapter ;
but for the current purposes, it means that pi0 in () will be unable to reflect anything other
than the unmarked feature combination—namely, rd-person—regardless of the features of
the dative nominal itself. More importantly, pi0 has failed to enter into a formal relation
with the Theme argument; given the PLC, presented in §. and repeated in (), st/nd-
person Theme arguments can no longer be licensed. These two eﬀects—the absence of person
agreement, and the inability to license non-rd-person Theme arguments—together constitute
the Person Case Constraint (PCC).
() Person Licensing Condition (PLC) [=()]
Interpretable st/nd-person features must be licensed by entering into an Agree
relation with an appropriate functional category. [Béjar and Rezac ]
Importantly, had the dative argument not been present, pi0 in () would have been able
to probe the Theme, and these eﬀects would not arise; this is how B&R derive the fact that
the PCC is typically confined to verb-phrases with two internal arguments, rather than one
(i.e., the fact that these restrictions on the [person] of the Theme disappear in the absence of a
Source/Goal argument).
Continuing the derivation in (), the fact that the dative is probed by pi0, according to
B&R, also triggers clitic-doubling of the dative—resulting in a clitic on pi0 that reflects the
full ϕ-set of the dative argument. Recall from the earlier discussion that this clitic-doubling
process—at least, in a language like Basque—is neither optional, nor is it conditioned by
particular semantic properties of the doubled noun-phrase (such as specificity or animacy),
yielding so-called “indirect object agreement”.
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() two internal arguments: person probing of dative⇒ clitic-doubling
piP
pi0–cl[ϕi]ApplP
<dat-arg[ϕi]>Appl’
Appl0VP
V0theme
clit
ic-
dou
bli
ng
There is an implicit property of B&R’s account that I would like to make explicit, at this
juncture: in (), the dative argument is probed by pi0, a head that only probes for person
features (as discussed earlier); however, it is more than just the person features of the dative
argument that are morphologically reflected on-or-near pi0—in the form of a clitic—in ().
The pronominal form created when the dative argument is probed reflects the entire ϕ-feature
set of the dative argument, not just its person features.
This might seem trivial, if one thinks of clitic-doubling in terms of pronominalization—
but it is worth highlighting, for reasons that will become apparent once we return to Kichean.
Further support for this particular distinction between clitic-doubling and “pure” agreement
will be provided in §..; for now, in the context of B&R’s account of the PCC, I will take it as
a given.
It is well-established in the literature on clitic-doubling that the doubled noun-phrase
behaves like the trace of an A-chain—for example, for binding-theoretic purposes (Alexiadou
and Anagnostopoulou , Anagnostopoulou , Sportiche , ). Another aspect of
the behavior of the full noun-phrase under clitic-doubling that recalls the behavior of A-traces
is that it ceases to count as an intervener for the purposes of A-movement and agreement (see
Anagnostopoulou ; cf. Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir  on A-traces). The generated clitic
cannot intervene either, presumably because it is head-adjoined to its host (this means that
viewing clitic-doubling as a movement chain per se is problematic, since it would constitute a
chain whose tail is phrasal but whose head is not; see Anagnostopoulou , and references
therein, for discussion).
As a result, when #0 is merged, it is able to probe the Theme—and so no analogous eﬀects
arise with respect to number:
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() two internal arguments: number probing
#P
#0piP
pi0–cl[ϕi]ApplP
<dat-arg[ϕi]>Appl’
Appl0VP
V0theme
This asymmetry between person and number—and in particular, the cross-linguistic absence
of a Number Case Constraint, analogous to the PCC—is the reason for B&R’s stipulation about
the order of ϕ-probing (namely, person before number). While this ordering is stipulative
in the context of accounting for the PCC, the success of PCC accounts that adopt it (see also
Anagnostopoulou ) can be seen as support for applying a similarly ordered derivation to
other empirical domains, which is exactly the approach pursued in §.. (though see Nevins
,  for a dissenting view).
Let us review the results of the derivation sketched in (–). First, in the absence
of a dative argument, both the person probe (pi0) and the number probe (#0) would probe
the Theme argument without impediment; the resulting feature values on the probes would
therefore faithfully reflect the ϕ-features of the Theme.
In the presence of a dative argument, however, probing by the person probe (pi0)—which
probes first by stipulation—fails to reach the Theme, targeting the closer dative argument
instead. This triggers clitic-doubling of the dative argument, resulting in a pronominal form
that reflects the entire ϕ-set of the dative argument (and not just its person features), and
sometimes identified as “indirect object agreement”. As far as the features on the person
probe (i.e., on pi0 itself, rather than on the dative clitic) are concerned, these will not be
st/nd-person—regardless of the actual ϕ-features of the dative nominal, or of the Theme;
that is because the closer dative prevents pi0 from targeting the Theme, but cannot transmit
its own feature values to the ϕ-probe (this property of datives will be explored in detail in
chapter ). Finally, having been clitic-doubled, the dative argument is rendered invisible for
the purposes of intervention; thus, by the time the number probe (#0) scans the structure, it is
able to successfully target the Theme argument.
In summary, the following agreementmorphology has been generated: (i) the same person-
morphology as one finds with a rd-person Theme in a mono-transitive (which by virtue
of the PLC, forces the Theme to indeed be rd-person, hence the Person Case Constraint);
(ii) number-morphology that faithfully reflects the number features of the Theme; (iii) a clitic
that reflects the full ϕ-set of the dative argument.
As mentioned earlier, B&R’s proposal, when combined with the results of §., yields
a complete account of ϕ-agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus—one that derives the so-called
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scale or hierarchy eﬀects, but crucially, also accounts for the morpho-phonological distinctions
observed in §. between the st/nd-person agreement markers found in the Kichean Agent-
Focus construction, and the rd-person ones. I will show that st/nd-person agreement
markers (which resemble the corresponding strong pronouns, and encode number distinctions
suppletively) arise via the exact same clitic-doublingmechanism implicated in B&R’s proposal,
while rd-person ones (which do not resemble the corresponding pronouns, and may involve
an isolable plural morpheme), are simply the spellout of the number probe, #0. The account
will be presented in detail in §..; but first, there is an implicit component of B&R’s account
itself (as well as many other accounts involving cliticization) that I would like to highlight, in
the next sub-section.
... On the featural coarseness of clitic-doubling
An implicit component of B&R’s account of the PCC, highlighted in the discussion in §.., is
a distinction between the featural granularity of “pure” agreement, and the featural coarseness
of clitic-doubling. Since the account of ϕ-agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus that will be
presented in §.. makes use of the same clitic-doubling mechanism implicated in B&R’s
account, I would like to discuss this distinction in greater detail, first.
If a syntactic probe H0 is relativized to look for some particular subset F of the entire ϕ-set,
it seems reasonable to assume that only the values of features belonging to F will be copied onto
H0 from whatever target it finds (this was an explicit part of the feature-geometric approach
sketched in §.., for example). This contrasts with clitic-doubling: if clitic-doubling is a
form of pronominalization, it is expected to behave like other forms of pronominalization in
treating the ϕ-set of the doubled noun-phrase as an atomic unit, which must be copied as a
whole. It should therefore be impossible, under clitic-doubling, to tease apart diﬀerent sub-
parts of theϕ-set, and copy some but not all of theϕ-features of the noun-phrase onto the clitic
(see related discussion in Rezac , ). We can formalize this observation as follows:
() the coarseness property of clitic-doubling31
If cl0 is the result of clitic-doubling of some noun-phrase α, then cl0 will reflect the
full set of ϕ-features on α.
31One concern that arises with respect to () involves the morphological operation of Fission (Halle ,
Noyer ). Fission refers to the process where a vocabulary item realizes only a sub-part of the ϕ-features
contained in a given node of the morphological structure, leaving the remainder of the features to be realized
by subsequent instances of Vocabulary Insertion. If we were to let Fission apply to clitics in an unrestricted
manner, () would be weakened to the point of vacuity. However, even within morphological theories that
employ Fission, it is recognized that the application of such an operation must be severely restricted:
“Fission of morphemes during Spell-out in some cases allows multiple phonological pieces to
correspond to single morphemes, further obscuring the morphosyntactic structure. Nevertheless,
these departures are considered marked options within a grammar, and therefore are assumed to
require (substantial) positive evidence during acquisition.”
[Harley and Noyer ]
Just as Fission obscures the correspondence of morphological nodes to vocabulary items, so does it obscure the
eﬀects of (); but instances of Fission are the marked option, which following Harley and Noyer, will only be
posited during the acquisition process when they cannot be avoided.
Thanks to Karlos Arregi, Andrew Nevins, and Milan Rezac for illuminating discussions of this and other
related points.
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This diﬀerence between clitic-doubling and “pure” agreement is immaterial if ϕ-probes
always probe for, and copy, ϕ-feature sets in their entirety; but once we allow person and
number features to probe separately, as in B&R’s account and in §.., this distinction
becomes relevant.32
Importantly, insofar as clitic-doubling is a reflex of being probed by a particular syntactic
head (as proposed by B&R, and detailed in §..), the specific set of features sought by the
probe—or in feature-geometric terms (§..), the point in the ϕ-feature geometry to which
the probe is relativized—will not aﬀect this result. The reason is that regardless of how it is
triggered, clitic-doubling is ultimately a type of pronominalization. We therefore expect there
to be mismatches (at least in some cases), where a syntactic head is relativized to search only
for a proper subset of the ϕ-feature geometry, but being probed by this head triggers clitic-
doubling which copies the entire ϕ-set.
If we examine B&R’s account again, we see that exactly such a mismatch exists in the case
of the person probe, pi0: there, pi0 probes for person features only, to the exclusion of number
features; but when a dative nominal is the structurally closest agreement target, this results in
clitic-doubling—as schematized in () and (), repeated here:
() two internal arguments: person probing
piP
pi0ApplP
dat-argAppl’
Appl0VP
V0theme
7
(blo
cke
d b
y c
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er d
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g
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() two internal arguments: person probing of dative⇒ clitic-doubling
piP
pi0–cl[ϕi]ApplP
<dat-arg[ϕi]>Appl’
Appl0VP
V0theme
clit
ic-
dou
bli
ng
Crucially, the resulting dative clitic matches the dative nominal in all itsϕ-features, person and
number features alike. This is precisely the behavior we expect given the featural coarseness of
clitic-doubling, as given in ().
32This distinction between “pure” agreement and clitic-doubling recalls the shift from agreement as
X0-movement, as in Chomsky b, to agreement as valuation, as in Chomsky .
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Independent support for the featural coarseness of clitic-doubling can be found in Basque,
and in particular in the form of Basque agreement morphology. The Basque auxiliary carries
agreement morphology corresponding to the ϕ-features of each core argument (absolutive,
ergative, and dative, or whatever subset of the three is present in a given clause):
() Gu
we(abs)
amama-ri
grandmother-dat
joan
gone
ga-
.abs-
tzai-√
-
zki-
pl.abs-
o.
sg.dat
‘We have gone to grandmother.’ [Laka ]
As argued in Preminger , not all the agreement morphemes found in Basque arise in the
same way. The dative and ergative agreement morphology is the result of clitic-doubling of the
corresponding noun-phrases. The absolutive agreement morphology, on the other hand, arises
via “pure” agreement by separate person and number probes, essentially following B&R’s
proposal (see Preminger :–). Similar conclusions have been reached, on largely
independent grounds, by Arregi and Nevins (, in prep.).
An interesting property of absolutive agreement morphology in the Basque auxiliary is that
exponents reflecting diﬀerent parts of the absolutive ϕ-set sometimes show up on opposite
sides of the auxiliary root. This is the case for the abs-dat auxiliary in the present-indicative,
for example:33
() abs-dat present-indicative auxiliary paradigm
abs
person
root
(have)
abs
number
abs
“number+”
dat
all ϕ-features
sg na tzai t
sg ha tzai {k ,n}
sg zai o
pl ga tzai zki gu
pl za tzai zki zu
pl+ za tzai zki te zue
pl zai zki e
The status of the first absolutive morpheme—i.e., the first column in ()—is subject to
some disagreement in the literature. In Preminger , I claimed that this morpheme is
the exponence of person agreement, despite being subject to number-conditioned contextual
allomorphy; Arregi and Nevins (, in prep.), on the other hand, claim that this morpheme is
an absolutive clitic. What both analyses agree upon, however, is that themorpheme in the third
column (“-zki”) is not a clitic: for Preminger , it is the exponent of number agreement; for
33The table in () shows how to assemble an auxiliary form for a present-indicative finite clause containing
absolutive and dative arguments (but no ergative argument), based on the ϕ-features of the arguments in
question. The person-number combination of pl, while formally plural, is used for polite addressing of
nd-person singular individuals (cf. French “vous”). To diﬀerentiate actual nd-person plurality from mere
“polite” uses of pl, Basque adds another pluralizing morpheme, which I have labeled “number+”. I refer to
this person-number configuration as “pl+”. Dative (as well as ergative) nd-singular agreement morphemes
alternate based on gender. The meaning of the ‘ ’ symbol is that “-te”, corresponding to the “number+”
feature of the absolutive argument, appears after the dat morpheme (rather than before it). This is particular
to the paradigm in ().
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Arregi and Nevins (, in prep.), it is part of the spellout of valued features on T0; in either
case, it is the reflex of “pure” agreement, not clitic-doubling.
Let us therefore concentrate on the diﬀerence between this morpheme (“-zki”) and the
dative agreement morphology—i.e., the final column of ()—which consists of a single
exponent expressing all the relevant ϕ-featural distinctions. Note that much like st/nd-
person absolutive agreement morphology in Kichean, these dative agreement morphemes (as
well as the ergative ones found in other auxiliary paradigms) bear a strong resemblance to the
corresponding strong pronouns in Basque. If, as argued by Arregi and Nevins (, in prep.)
and in Preminger , dative (as well as ergative) agreement morphology on the auxiliary in
Basque is the result of clitic-doubling, it follows from the featural coarseness property of clitic-
doubling (in (), above) that a morpheme like “-zki”, if it is found anywhere, could only be
found in the domain of absolutive agreement.
We have seen that the morphological make-up of the Basque auxiliary provides support
for the generalization given in (), concerning the featural coarseness of clitic-doubling. As
mentioned earlier, this property of clitic-doubling is already implicit in accounts such as
B&R’s, where being probed by pi0—a probe that searches only for person features—gives rise
to a clitic reflecting the full set of ϕ-features borne by the dative nominal.34
I will therefore take () to be correct, as we turn to the discussion of agreement
morphology in Kichean Agent-Focus, below. As discussed earlier, the proposal by
B&R—meant to account for the PCC—when combined with the results of §., yields a
comprehensive account of ϕ-agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus construction. This
account will not only derive the so-called scale or hierarchy eﬀects (without recourse to an
extrinsic device of that sort), but also derive the morpho-phonological distinctions observed
in §.., between st/nd-person absolutive agreement markers in Kichean (which resemble
the corresponding strong pronouns, and encode number distinctions suppletively), and rd-
person ones (which do not resemble the corresponding pronouns, and exhibit what may be an
isolable plural morpheme). This account is the topic of the next sub-section.
... Applying Béjar and Rezac’s () account to Kichean
In this sub-section, I combine the results of §. with B&R’s account of the PCC, to yield an
account of ϕ-agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus construction. This account will be based
on the idea that the st/nd-person absolutive agreement marker in Kichean arises via clitic-
34AndrewNevins (p.c.) suggests that Romancemight provide independent support for the same conclusion,
regarding the featural coarseness of cliticization. In many Romance languages, participial agreement targets
[number] and [gender], while finite agreement targets [number] and [person]—two diﬀerent subsets of the full
set of ϕ-distinctions available in Romance. On the other hand, Romance clitics, for the most part, express all
three distinctions ([number], [person], and [gender]).
As pointed out to me by Karlos Arregi, there are instances where Romance clitics fail to express certain
available ϕ-featural distinctions—which is unexpected given the coarseness property—such as dative clitics
that fail to make any [gender] distinctions. We might hypothesize that this is a matter of lexical inventory—
namely, that there happen to be no vocabulary items in the relevant dative clitic paradigm whose insertion
rules make distinctions for [gender]. This would be ad-hoc, however; and more importantly, once we allow
for such “vocabulary-based impoverishment”, the claim regarding featural coarseness of cliticization/clitic-
doubling loses its predictive power.
I leave the resolution of these issues with respect to Romance morphosyntax for future research.
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doubling triggered by the person probe, pi0 (akin to the dative clitic in B&R’s account of the
PCC), while the rd-person absolutive agreement marker—in particular, the rd-person plural
absolutive marker—is the overt spellout of the number probe, #0.
Importantly, it will be shown that this account not only derives the eﬀects sometimes
attributed to a scale or “salience” hierarchy, but also accounts for which agreement markers do
and do not resemble the relevant strong pronouns, and where an isolable number morpheme
can and cannot be identified within the overt agreement morphology—making it empirically
superior to an account based directly on scales or “salience” hierarchies (a detailed comparison
with the latter type of approach will be undertaken in §..).
Recall that the same agreement markers that show up in the Agent-Focus construction are
also found in regular transitives and intransitives in Kichean (as noted in §.., above); the
account proposed here derives this, as well, as will be detailed in §... However, in this sub-
section, I concentrate on the Agent-Focus construction, since it is in some sense the limiting
case as far as the complexities of the agreement system are concerned.
Suppose that in the Kichean, probing for person features occurs separately from—and prior
to—probing for number features, just as in B&R’s account of the PCC (for evidence fromwithin
Mayan for the separation of person and number agreement, see §.A). Given that the discussion
in §.was restricted to person features (the discussion of number in Kichean Agent-Focus was
intentionally set aside until §.), the probe identified there as Infl0 is—when adapted to the
terms of B&R’s account—none other than the person probe, pi0:
() basic clause structure in Kichean Agent-Focus (cf. (), in §..)
piP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
objV0
· · ·
subj
· · ·
pi0
[participant?]
It was shown in §. that this probe—pi0, by its new name—is feature-relativized to target only
noun-phrases that bear a [participant] feature (i.e., st/nd-person arguments). Importantly,
this was demonstrated independent of any particular account of the PCC, or any diﬀerences or
similarities with respect to such an account.
Now recall that in B&R’s system, being probed by pi0 results in clitic-doubling. Recall also
that this clitic-doubling need not be optional, nor is it necessarily dependent on any particular
semantic properties of the doubled noun-phrase (Basque, for instance, provided an example
of obligatory and indiscriminate clitic-doubling of the dative noun-phrase).
In B&R’s account of the PCC, the noun-phrase probed by pi0 is always the structurally
closest one—namely, the dative argument—and therefore this is also invariably the noun-
phrase that is clitic-doubled. Since pi0 in Kichean is feature-relativized to [participant],
however, it will not necessarily be the closest noun-phrase in () that is probed by pi0. In
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particular, when the subject is rd-person (and therefore bears no [participant] feature) but
the object is st/nd-person, the noun-phrase probed by pi0 will be the object—as argued in
detail in §...
Holding constant the notion, from B&R, that being probed by pi0 triggers clitic-doubling,
we would predict that in Kichean Agent-Focus, it would be the closest bearer of [participant]
that is clitic-doubled:
() clitic-doubling in Kichean Agent-Focus
a. st/nd-person subject
piP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
objV0
· · ·
subj
· · ·
pi0
[participant?]
⇒
piP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
objV0
· · ·
subj
· · ·
pi0–cl[ϕsubj]
clitic-doubling
b. rd-person subject,
st/nd-person object
piP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
objV0
· · ·
subj
· · ·
pi0
[participant?]
⇒
piP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
objV0
· · ·
subj
· · ·
pi0–cl[ϕobj]
clitic-doubling
As argued in §.., clitic-doubling is featurally “coarse”, in that it must copy the entire
ϕ-feature set of the doubled noun-phrase, even if clitic-doubling was triggered by a probe
that was only searching for a subset of the ϕ-feature geometry (this assumption was shown to
be implicitly present in B&R’s account, as well; see §..). Thus, while pi0 in Kichean probes
only for [participant] features, the clitic whose creation is triggered by this probe will reflect
the full ϕ-set of the [participant]-bearing target.
This means that in (a–b), the generated clitic will reflect the number features of the
[participant]-bearing argument, as well as its person features. As shown in §.., this is
precisely what one finds in Kichean Agent-Focus:
() Ja
foc
rje’
them
x-i-tz’et-ö
prfv-sg.abs-see-af
yïn
me
’It was them who saw me.’ [=(a)]
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() Ja
foc
rja’
him
x-oj-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl.abs-see-af
röj
us
’It was him who saw us.’ [=(a)]
Furthermore, as discussed in detail in §.., the forms of the agreement markers found with
[participant]-bearing (i.e., st/nd-person) arguments show no sign of an independent plural
morpheme: the morpho-phonological relation between the singular st/nd-person agreement
markers and the plural st/nd-person agreement markers is entirely suppletive. The fact that
there is no independent plural morpheme can be naturally accommodated if the morphology
in question comes about as the result of clitic-doubling, and therefore involves the copying of
complete ϕ-sets.
The strongest source of support for clitic-doubling, however, might come from the actual
forms of the agreement markers. Recall that these agreement markers—namely, the st/nd-
person members of the absolutive series of agreement markers—bear a striking resemblance
to the corresponding strong pronouns:
() strong pronouns and abs. agreement morphemes – st/nd-person [=()]
abs
agreement
marker
strong
pronoun
sg -i(n)- yïn
pl -oj- röj
sg -a(t)- rat
pl -ix- rïx
The current approach derives this fact: according to the derivation sketched in (–), these
morphemes come about as the result of clitic-doubling; and clitics, of course, are nothing but
reduced pronouns (as noted earlier, the same mechanism will also derive the appearance of
the same forms in regular transitives and intransitives in Kichean; see §.. for details).
Notice that given this analysis, the overt agreement morphology found in the presence
of st/nd-person arguments—whose appearance is triggered by the probing of pi0—is not
the spellout of valued features on the syntactic probe, but rather a clitic. There is no reason
to think that the features on pi0 are not also valued when a [participant]-bearing argument
is found; after all, both arguments in the Agent-Focus construction are non-oblique (§..).
The natural question to ask is why these valued features receive no phonological expression.
At this juncture, I will make the one assumption required in the current account that is not
independently supported by either B&R’s analysis, or the analysis presented in §.: I propose
that there is a morphological restriction allowing only one morpheme to surface in the slot
we would descriptively identify as the “absolutive agreement slot”. In other words, the clitic
generated in () competes with pi0—as well as with #0, which probes next—for a single
morphological slot, and phonologically expressing the clitic takes precedence (perhaps due to
a general preference for expressing pronominal material at the expense of functional material,
rather than the other way around).
The idea that the person marker (or more accurately, on the current account, the clitic)
blocks the exponence of #0 from appearing finds some support in the behavior of verbal
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agreement in Tzotzil, where a morpheme indicating plurality can surface in the same verbal
complex as the corresponding person marker, exactly when the person marker is prefixal but
the plural marker is suﬃxal (see §.A).
Returning to Kichean, it is important to note that morphological competition of this sort
between a clitic and the exponence of #0 does not undo the earlier observations regarding the
absence of an independently identifiable plural morpheme in the forms of the st/nd-person
agreement markers. The crucial point was that these agreement markers do express number
distinctions—they just do so through suppletion; and it was the suppletive nature of these
morphological distinctions (as well as the form of the morphemes themselves) that aligned
well with a clitic-doubling analysis.
In the portion of the derivation sketched up to this point, only pi0 (the probe that searches
for [participant] features) has probed. As discussed in §.., the next head merged will be #0,
the number probe. Given the assumption stated above, regarding morphological competition
between the generated clitic and the overt spellout of the syntactic ϕ-probes, the eﬀects of
probing by #0 will not be observable unless no clitic was generated. Recall from the discussion
of B&R’s analysis that being probed by pi0 results in clitic-doubling, but being probed by #0
does not. Therefore, if pi0 fails to trigger clitic-doubling for some reason, the agreement slot
will in principle be available for the exponence of #0.
Consider the derivation of Agent-Focus clauses in which both the subject and the object are
rd-person. Given that pi0 in Kichean is feature-relativized to [participant], it will be unable to
target either of the two core arguments (since neither bears this feature). I leave aside for now
the question of what, if anything, is targeted by pi0 in such a derivation; this issue will be the
focus of chapter . However, if neither argument can be targeted by pi0, then we expect that no
clitic-doubling would be triggered; this, in turn, means that exactly in this kind of derivation—
where both core arguments are rd-person—we would have a chance to see the valued features
on pi0 and/or #0 spelled out overtly (since there is no clitic to compete with them for the single
available agreement slot).
Conceivably, pi0 and #0 might compete amongst themselves for overt spellout in this
agreement slot; but recall from the earlier discussion of the morpho-phonology of the Kichean
absolutive agreement paradigm (§..), that this paradigm contains no overt morphology that
one could associate with rd-person. Thus, the only overt material that stands to appear in
this agreement slot is the spellout of #0. This is exactly what we find: as discussed in §.,
in Kichean Agent-Focus clauses where both the subject and the object are rd-person, we find
either (i) no overt agreement morphology; or (ii) the morpheme “-e-”, which outside of the
Agent-Focus construction serves as the rd-plural absolutive agreement marker, and can be
plausibly analyzed as an independent plural morpheme (see §..).
The distribution of this plural marker with respect to the arguments of the Agent-Focus
verb creates a picture that should by now be familiar, from the behavior of [participant]
features in this construction. When neither of the arguments is plural, we do not find “-e-”;
but it is enough for either the subject or the object to be plural, for “-e-” to appear:35
35See fn. , in §.., for a caveat related to animacy.
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() ja
foc
ri
the
xoq
woman
x-Ø/*e-tz’et-ö
prfv-sg/*pl.abs-see-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was the woman who saw the man.’ [=()]
() Ja
foc
rje’
them
x-e/*Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/*sg.abs-see-af
rja’
him
’It was them who saw him.’ [=()]
() Ja
foc
rja’
him
x-e/*Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/*sg.abs-see-af
rje’
them
’It was him who saw them.’ [=()]
If we take “-e-” to be the overt spellout of a #0 head that has found a [plural]-bearing target,
we must conclude that #0 is capable of skipping a subject that does not bear the feature it is
searching for, en route to the object.36 In terms of the analysis developed in §., we can say
that #0 is relativized to [plural]. If the subject bears a [plural] feature, it will be targeted by #0;
if it does not, but the object does, then the object will be targeted by #0:
36One concern that might arise about identifying “-e-” as the overt exponence of #0 is that “-e-” is TAM-
invariant: it shows no allomorphy or suppletion based on the tense or aspect of the clause in which it appears.
Compare (i.a) and (i.b), for example:
(i) a. x-e-wär
prfv-pl.abs-sleep
‘They have slept.’
b. y-e-wär
impf-pl.abs-sleep
‘They are sleeping.’
Following Arregi and Nevins (, in prep.), TAM-invariance seems to be the most reliable diagnostic for
distinguishing clitics from the spellout of agreement heads—and on this diagnostic, “-e-” appears to pattern
with clitics; but crucially, TAM-invariance is only a one-way implication. While it rules out clitics that exhibit
TAM-based allomorphy or suppletion, it does not rule out agreement heads whose spellout does not show such
variation.
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() relativized probing for [plural]
a. pl subject, sg object
#P
piP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
objsgV0
· · ·
subjpl
· · ·
pi0
Ø
#0
[plural?]
⇒
#P
piP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
objsgV0
· · ·
subjpl
· · ·
pi0
Ø
#0
-e-
b. sg subject, pl object
#P
piP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
objplV0
· · ·
subjsg
· · ·
pi0
Ø
#0
[plural?]
⇒
#P
piP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
objplV0
· · ·
subjsg
· · ·
pi0
Ø
#0
-e-
Despite the overwhelming similarities observed here between the mechanisms that apply
to [participant] and [plural] in Kichean, there is one important diﬀerence, having to do with
argument licensing. Recall the Agent-Focus person restriction, repeated here:
() Agent-Focus person restriction [=()]
In the Agent-Focus construction in Kichean, at most one of the two core arguments can
be st/nd-person. [Davies and Sam-Colop , Dayley , Norman and Campbell ,
Smith-Stark , Stiebels ]
In §., I argued that () derives from the fact Infl0 in Kichean—or pi0, as it has been renamed
here—enters into only a single agreement relation (see, in particular, §...), along with
the fact that st/nd-person arguments must be licensed by agreement, following Béjar and
Rezac’s () PLC:
() Person Licensing Condition (PLC) [=()]
Interpretable st/nd-person features must be licensed by entering into an Agree
relation with an appropriate functional category. [Béjar and Rezac ]
Two asymmetries arise from (–). First, while pi0 is a licensor for the purposes of (),
#0 cannot be. If it could, then there would in principle be a chance for two st/nd-person
arguments to be licensed in the same Agent-Focus clause (provided that binding-theoretic
restrictions were obeyed)—one by pi0, and one by #0—contra the observed restriction in ().
That this is not the case is already implied by the formulation of (): not any agreement
relation is suﬃcient to license [participant]-bearing (i.e., st/nd-person) noun-phrases. In
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particular, I will assume that the agreement relation must involve the [participant] feature
itself. Thus, a probe that enters only into agreement relations involving the [plural] feature,
such as #0, is irrelevant for PLC purposes.
The need for a qualification of this sort becomes even clearer if one considers relations
beyond the scope of ϕ-agreement to also involve syntactic agreement: it is quite obvious that
agreement with a wh-probe, or a Focus probe, could not and should not license a [participant]
feature on a noun-phrase; from this perspective, a [plural] probe would be no diﬀerent.
The second asymmetry is, in some sense, the other side of the same coin: just as the [plural]
probe (#0) fails to license st/nd-person arguments for the purposes of (–), it is also the
case that there is no restriction corresponding to () on the appearance of multiple plural
arguments in a single Agent-Focus clause in Kichean. This is demonstrated in (), below:
() Ja
foc
rje’
them
x-oj-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl.abs-see-af
röj
us
’It was them who saw us.’
In other words, it seems that in Kichean, [plural] features cannot license arguments, and do
not require licensing.
This means that in an Agent-Focus clause where both the subject and the object are plural,
no problem arises if the #0 probe simply targets the closer of the two plural noun-phrases; the
other plural noun-phrase, whose [plural] feature does not participate in an agreement relation,
does not require licensing:
() pl subject, pl object
#P
piP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
objplV0
· · ·
subjpl
· · ·
pi0
Ø
#0
[plural?]
⇒
#P
piP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
objplV0
· · ·
subjpl
· · ·
pi0
Ø
#0
-e-
Recall that by hypothesis, the clitics that arise in the presence of st/nd-person arguments
compete for the single agreement slot with the exponents of #0 (and in principle, pi0 as well).
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Therefore, we can assume that the agreement relations illustrated in (a–b, ) obtain even
when one of the arguments is st/nd-person, and #0 simply cannot be spelled out overtly.
This is made particularly clear by examples like (), above, where both the subject and the
object are plural, but “-e-” does not appear. On the current account, #0 in an example like ()
behaves exactly as shown in (); the agreement slot is simply occupied by a st-plural clitic,
“-oj-” (a reduced form of the st-plural pronoun, “röj”; see §..), and this prevents “-e-”
from surfacing.
See also the discussion of Tzotzil, where the equivalent of Kaqchikel “-e-” is a suﬃx, rather
than a prefix—and is able to co-occur with the relevant person markers (§.A).
We have arrived at a comprehensive account of agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus
construction. To summarize, the derivation involves separate pi0 and #0 probes, which are
relativized to [participant] and [plural], respectively (see §.A for evidence from within the
Mayan family for the separation of person agreement and number agreement). As shown in
§.., when the probe fails to find the features it is looking for on the subject, it skips the
subject altogether, entering into a single agreement relation with the object (at least when the
object does bear the features in question).
Following Béjar and Rezac (), being probed by pi0 triggers clitic-doubling of the probed
argument, one of two asymmetries between pi0 and #0; the other asymmetry involves whether
or not the features in question interact with licensing, as in the Agent-Focus person restriction
and the PLC (in (–)). Since pi0 will skip arguments that do not bear a [participant] feature
(i.e., rd-person arguments), such arguments will not be clitic-doubled, leaving the single
agreement slot available for the overt exponence of #0 (in the event that the latter is overt).
This accounts for the morpho-phonological distinctions observed in §..: the st/nd-
person agreement markers resemble the corresponding strong pronouns (since clitics are,
quite literally, reduced pronouns), while the rd-person ones do not; conversely, agreement
with rd-person arguments in the Agent-Focus construction exhibits what may be an isolable
plural morpheme in Kichean (since it is the overt spellout of #0), whereas st/nd-person
agreement markers encode number suppletively (which is consistent with the idea that the
st/nd-person agreement markers arise via clitic-doubling, which treats the entire ϕ-set of
the doubled noun-phrase as an atomic, indivisible unit; §..).
The results of this account are summarized in ():
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() verbal morphology generated in Agent-Focus– Kaqchikel
subj/obj
ϕ-features
probing for
[participant]
(by pi0) finds
a target?
clitic whose
creation
is triggered
probing for
[plural]
(by #0) finds
a target?
exponent
of #0
actual
morph.
found in
agreement
slot
{sg, sg} yes -i(n)- (sg) no -i(n)-
{sg, sg} yes -a(t)- (sg) no -a(t)-
{pl, sg} yes -oj- (pl) yes -e- -oj-
{pl, sg} yes -ix- (pl) yes -e- -ix-
{sg, pl} yes -i(n)- (sg) no -i(n)-
{sg, pl} yes -a(t)- (sg) no -a(t)-
{pl, pl} yes -oj- (pl) yes -e- -oj-
{pl, pl} yes -ix- (pl) yes -e- -ix-
{sg, sg} no n/a no Ø
{pl, sg} no n/a yes -e- -e-
{pl, pl} no n/a yes -e- -e-
As before, the notation {ϕ1, ϕ2} is fully commutative, since there is never any diﬀerence
between the agreement morphology found with <subj[x], obj[y]> and <subj[y], obj[x]> in
Kichean Agent-Focus, for any pair of ϕ-feature bundles x and y (a result of relativized probing,
on the account presented here). Combinations not listed in () are ruled out either on binding-
theoretic grounds (e.g. {pl, sg}), or due to the Agent-Focus person restriction (e.g. {sg, sg};
see (), in §..).
The final column in (), representing the actual morphology found on the Agent-Focus
verb in each case, is the result of the aforementioned competition for the single agreement
slot: if there is a morpheme in the clitic column, the agreement slot (i.e., the final column) will
contain that clitic; only in the event that no clitic is generated does the morpheme in the #0
column (if it is non-null) stand to appear in the agreement slot. The reader will notice that this
derives the complete pattern of agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus, given earlier in ()
(§..).
As noted at the beginning of §., this account compares favorably to an account of
the same omnivorous person and omnivorous number eﬀects in terms of scales or “salience”
hierarchies. This comparison is the topic of §... First, however, I would like to spell out how
the same assumptions successfully derive agreement with absolutive noun-phrases in regular
transitives and intransitives in Kichean.
... Absolutive agreement in regular transitives and intransitives
The account proposed in §.. captures the syntactic and morphological properties of
agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus construction. It turns out that the same account derives
the behavior of absolutive agreement in Kichean transitives and intransitives, as well.
In intransitives, there is of course only one noun-phrase in the domain of the [participant]
and [plural] probes, pi0 and #0:
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() #P
piP
· · ·
· · ·
ThemeV0
· · ·
pi0
participant?
#0
plural?
Suppose that the very same derivational sequence that was argued for in the Agent-Focus
construction occurs here, as well. First, pi0 probes for a noun-phrase that carries a [participant]
feature. In this case, the only noun-phrase that could possibly be targeted is the Theme, since
there are no other nominals in the domain of the probe. Thus, if the Theme is st/nd-person
(and therefore, carries a [participant] feature), it will be successfully targeted by pi0.
As argued in §..–§.., being successfully probed by pi0 results in clitic-doubling of the
probed argument; therefore, if the Theme is indeed st/nd-person, a clitic will be generated
that reflects the full ϕ-feature set of the Theme (due to the featural coarseness property of clitic-
doubling; see §..). As before, this clitic will occupy the absolutive agreement slot, and no
other overt morphology—in particular, the overt spellout of #0—will be able to appear in that
slot.
If the Theme is rd-person, on the other hand, it cannot be targeted by pi0; recall that pi0
is relativized to probe for [participant] features, and therefore skips rd-person arguments
entirely—as evinced by its behavior in Agent-Focus contexts (§..–§..). As a result, no
clitic will be generated in this case, and the agreement slot will be available for the spellout of
other morphological material.
Recall once more that in Kichean (and in fact, in all of Mayan), the absolutive agreement
paradigm contains no overt morphology that one could associate with rd-person (§..).
Thus, if anything stands to appear in the agreement slot in this scenario, it will be the overt
spellout of #0 (as was the case in Agent-Focus clauses where both the subject and the object
were rd-person). As before, #0 is relativized to probe for [plural]. Thus, if the Theme is plural,
#0 will be able to target it. This would presumably occur whether a clitic was generated or not
(i.e., whether the plural Theme is a st/nd-person argument or a rd-person one); but if no
clitic was generated, the overt exponence of a #0 head that has successfully targeted a plural
nominal (namely, “-e-”) will be able to be spelled out in the agreement slot.
We have therefore seen that the same derivational sequence proposed in §.. for the
Agent-Focus construction, when applied in a derivation where there is only a single argument
in the domain of the ϕ-probes pi0 and #0, correctly predicts that the same agreement markers
will be found in intransitive clauses in Kichean. On the current proposal, the st/nd-person
agreement markers in intransitives arise via the same clitic-doubling operation, triggered by
probing by the same pi0 [participant] probe, as the st/nd-person agreement markers in
the Agent-Focus construction do. The rd-person agreement marker—in particular, the rd-
person plural marker—is the spellout of the same #0 [plural] probe as in the Agent-Focus
construction. As shown in §../§.., this is indeed the case.
These results are summarized in () (cf. (), above):
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() verbal morphology generated in intransitives – Kaqchikel
Theme
ϕ-features
probing for
[participant]
(by pi0) finds
a target?
clitic whose
creation
is triggered
probing for
[plural]
(by #0) finds
a target?
exponent
of #0
actual
morph.
found in
agreement
slot
sg yes -i(n)- (sg) no -i(n)-
sg yes -a(t)- (sg) no -a(t)-
pl yes -oj- (pl) yes -e- -oj-
pl yes -ix- (pl) yes -e- -ix-
sg no n/a no Ø
pl no n/a yes -e- -e-
As in (), the final column in () (representing the actual morphology found on the
intransitive verb in each case) is generated by the same logic of morphological competition: if
probing by pi0 is successful in finding a [participant]-bearing noun-phrase, the result is clitic-
doubling of that noun-phrase, and this clitic will occupy the agreement slot (the final column
of ()); in the event that no such clitic is generated (i.e., when the Theme is rd-person), the
exponence of #0 has a chance to appear in the agreement slot.
Turning now to transitives, not much needs to be changed. All that is necessary is that pi0
and #0 be unable to see the External Argument (the ergative noun-phrase). There are at least
two ways of achieving this result—and moreover, the two are not mutually incompatible (i.e.,
it could be the case that both hold).
Before outlining these two alternatives, let me first address a potential solution that might
seem intuitive, but ultimately proves to be inadequate: we might conjecture that the probes
that I have labeled pi0 and #0 together correspond roughly to what is usually thought of as
v0 (which is the approach taken in Preminger  for Basque), rather than Infl0 (which is
the approach taken here). If this is the case, then given the Little-v Hypothesis (Hale and
Keyser , Chomsky b, Kratzer , Marantz , Harley , Coon and Preminger
to appear, among others), the base position of the External Argument would be higher than
both pi0 and #0; and therefore, no interactions between these two probes and the External
Argument would be expected. The problem is that the same logic could be applied to Agent-
Focus clauses—but there, the External Argument is quite plainly visible to pi0 and #0, which is
what gives rise to the omnivorous agreement eﬀects discussed throughout this chapter.37
This suggests that the lack of interaction between pi0 and #0 and the subject of a transitive
is not about the subject being an External Argument, per se, but rather about ergative case
(recall that the External Argument in the Agent-Focus construction is crucially not ergative-
marked; see §..). We might therefore conclude that the ergative noun-phrase is invisible
to probing by pi0 and #0 either because ergative case is inherent case (Aldridge , Legate
37It is conceivable, of course, that the External Argument is generated in a diﬀerent position in the Agent-
Focus construction than it is in a regular transitive clause (in violation of UTAH, the Uniformity of Theta
Assignment Hypothesis; Baker ). However, while there are many diﬀerences between Agent-Focus clauses
and regular transitive clauses in Kichean, I know of no independent evidence that points specifically to a
diﬀerence in the position of the External Argument.
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, Woolford ), or because ergative case is an oblique case.38 The problem with this
kind of approach is that oblique cases—as opposed to full-fledged PPs—are not truly invisible
to phi-agreement (as will be discussed in detail in chapter ).
Instead, suppose that the External Argument in a transitive clause—but not in the Agent-
Focus construction—is A-moved out of its base-position prior to probing by pi0 and #0 (perhaps
due to ergative case-assignment taking place in a dedicated projection; see, for example,
Merchant , Preminger to appear). As shown by Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir (), the
trace of an A-moved phrase is invisible to ϕ-probes, at least in certain cases; if the trace of the
A-moved ergative argument behaves in this fashion, we would not expect it to interact with
probing by pi0 and #0.
We would therefore expect no interaction between the ϕ-probes pi0 and #0 and the ergative
argument in a regular transitive clause. This correctly predicts that when only the absolutive
argument is considered, the behavior of the “absolutive agreement marker”—which on this
account, is a composite of the clitic generated by probing by pi0 in some cases, and the overt
exponence of #0 in others—would be the same in transitives as it is in intransitives.
This does not address the question, of course, of how the ergative agreement morphemes
in Kichean come about—in particular, whether they are clitics, or the exponence of a ϕ-probe.
While I have little to say about this question here, it is interesting to note that the ergative
agreement paradigm, repeated below, encodes number distinctions suppletively in all three
persons (contra the absolutive agreement paradigm):
() Kaqchikel ergative agreement paradigm [=()]
sg pl
st -n/w- -q(a)-
nd -a(w)- -i(w)-
rd -r(u)/u- -k(i)-
This suggests that these agreement markers are either (i) clitics; or (ii) the overt exponence of
a single probe H0, which probes for both number and person features simultaneously. These
markers are also TAM-invariant (i.e., they do not show allomorphy based on the tense or aspect
of the host; see Arregi and Nevins , in prep., as well as fn. ), which provides at least a
hint that they may be clitics. Since the precise nature of these agreement markers is immaterial
to the central point of this thesis, I leave this question aside for now.
To summarize, we have seen that the same derivational sequence proposed in §..
to account for agreement in the Agent-Focus construction correctly predicts that the same
agreement markers will be found in constructions where there is only a single argument in
the domain of the ϕ-probes, pi0 and #0, as is the case in intransitives, and—given certain fairly
reasonable assumptions—in transitives, as well.
38That oblique phrases are the diachronic genesis of ergatives has been argued extensively in the literature
(Anderson , Chung , Clark , Comrie , Dixon , , Johns , among others); but see
recent work by Polinsky () for arguments that the same property is detectable in the synchronic grammars
of at least a sub-group of ergative languages.
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... On scales and “salience” hierarchies
As noted in §.., the behavior of agreement in the Agent-Focus construction in Kichean has
often been described in terms of a scale or “salience” hierarchy (Dayley , Mondloch ,
Norman and Campbell , Smith-Stark , Stiebels )—recall (), repeated here:
() “salience” hierarchy in Kichean Agent-Focus
st/nd-person≫ rd-plural≫ rd-singular
While I take no issue with the usefulness of () as a descriptive tool that can be used to discuss
Kichean agreement, thinking of it as an actual account of agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus
faces serious problems. I will survey these problems here.
First, if it is “salience”—in the cognitive sense—that is relevant, it is quite puzzling
that such a scale would surface nowhere else in the language except in the Agent-Focus
construction.
Even more puzzling for an account based on cognitive salience is the following fact from
K’ichee’, noted by Stiebels (:, fn. ):
“[K’ichee’] has developed a second person formal pronoun, which does not behave
as a second person with respect to the salience hierarchy, i.e. it does not outrank
third person.”
If determining which argument is targeted for agreement in the Agent-Focus construction
were a matter of cognitive salience, then we would expect expressions referring to speech-
act addressees to all pattern alike, contra to fact. The claim here is not that there is no possible
story regarding the K’ichee’ nd-person formal pronoun that would assimilate its “salience” to
that of rd-person arguments; the point is that the one concrete prediction made by an appeal
to cognitive salience is, in fact, not borne out.
Next, note that an approach along the lines of () would have little to say about the Agent-
Focus person restriction:
() Agent-Focus person restriction [=()]
In the Agent-Focus construction in Kichean, at most one of the two core arguments can
be st/nd-person. [Davies and Sam-Colop , Dayley , Norman and Campbell ,
Smith-Stark , Stiebels ]
There is nothing about () that predicts that two arguments with high “salience” would not be
able to co-occur; indeed, languages and constructions that exhibit behavior that is superficially
very similar to () (e.g. main verb agreement in Algonquian) do not have a restriction along
the lines of (). The account presented in §.., however, derives both (), and the eﬀects
of () from the same underlying source (namely, a probe relativized to [participant] features,
which can therefore license [participant] features on exactly one argument).
Most importantly, an approach based on () would not account for the particular morpho-
phonological distinctions between the forms of st/nd-person agreement markers (which
look like the corresponding pronouns, and encode number distinctions suppletively), and rd-
person agreement markers (which do not), as detailed in §... One could contend that ()
should not account for these distinctions, since the same agreement markers found in the
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Agent-Focus construction are used in regular transitives and intransitives in Kichean, as well;
but that would mean that these distinctions must have a diﬀerent source. If this independent
source turns out to also account for the eﬀects that () was designed to capture, it removes
the need for () itself.
In §..–§.., I presented an account of these morpho-phonological diﬀerences based
on the idea that the st/nd-person absolutive agreement markers are actually clitics, which
come about as the result of clitic-doubling triggered by the [participant] probe (pi0), while the
rd-person agreement absolutive agreement markers were the actual exponence of the [plural]
probe (#0). Crucially, this account also derives the very eﬀects that () was meant to account
for, within the Agent-Focus construction—rendering () entirely redundant.
This redundancy extends to attempts to view scales like () as an emergent property of a
ranked set of constraints—as in, for example, the system proposed by Stiebels (). Just like
accounts that make direct reference to a scale or “salience” hierarchy, the point of accounts such
as Stiebels’ is to factor out the choice of agreement target from ϕ-agreement itself, treating
it as an autonomous component of the ϕ-agreement process (in this case, a component based
on a system of ranked constraints). Thus, ϕ-agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus is treated as a
uniform phenomenon, but for the choice of which argument will be targeted.
Therefore, like their scale-based counterparts, such approaches cannot account for the fact
that diﬀerent choices of agreement targets result in agreement markers with diﬀerent morpho-
phonologically properties (see also §.). As before, the fact that these morpho-phonological
distinctions extend beyond the realm of Agent-Focus to all instances of agreement with
absolutive arguments (i.e., in regular transitives and intransitives, as well) suggests that they
have a separate source; but if this source also derives the choice of agreement target in the
Agent-Focus construction (as it was shown in §..–§.. to do), then the system of ranked
constraints is unnecessary, in the first place.
We have arrived at a comprehensive account of agreement in Agent-Focus clauses in
Kichean, and the pieces are in place to explore instances of failed agreement (§.) in this
construction. In the next chapter, I use such instances to help address the central question
of this thesis—namely, how to correctly model the normally obligatory nature of ϕ-agreement.
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.A. Appendix: Evidence from Tzotzil for separate person and number
In §., I proposed an account of ϕ-agreement in Kichean based on the idea that person and
number are syntactically separable, and that they probe independently of one another. In this
appendix, I show evidence for syntactic separability of person and number that comes from
within the Mayan language family.
Tzotzil is a Mayan language of the Tseltalan family, a somewhat distant relative of the
Kichean languages which are at the center of this chapter. As discussed by Aissen () and
Woolford (to appear), Tzotzil has two sets of absolutive agreement markers, one that appears
in the prefixal field (as in (a)), and one that appears in the suﬃxal field (as in (b)):39
() a. ch-
impf-
a-
.abs-
s-
.erg-
mil
kill
‘He is going to kill you.’
b. j-
.erg-
mala
wait
-oj
-perf
-oxuk
-pl.abs
‘I have waited for y’all.’
[Aissen :, ]
As noted by Woolford, Tzotzil is exceptional in exhibiting both patterns within one language;
other Mayan languages generally exhibit one pattern or the other (Bricker , Tada ).
The reader will notice that the gloss of the prefixal agreement markers does not include a
number distinction; indeed, the suﬃxal forms in Tzotzil encode number distinctions, but the
prefixal forms (including all ergative/genitive markers, not shown below) do not:
() Tzotzil absolutive prefixes
 i-
 a-
 Ø-
() Tzotzil absolutive suffixes
sg -on
pl.incl -otik
pl.excl -otikotik
sg -ot
pl -oxuk
()sg -Ø
()pl -ik
[Aissen , Woolford to appear]
Consider now the marker “-ik”, which is listed in () as ()pl. First, note that the
segmental content of “-ik” is present in the other plural members of () (modulo the change
of [i ] to another high vowel, [u], in “-oxuk” ‘pl.abs’), already suggesting that “-ik” functions
as an all-purpose plural marker in Tzotzil.
More strikingly, “-ik” can signal plurality of both rd-person arguments (as in ()), and
under particular circumstances, of nd-person arguments, as well (as in ()):
39I thank Jessica Coon for turning my attention to this pattern, and its relevance to the arguments made in
this chapter.
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() Pi-
prfv-
j-
.erg-
mil
kill
-ik
-()pl.abs
‘I killed them.’
() ch-
impf-
a-
.abs-
j-
.erg-
mil
kill
-ik
-()pl.abs
‘I am going to kill y’all.’
[Aissen :]
The factors governing the choice of prefixal versus suﬃxal absolutive agreement morphology
in Tzotzil are beyond the scope of the current work; I refer the reader to Aissen () and
Woolford (to appear) for discussion.40 What is crucial here is (), where the ϕ-features of the
nd-person plural object are expressed discontinuously, by two morphemes—one that reflects
its person features (“a-” ‘.abs’), and one that reflects its number features (“-ik” ‘()pl.abs’).
The same holds with st-person plural absolutive arguments, modulo the aforementioned
morphological decomposition:
() a. “-otik” (‘pl.incl.abs’) =
“-o{n,t}” (‘.abs’) + “-ik” (‘()pl.abs’)
b. “-otikotik” (‘pl.excl.abs’) =
“-o{n,t}” (‘.abs’) + “-ik” (‘()pl.abs’) + “<redupl>” (‘excl.abs’)
() a. l-
prfv-
i-
.abs-
s-
.erg-
pet
carry
-ot
-.abs
-ik
-()pl.abs
(=-otik)
‘He carries us(incl.).’
b. ch-
impf-
i-
.abs-
s-
.erg-
mil
kill
-ot
-.abs
-ik
-()pl.abs
-<redupl>
-excl.abs
(=-otikotik)
‘He is going to kill us(excl.).’
[Aissen :,]
Of course, due to the absence of an overt .abs prefix, one cannot test the discontinuous
expression of ϕ-features with rd-person plural absolutive arguments—but at the very least,
they do not counter-exemplify the generalization that plural is expressed by an independent
morpheme (see (), above).
We have seen that absolutive agreement in Tzotzil can be expressed discontinuously—
in which case it consists of a prefix expressing person features only, and a set of suﬃxes
consisting of a number morpheme, and potentially other morphemes related to the st-person
inclusive/exclusive distinction.41
40Broadly speaking, prefixal absolutive agreement morphology in Tzotzil is parasitic on the presence of
a prefixal aspect marker (Aissen , Woolford to appear). There is one exception to this generalization,
involving st-person absolutive agreement in conjunction with nd-person ergative agreement; Woolford (to
appear) claims that this exception is phonologically motivated, though I find her dismissal of a syntactic
account (assimilating this pattern to, say, the Inverse system of Algonquian) to be inconclusive.
41I assume that the appearance of a st-person suﬃx in cases like (a–b) is merely a form ofmorphological
support for expressing the inclusive/exclusive distinction, rather than an actual person marker—as evinced by
the absence of a suﬃxal person marker in the discontinuous agreement construction involving nd-person
(where there is no inclusive/exclusive distinction), as in ().
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Note the similarity between this pattern and the Basque agreement data, presented in
§.. and repeated here:
() Gu
we(abs)
amama-ri
grandmother-dat
joan
gone
ga-
.abs-
tzai-√ -
zki-
pl.abs-
o.
sg.dat
‘We have gone to grandmother.’ [=()] [Laka ]
() abs-dat present-indicative auxiliary paradigm [=()]
abs
person
root
(have)
abs
number
abs
“number+”
dat
all ϕ-features
sg na tzai t
sg ha tzai {k ,n}
sg zai o
pl ga tzai zki gu
pl za tzai zki zu
pl+ za tzai zki te zue
pl zai zki e
As shown in (–), the absolutive plural marker “-zki” in the Basque absolutive-dative
present indicative auxiliary paradigm shows up on the opposite side of the auxiliary root from
absolutive person marking—much like in the Tzotzil data discussed here. In Preminger ,
I argued that this is the result of “-zki” being the spellout of a separate head, #0, when that
head has successfully targeted an absolutive noun-phrase bearing [plural].
It is not impossible to handle cases where diﬀerent ϕ-features of the agreement target are
expressed discontinuously, as in the examples shown here, within a purely morphological
approach (e.g. using the Fission operation of Distributed Morphology; Halle , Noyer
; see also fn. , in this chapter). However, this separability of person and number—
and in particular, the fact that they sometimes surface on opposite sides of the stem—is at
least suggestive that the two are independent of one another in syntax as well.
The importance of these Tzotzil data, in particular, is that they provide support fromwithin
the Mayan language family for this separation of person and number, which constitutes part
of the account proposed in §. for ϕ-agreement in Kichean.
Importantly, the state of aﬀairs in Tzotzil contrasts with Kichean, where the appearance
of person morphology (which on the account proposed in §., arises through clitic-doubling
that is triggered by the [participant] probe) crucially blocks the plural marker from appearing.
Importantly, the Kichean plural marker (e.g. “-e-”, in Kaqchikel) is not suﬃxal: when it
appears in the verbal complex, it is in the same prefixal slot that in other cases is occupied
by the person marker. Whether or not the plural marker can appear in the same derivation
as the person marker therefore appears to depend on whether or not they are both prefixal—
lending some support to the idea that in Kichean, one blocks the appearance of the other (as
proposed in §..).
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Chapter 
Why uninterpretable features (and other
derivational time-bombs) won’t work
Based on the detailed investigation of agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus construction
conducted in chapter , we are now in a position to present an argument against approaches
that enforce the obligatoriness of ϕ-agreement through derivational time-bombs, such as the
uninterpretable features approach of Chomsky (, ). This argument is the focus of the
current chapter.
I begin by laying out the argument against a derivational time-bombs for ϕ-agreement
from person agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus construction (§.). I then present a very
similar argument based on number agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus (§.).
Next, I address the possibility of salvaging the derivational time-bombs (or uninterpretable
features) account by proposing that these representational devices are only selectively present
(and crucially, absent in those cases that look like failed agreement), showing that such an
account cannot be generally maintained (§.).
Finally, I sketch two implementations of ϕ-agreement—one within the obligatory
operations approach, and one within the violable constraints approach—which unlike their
derivational time-bomb counterpart, can deal with the empirical patterns surveyed here (§.).
In the appendix (§.A), I provide a brief historical survey of how syntactic theory came to
regard uninterpretable features as having anything to do with the obligatoriness ofϕ-agreement,
in the first place.
.. Failed person agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus
Agreement with st/nd-person arguments in Kichean was analyzed in §. as clitic-doubling,
triggered when these arguments are probed by the [participant]-probe pi0. As in many more
familiar paradigms, agreement with st/nd-person arguments in Kichean is obligatory; its
absence results in ungrammaticality. This is demonstrated in (–) using examples from
the Kichean Agent-Focus construction:
 FAILED PERSON AGREEMENT IN KICHEAN AGENT-FOCUS
() a. ja
foc
rat
you(sg.)
x-at/*Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/*sg.abs-hear-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was you(sg.) that heard the man.’ [=()]
b. ja
foc
ri
the
achin
man
x-at/*Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/*sg.abs-hear-af
rat
you(sg.)
‘It was the man that heard you(sg.).’ [=()]
() a. ja
foc
yïn
me
x-in/*Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/*sg.abs-hear-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was me that heard the man.’ [=()]
b. ja
foc
ri
the
achin
man
x-in/*Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/*sg.abs-hear-af
yïn
me
‘It was the man that heard me.’ [=()]
Recall now the three models of obligatoriness surveyed in chapter —and in particular,
the derivational time-bombs model, exemplified by Chomsky’s (, ) uninterpretable
features approach to the obligatoriness of agreement. In this model, inflectional probes enter
the derivation bearing uninterpretable ϕ-features; these features, in their uninterpretable
state, cannot be part of a well-formed, end-of-the-derivation structure. Establishing a
successful ϕ-agreement relation has the eﬀect of rendering these features interpretable—or
perhaps, deleting them altogether—thereby avoiding ill-formedness.
Given this model, and given the obligatory nature of person agreement in Kichean Agent-
Focus (as demonstrated in (–)), we must assume that pi0 in Kichean is inserted into the
derivation bearing an uninterpretable [participant] feature. Upon entering into an agreement
relation with a st/nd-person argument, this uninterpretable [participant] feature is either
deleted, or rendered interpretable. Thus, the reason the non-agreeing variants of (–)
are ungrammatical is because no agreement relation has been established, and so nothing has
altered the uninterpretable state of the [participant] feature on pi0; and since uninterpretable
features that have not been tended to give rise to ill-formedness, ungrammaticality arises.
As noted above, I argued in §. that overt agreement with st/nd-person arguments
in the Agent-Focus construction (as well as agreement with regular absolutive arguments) in
Kichean is actually not the spellout of pi0 itself, but rather clitic-doubling of the st/nd-
person argument that is triggered when the argument is probed by pi0. This does not, however,
aﬀect the logic of feature-checking, agreement, and grammaticality: just like the clitic-
doubling observed in Basque, this clitic-doubling is neither optional, nor is it dependent on the
particular semantic properties of the doubled noun-phrase, such as animacy or specificity (see
§. for discussion). Indeed, if there were any possibility of suppressing or opting out of this
clitic-doubling, the non-agreeing variants of examples like (–) would be grammatical.
Instead, clitic-doubling is inescapably triggered when the relevant argument is probed by
pi0, meaning the presence of agreement morphology is a reliable indicator of pi0 finding an
appropriate agreement target. In other words, the clitic-doubling account does not alter the
way an uninterpretable features account (or any account based on derivational time-bombs)
would apply to these data.
WHY UNINTERPRETABLE FEATURES (AND OTHER DERIVATIONAL TIME-BOMBS) WON’T
WORK 
If the ungrammaticality of the non-agreeing variants of (–) is the result of the
uninterpretable feature(s) on pi0 going unchecked, we are left to wonder regarding the fate
of the same feature(s) in examples where both arguments are rd-person:1
() ja
foc
ri
the
tz’i’
dog
x-Ø-etzela-n
prfv-sg.abs-hate-af
ri
the
sian
cat
‘It was the dog that hated the cat.’ [=()]
() ja
foc
ri
the
xoq
woman
x-Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-sg.abs-see-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was the woman who saw the man.’ [=()]
I set aside the possibility that pi0 in (–) is generated without the relevant uninterpretable
feature(s); as will be shown in §., there is no generally tenable approach of this sort to
ϕ-agreement in Kichean.
Crucially, this possibility aside, examples like (–) should be ungrammatical unless
some node or other has checked the relevant feature(s) on pi0. There are no st/nd-person
agreement targets in (–) (nor does any st/nd-person agreement morphology show up
in these examples), therefore the putative checker of the uninterpretable feature(s) on pi0 must
be some rd-person node; but pi0 was shown in §. to systematically skip rd-person targets.
We are therefore left with the conclusion that nothing could have checked the uninterpretable
feature(s) on the probe, falsely predicting that (–) should be ungrammatical.
It is important to note that this is not an artifact of the particular technical implementation
chosen in chapter , where the ϕ-probe in Kichean is relativized to a particular node in the
ϕ-feature geometry (namely, [participant]). Any approach to agreement in Kichean Agent-
Focus that is based on uninterpretable features (and in fact, any approach based on probing,
in general) would have to include some provision whereby rd-person targets are ignored
by the relevant ϕ-probe. The reason is as follows: the uninterpretable features approach is
meant to enforce the obligatory nature of probing by inflectional nodes, and consequently, the
obligatoriness of ϕ-agreement in language (§..). If rd-person subjects could check the
uninterpretable feature(s) on the ϕ-probe, then they could—by hypothesis—cause the probe
to stop searching for a target. The omnivorous person eﬀects that were the subject of §.
would then never arise (or at least, they would be optional). We would predict that the subject
could control agreement in examples like (b, b), since it is unambiguously closer to the
ϕ-probe than the object; but this is not the case, as the agreement morphology in (b, b)
demonstrates.2
1Note that these combinations do not run afoul of the Agent-Focus person restriction, given in () (§..)
and repeated here:
(i) Agent-Focus person restriction
In the Agent-Focus construction in Kichean, at most one of the two core arguments can be st/nd-person.
[Davies and Sam-Colop , Dayley , Norman and Campbell , Smith-Stark , Stiebels ]
The restriction in (i) has nothing to say about Agent-Focus clauses where both the subject and the object are
rd-person—and such examples are, in fact, felicitous.
2If one opts for an analysis in the spirit of Béjar and Rezac’s () Cyclic Agree proposal—where the
ϕ-probe is situated in between the subject and object, and the object is the one probed first—then the same
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Finally, any account of these omnivorous person eﬀects which assumes that rd-person
subjects can check the uninterpretable feature(s) on the probe, but the probe then continues
searching for a st/nd-person object, is also untenable. First, note that such an account
would require a separate mechanism to force the probe to continue searching after the closer
subject has checked its uninterpretable feature(s) (otherwise we would falsely predict that the
omnivorous person eﬀects would be optional)—in which case, this separate mechanism can
be used throughout to enforce ϕ-agreement, rendering the uninterpretable featuresmechanism
redundant. More importantly, such an account would fall under the purview ofMultiple Agree;
and as shown in §., accounts based on Multiple Agree fail to capture the Agent-Focus person
restriction, whereby only one of the two core arguments in the Agent-Focus construction can
be non-rd-person (see §.. for a detailed discussion).
To conclude, there is no viable account of agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus
constructionwhere theϕ-probe responsible for person agreement enters into an agreement
relation with any rd-person arguments whatsoever.
Thus, any probing-based account of agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus must result in the
ϕ-probe skipping rd-person targets. In §.., I compared this to the behavior of interrogative
C0 in skipping non-wh phrases (§...), and the behavior of more familiar instances of Infl0
in skipping categories other than DP (§...); and I used the term relativized probing to
describe this generalized property of syntactic probes.
For the current purposes, however, it means that none of the rd-person arguments in
examples like (–) could have checked the uninterpretable ϕ-feature(s) on the probe.
Moreover, it means that no rd-person target whatsoever could have checked the feature(s)
on the probe. This also rules out, for example, agreement with a covert expletive, or agreement
with some clausal/predicational projection containing both the subject and object, as a way to
salvage the uninterpretable features account: since no st/nd-person agreement morphology is
found on the verb in (–), the covert expletive or clausal/predicational projection would
have to count as rd-person, for agreement purposes; but the idea that a rd-person node
would be targeted for agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus construction runs into the same
set of problems discussed above.
In summary, there is simply no syntactic node that could have checked the uninterpretable
ϕ-feature(s) on pi0 in (–), which means that these examples should be ungrammatical—
contra to fact.
It is possible, of course, that there exists some repair mechanism capable of eliminating
unchecked uninterpretable features from the representation before they have a chance to cause
ungrammaticality (e.g. Béjar’s  Default Valuation operation); but such a mechanism must
be a last resort, otherwise agreement is predicted to always be optional.
In other words, we need to distinguish cases where agreement has scanned the structure
and failed to find a suitable target (as in (–)), from cases that we might descriptively
characterize as “gratuitous non-agreement”—where there is an available accessible agreement
target, but agreement is not instantiated. Examples of “gratuitous non-agreement” would be
conclusion follows, only the relevant examples are (a, a), rather than (b, b). See the discussion
of the Cyclic Agree variant in §....
WHY UNINTERPRETABLE FEATURES (AND OTHER DERIVATIONAL TIME-BOMBS) WON’T
WORK 
the non-agreeing variants of (–), above—as well as an example like (b), repeated
from chapter :
() a. ha-necig-im
the-representative-pl
dibr-u
spoke-pl
(Hebrew, [=()])
‘The representatives spoke.’
b. * ha-necig-im
the-representative-pl
diber
spoke(sg.M)
To make sure that this repair mechanism is only allowed as a last resort (and in particular,
to prevent it from applying to cases of “gratuitous non-agreement”), the system must
keep track of whether agreement has been attempted, independently of whether it has
culminated successfully (which is what is tracked by the uninterpretable/interpretable or
unchecked/checked distinctions). In other words, there must be a separate mechanism that
enforces that ϕ-agreement be attempted, independently of its successful culmination; but
this renders the uninterpretable/interpretable status of ϕ-features entirely redundant, for the
purposes of enforcing the obligatoriness of agreement.3
The conclusion is therefore that uninterpretable features cannot be what is responsible for
the obligatory nature of person agreement in examples like (–).
.. Failed number agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus
Number agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus furnishes a very similar argument against
uninterpretable features as the one furnished by person agreement (§.). Concentrating on
Agent-Focus clauses where both the subject and object are rd-person, we observed omnivorous
agreement eﬀects with respect to the feature [plural] (examples repeated from §..):
() Ja
foc
rje’
them
x-e/*Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/*sg.abs-see-af
rja’
him
’It was them who saw him.’ [=()]
() Ja
foc
rja’
him
x-e/*Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/*sg.abs-see-af
rje’
them
’It was him who saw them.’ [=()]
As in the examples of person agreement in §., number agreement in (–) is obligatory
(at least with animate arguments; see fn.  in §..).
As before, if the ungrammaticality of the non-agreeing variants of (–) is the result
of the uninterpretable feature(s) on the ϕ-probe going unchecked, we are left to wonder
regarding the fate of the same feature(s) in examples like (–), repeated here:
() ja
foc
ri
the
tz’i’
dog
x-Ø-etzela-n
prfv-sg.abs-hate-af
ri
the
sian
cat
‘It was the dog that hated the cat.’ [=()]
3In fact, this separate principle will likely take the form of a rule or constraint—the two models given in
chapter  as alternatives to the derivational time-bombs model (to which the uninterpretable features approach
belongs), and which form the basis of the alternatives that are proposed in §..
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() ja
foc
ri
the
xoq
woman
x-Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-sg.abs-see-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was the woman who saw the man.’ [=()]
Again, I set aside the possibility that the ϕ-probe in (–) is generated without the
relevant uninterpretable feature(s); as will be shown in §., this is not a tenable approach
to examples of this sort.
This leads to what should be, by now, a familiar impasse: examples like (–)
should be ungrammatical unless some syntactic node or other has checked the relevant
feature(s) on the ϕ-probe; however, given that plural agreement morphology (“-e-”) does
not appear in examples like (–)—and there is no st/nd-person clitic there to
compete with number morphology over the single agreement slot—this putative checker of the
uninterpretable feature(s) could not have been plural. Therefore, to salvage an approach based
on uninterpretable features, one must assume that some projection that is formally singular
has checked the relevant features on the ϕ-probe; but if formally singular projections could
check the uninterpretable feature(s) in this construction, we would falsely predict that the
probe would agree with the singular subject in an examples like (), thereby eliminating the
need for the probe to search any further (if the checking of uninterpretable features were the
mechanism responsible for enforcing the obligatoriness of agreement, in the first place).
Finally, any account where a singular subject can check the uninterpretable feature(s) on
the probe, but the probe will keep searching for a plural object, will raise a familiar set
of problems. First, it would require a separate mechanism to force the probe to continue
searching after the subject has already checked the uninterpretable feature(s), a mechanism
which could then be used more generally to enforce the obligatoriness of ϕ-agreement,
rendering the uninterpretable features mechanism redundant. Second, an account of this sort
is a sub-case of Multiple Agree, which as mentioned in §., was shown to be an inadequate
account of ϕ-agreement in Kichean Agent-Focus (see §..).4
We are therefore left to conclude that singular targets cannot check the uninterpretable
feature(s) on the probe, leading to the false expectation that examples like (–) would be
ungrammatical.
4As noted in the text, the argument against Multiple Agree in Kichean Agent-Focus in §. was based on
the Agent-Focus person restriction, given in () and repeated here:
(i) Agent-Focus person restriction
In the Agent-Focus construction in Kichean, at most one of the two core arguments can be st/nd-person.
[Davies and Sam-Colop , Dayley , Norman and Campbell , Smith-Stark , Stiebels ]
In other words, the argument against Multiple Agree was based on the behavior of person agreement, rather
than number agreement. It is therefore theoretically possible that while person agreement in Kichean Agent-
Focus adheres to a Single Agree logic, number agreement still involves Multiple Agree. This would be entirely
ad-hoc, however, and amount to little more than a restatement of the fact that person features are involved in
licensing relations, while number features are not (a point discussed in greater detail in §..). Moreover, it
would not aﬀect the more general point made here and in §., regarding theMultiple Agree approach: if a rd-
person agreement target can defuse the derivational time-bomb(s) on the ϕ-probe (or check the uninterpretable
feature(s) on the ϕ-probe), there must be a separate mechanism that forces the probe to continue searching for
the object when the subject is rd-person—but this mechanism could then be used to drive ϕ-agreement in
general, rendering derivational time-bomb(s) (or uninterpretable features) redundant.
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This impasse obtains regardless of whether the syntactic node hypothesized to check the
uninterpretable ϕ-feature(s) in (–) is the subject, the object, or some other formally
singular target (such as a covert expletive, or a clausal/predicational projection).
As before, it is possible to amend this with a last-resort mechanism that tends to unchecked
uninterpretable features; but to ensure that this mechanism only applies as a last-resort, there
would need to be a device other than the uninterpretable features themselves that ensures that
agreement be attempted—rendering the uninterpretable status of these features redundant for
the purposes of driving ϕ-agreement, in the first place. See §. for a more detailed discussion.
.. Against selectively-present inducers of agreement
The discussion in §.–§. tacitly assumed that if uninterpretable features are what enforces
the obligatory nature of agreement, then they must be present in every derivation (at least in
finite clauses; see Aissen , as well as Coon, Mateo Pedro, and Preminger in prep., regarding
agreement in non-finite clauses in Mayan).
One might explore the possibility of relaxing this assumption, as a way of salvaging an
approach based on uninterpretable features. Suppose that the probe carries uninterpretable
ϕ-features exactly in those derivations where it is able to find an appropriate agreement
target.5 Thus, in a derivation in which agreement is possible, the probe would carry the
relevant uninterpretable feature(s), rendering ϕ-agreement obligatory; but in a derivation
where ϕ-agreement is not possible (e.g. due to the absence of an appropriate agreement target,
as is the case in examples like (–)), the corresponding head would be merged without
those features—or alternatively, not be merged at all—and therefore no “crash” would arise.
It is interesting to note that this logic mirrors almost exactly the logic routinely employed in
minimalist treatments of long-distance wh-movement, as proposed for example by Chomsky
(, ) and McCloskey () (see also Bošković  and Frampton and Gutmann
, and references therein, for discussion of the issues raised by such treatments). Under
the assumption that wh-movement is feature-driven and successive-cyclic—and that syntactic
structure is built incrementally from the bottom up—the embedded declarative C0 in an
example like () must carry a <wh> feature, to attract the wh-element to the periphery of
the embedded declarative:
() What did Mary say [twhat [C0 that]<+wh> John wanted twhat]?
This movement to the periphery of the embedded clause in () cannot be the result of the
featural specification on the matrix C0, since the matrix C0 has yet to be merged at the relevant
point in the derivation.
However, if the obligatoriness of wh-movement out of the embedded declarative in ()
is derived by means of <wh> being a derivational time-bomb (e.g. by being uninterpretable),
then the same C0 should cause ungrammaticality in an example like (), in which there is
no wh-element to be found—contra to fact:
() Mary said [ [C0 that] John wanted an armadillo].
5This analytical possibility was independently suggested to me by David Pesetsky and by Heidi Harley.
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The solution proposed by Chomsky and McCloskey is to assume that there are two variants of
declarative C0, one of which is equipped with a <wh> feature, and one of which is not; and
to posit that the <wh>-bearing variant is merged in exactly those derivations where there is a
wh-element to be found—thereby avoiding a “crash” in those declaratives that do not contain
a wh-element:6
() Mary said [ [C0 that]<Ø> John wanted an armadillo].
I believe the similarity between these two empirical domains (the obligatory-when-possible
nature of ϕ-agreement, and the obligatory-when-possible nature of wh-extraction) is not
accidental—a point to which I return in chapter  (see, in particular, §..).
For this approach to work, we need a principle that tells us under which circumstances each
variant of the probe can and cannot be merged. If the feature-free version of the probe could
be merged in every derivation, we would predict that agreement, as well as wh-movement,
would never be obligatory. In the domain of wh-extraction, the proposals cited above provide
an explanation for how the choice of the correct variant of C0 is enforced:
() * Mary said [ [C0 that]<+wh> John wanted an armadillo].
() * [ C0<+wh> Mary say [ [C0 that]<Ø> John wanted what] ]
In (), a <wh>-bearing C0 was chosen in an embedded clause with no wh-element to be
found; this results in ungrammaticality, then, because of an unchecked uninterpretable feature
on this embedded C0. In (), an embedded C0 without a <wh> was chosen; this results in
no wh-element being displaced to the periphery of the embedded clause. This is fine insofar
as the derivation of the embedded clause is concerned, but once we reach the periphery of the
matrix clause (which is interrogative in (), and therefore bears its own <wh> feature, just
as in (), above), there is no accessible wh-element that could check the uninterpretable
<wh> feature on the matrix C0, and this unchecked uninterpretable feature gives rise to
ungrammaticality.
A system of this sort might raise problems of computational lookahead, depending on
ones view of Chomsky’s (, ) overgeneration-followed-by-filtration approach (see
Frampton and Gutmann  for discussion), but I leave these issues aside for now.
Returning to the agreement facts at hand, we must now ask what it is that prevents the
feature-free version of theϕ-probe—or noϕ-probe at all—from beingmergedwhen agreement
is possible (recall that if nothing prevented this, we would falsely predict that agreement
would never be obligatory). In the domain of person agreement, it seems we have already
encountered a viable candidate for enforcing the merger of the feature-bearing version of the
ϕ-probe. Recall Béjar and Rezac’s () Person Licensing Condition (PLC):
() Person Licensing Condition (PLC) [=()]
Interpretable st/nd-person features must be licensed by entering into an Agree
relation with an appropriate functional category. [Béjar and Rezac ]
If the PLC constitutes a necessary condition on the merger of st/nd-person arguments, then
merging the feature-free variant of the ϕ-probe (or no ϕ-probe at all) when a st/nd-person
6See §.., on the question of whether the morphology of the Irish complementizer system constitutes
evidence in favor of this particular implementation (McCloskey ).
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agreement target is available would result in ungrammaticality due to a failure to license the
argument in question:
() ungrammaticality due to unlicensed [+participant] arguments
a. *
[
pi0<Ø> [you]<+prtc.> V0 [the man]
]
(cf. (a))
b. *
[
pi0<Ø> [the man] V0 [you]<+prtc.>
]
(cf. (b))
The same logic cannot be employed, however, when it comes to number agreement. The
reason is an asymmetry between person features and number features in Kichean Agent-
Focus that has already been highlighted in §..: while Agent-Focus allows at most one
[participant]-bearing argument (the Agent-Focus person restriction, () in §..), it allows
both arguments to bear [plural]. If the ungrammaticality of the non-agreeing version of an
example like (), below, is the result of a failure to license a [plural]-bearing argument, then
at least one of the [plural]-bearing arguments in () should be unlicensed as well, regardless
of the form of the verb; but crucially, () is grammatical (on the inadequacy of a Multiple
Agree approach, where the ϕ-probe is able to enter into an agreement relation with both core
arguments, see §.–§., as well as fn. ).
() Ja
foc
rja’
him
x-e/*Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/*sg.abs-see-af
rje’
them
’It was him who saw them.’ [=()]
() Ja
foc
rje’
them
x-oj-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl.abs-see-af
röj
us
’It was them who saw us.’ [=()]
Note that the same considerations rule out a related but distinct account for the obligatory
nature of ϕ-agreement—one that is based on the noun-phrases themselves, rather than the
ϕ-probes, carrying derivational time-bombs. If the obligatoriness of agreement with a plural
argument, as exemplified by (), were the result of a derivational time-bomb borne by the
plural noun-phrase itself, we would again predict that examples like () (where at most, one
of the two plural arguments has been agreed with) would be ungrammatical, contra to fact.
In other words, once we allow the finite verb in Kichean to occur without uninterpretable
number features, there seems to be no way of enforcing agreement in an example like ()
that does not falsely predict ungrammaticality for ().
I therefore conclude that selectively-present inducers of agreement, while they may
occur in other empirical domains, are not a viable way of salvaging the uninterpretable
features approach to agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus construction—and therefore, the
arguments provided against this approach in §.–§. stand.
.. Taking stock: Obligatory operations and violable constraints
We have seen that the particular patterns of ϕ-agreement observed in the Agent-Focus
construction in Kichean rule out an account of the obligatoriness of ϕ-agreement in terms
of the kind of representational device I have termed derivational time-bombs, including the
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uninterpretable features proposal of Chomsky (, ) (another case-study that supports
the same conclusion, involving failed agreement in Basque, will be presented in chapter ).
This result actually extends to any approach where ϕ-agreement and grammaticality are
bi-conditionally related to one another, since what we have uncovered is the existence of
grammatical utterances in which the agreement host (the finite verb) has demonstrably failed
to find a suitable target with which to agree (as was shown to be the case in Agent-Focus clauses
where both arguments are rd-person and/or singular; see, for example, (–) above).
It is also worth pointing out that this result means that ϕ-agreement—and by extension,
any notion of case where the assignment of case is parasitic on ϕ-agreement—cannot have
anything to do with the licensing of arguments or noun-phrases in Kichean. This is already
suggested by the existence of two non-oblique noun-phrases in the Agent-Focus construction,
with only one agreement slot on the verb (in contrast with regular transitives in Kichean,
which have separate agreement markers for the subject and the object; see §..). It is even
more striking, though, now that we have shown that there are Agent-Focus clauses where
no successful agreement has taken place at all. Note also that the arguments in the relevant
examples (e.g. in (), “ri xoq” ‘the woman’ and “ri achin” ‘the man’) are both full DPs,
rather than bare nominals. This might raise the question of why it seemed that ϕ-agreement
had anything to do with DP-licensing, in the first place (outside of the licensing of st/nd-
person arguments, as discussed above); I will oﬀer a possible answer to this question in §...
We are now in need of an account that enforces the obligatoriness of ϕ-agreement,
but is also compatible with the grammaticality of utterances in which ϕ-agreement has
demonstrably failed. Of the three models presented in chapter , this leaves the obligatory
operations and violable constraints models.
If we opt for the obligatory operations approach (§..), we could posit an operation
whose eﬀects are—as in Chomsky’s (, ) Agree—the valuation of ϕ-features on the
agreement host (the “probe”) using the feature-values on the agreement target (or their
feature-geometric equivalents; see below). Crucially, however, this would diﬀer from Agree
in two important respects: first, its invocation would be obligatory (recall that in Chomsky’s
model, the obligatoriness of Agree is derivative, a side-eﬀect of the crash-inducing nature of
uninterpretable features; see §..); and second, it would be allowed to fail, with no adverse
eﬀects on the derivation. This operation is formalized in (), below:7
() find(f ): given an unvalued feature f on a head H0, find an XP bearing a valued
instance of f , and assign that value to H0
As in §.., the terms “unvalued feature f ” and “XP bearing a valued instance of f ” in
() are to be taken as shorthand for the corresponding feature-geometric notions (namely,
a placeholder for a piece of feature-geometry rooted in f , and an XP that is specified for
the privative node f in the feature-geometry, respectively; see §... for a more detailed
discussion).
Now recall that pi0 and #0 in Kichean seek [participant] features and [plural] features,
respectively (as detailed in §.). Thus, when pi0 and #0 are merged, they trigger obligatory
invocation of the operation in ()—in particular, find([participant]) and find([plural]),
7As pointed out to me by David Pesetsky, an important precursor to this line of thinking can be found in
the work of López (), though the arguments there are of a diﬀerent nature than the ones presented here.
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respectively. Given this model, if nothing in the derivation carries valued [participant] or
[plural] features, then find([participant]) and find([plural]) will simply fail; this is the case
when both the subject and object are rd-person singular, as in (–), for example:
() ja
foc
ri
the
tz’i’
dog
x-Ø-etzela-n
prfv-sg.abs-hate-af
ri
the
sian
cat
‘It was the dog that hated the cat.’ [=()]
() ja
foc
ri
the
xoq
woman
x-Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-sg.abs-see-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was the woman who saw the man.’ [=()]
In this case, failure of () simply means that no [participant] and [plural] values will be
assigned to pi0 and #0, respectively. This lack of valuation does not give rise to ill-formedness,
nor does it aﬀord any special status to pi0 and #0, or assign any “ungrammaticality diacritic”
to them; the derivation simply continues unhindered:
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() failure of find( [participant] ) and find( [plural] ) due to lack of
suitable targets
8 [≡(–)]
#P
piP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
obj3sg
ϕ-set=Ø
V0
· · ·
subj3sg
ϕ-set=Ø
· · ·
pi0
participant?
#0
plural?
⇒
· · ·
#P
piP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
obj3sg
ϕ-set=Ø
V0
· · ·
subj3sg
ϕ-set=Ø
· · ·
pi0
participant=Ø
#0
plural=Ø
· · ·
The invocation of () is syncategorematically triggered by the merger of a lexical item
that carries unvalued ϕ-features, and is therefore obligatory whenever such an item is merged.
The obligatoriness of the rule correctly rules out “gratuitous non-agreement”, as in the non-
agreeing variants of (–), for example:
() a. ja
foc
rat
you(sg.)
x-at/*Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/*sg.abs-hear-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was you(sg.) that heard the man.’ [=()]
b. ja
foc
ri
the
achin
man
x-at/*Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/*sg.abs-hear-af
rat
you(sg.)
‘It was the man that heard you(sg.).’ [=()]
8The derivation schematized in () abstracts away from the fact that pi0 and #0 are merged separately
from one another (see §. for a detailed discussion); therefore, find([participant]) and find([plural]) will
each be triggered in separate derivational steps.
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() a. Ja
foc
rje’
them
x-e/*Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/*sg.abs-see-af
rja’
him
’It was them who saw him.’ [=()]
b. Ja
foc
rja’
him
x-e/*Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/*sg.abs-see-af
rje’
them
’It was him who saw them.’ [=()]
This is an important point: the ungrammatical variants of (–), in this approach, are not
ruled out due to some oﬀending diacritic or representational property that they carry; they are
ruled out because there is simply no derivational sequence allowed by the grammar in which
() is not invoked—and thus, no derivational sequence in which the available [participant]
features in () and the available [plural] features in () are not copied onto pi0 and #0,
respectively (in the case of pi0, triggering concomitant clitic-doubling; see §.).
Note that this idea—that a particular structure would be ruled out not because of any
oﬀending element or diacritic, but because there is no well-formed derivation that leads to this
structure—is also present in virtually every account involving minimality/Closest. In these
cases, some node α can in principle establish a relation with either of two possible targets, β
and γ ; but if β is structurally closer, the representation in which α has established a relation
with γ is ruled out:
() a. α ≫ β ≫ γ
b. * α ≫ β ≫ γ
Crucially, what rules out a structure like (b) is not some unchecked feature or other
representational diacritic—but rather, the fact that there is no well-formed derivation (in this
case, one that obeys minimality/Closest) that leads to this structure; see Richards , and
references therein, for many examples of this logic at work.
On the current proposal, the ill-formedness of “gratuitous non-agreement” (as in, for
example, the non-agreeing variants of (–)) is a similar sort of eﬀect: there is simply
no well-formed derivation leading to that surface representation (in this case, due to the fact
that find(f ) must be invoked).
The same logic extends to other cases of “gratuitous non-agreement”—as in the Hebrew
data repeated here:
() a. ha-necig-im
the-representative-pl
dibr-u
spoke-pl
(Hebrew, [=()])
‘The representatives spoke.’
b. * ha-necig-im
the-representative-pl
diber
spoke(sg.M)
Assuming that agreement in Hebrew is triggered by unvalued ϕ-features on the finite
verb/Infl0, the invocation of find([ϕ]) will find valued ϕ-features on the subject (“ha-necig-
im” ‘the-representative-pl’) when it is still within the verb-phrase. Following the definition of
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find(f ) in (), this will result in valuation of the ϕ-features on the finite verb/Infl0, whose
overt expression is the agreement marker “-u” (‘-pl’).
The same logic also rules out instances that can be described as “gratuitous agreement”—
namely, plural or st/nd-person agreement morphology in a derivation where no plural or
st/nd-person target can be found by find(f ):
() ja
foc
ri
the
tz’i’
dog
x-Ø/*at/*e/*ix/...-etzela-n
prfv-sg/*sg/*pl/*pl/...abs-hate-af
ri
the
sian
cat
(Kaqchikel)
‘It was the dog that hated the cat.’
() ja
foc
ri
the
xoq
woman
x-Ø/*at/*e/*ix/...-tz’et-ö
prfv-sg/*sg/*pl/*pl/...abs-see-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was the woman who saw the man.’
() ha-nacig
the-representative
diber/*dibar-ti/*dibr-u/*dibar-tem/...
spoke(sg.M)/*spoke-sg/*spoke-pl/*spoke-pl/...
(Hebrew)
‘The representatives spoke.’
The ungrammatical instances of (–) are ruled out because a derivation in which find(f )
is invoked and finds valued [plural], [participant], or [author] features simply does not exist.
Given that find(f ) is allowed to terminate without having succeeded (for example, due
to the absence of an appropriate target), the absence of a derivation that leads to an observed
string—as in the ungrammatical variants of (–, ) and (–)—is generally the
only way for agreement-related ungrammaticality to arise, on this account. This will prove
crucial once the empirical picture is broadened to include instances of defective intervention,
which are the topic of chapter .
As an alternative to find(f ), one could opt for a solution within the violable constraints
model. In §.., I sketched an account based on a constraint such as HaveAgr, in ():
() HaveAgr: Assign one violation mark for every failure to represent the ϕ-features of
the designated argument on a finite verb. [=()]
Instances of “gratuitous non-agreement”, on this view, would incur violations of HaveAgr
that do not satisfy any higher ranked constraint. To be predictive, this approach would
ultimately require a theory of the set of constraints that could conceivably dominate and
interact with HaveAgr, as well as a theory of gen (the function that generates the set of
competing candidates for a given input).
On the other hand, it is easy to see that a structure like ()—the representation of an
Agent-Focus sentence where both arguments are rd-person singular, as in (–)—does
not incur any violations of HaveAgr at all: neither the inflectional nodes associated with
finiteness (pi0 and #0) nor any of the arguments in (–)/() bear any ϕ-feature values,
meaning HaveAgr is vacuously satisfied.
WHY UNINTERPRETABLE FEATURES (AND OTHER DERIVATIONAL TIME-BOMBS) WON’T
WORK 
() #P
piP
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
obj3sg
ϕ-set=Ø
V0
· · ·
subj3sg
ϕ-set=Ø
· · ·
pi0
participant=Ø
#0
plural=Ø
Assuming no violations of other relevant constraints are incurred by a structure like (),
this candidate will harmonically bound its competitors (i.e., outperform them regardless of
the constraint ranking), correctly predicting the well-formedness of examples like (–).
Before concluding this chapter, I would like to address an apparent similarity between this
last constraint-based model, and the idea that agreement in the Agent-Focus is driven by a scale
or “salience” hierarchy (Dayley , Mondloch , Norman and Campbell , Smith-Stark
, among others):
() “salience” hierarchy in Kichean Agent-Focus [=()]
st/nd-person≫ rd-plural≫ rd-singular
In chapter , I provided empirical arguments against such an approach—most importantly,
the morpho-phonological diﬀerences between the st/nd-person agreement markers (which
resemble the corresponding strong pronouns, and which encode singular/plural distinctions
suppletively) and the rd-person ones (which do not resemble the corresponding pronouns,
and which may contain an isolable plural morpheme). These diﬀerences between the relevant
agreement markers arise within and outside of the Agent-Focus construction, suggesting
that they have a source other than (); but in §., I presented an account of these
morpho-phonological diﬀerences that also derives the supposed “hierarchy” eﬀects, rendering
a formalism like () entirely redundant.
With respect to the current discussion, one may notice that a scale like () bears at least
superficial similarity to a violable constraints model; indeed, one could model the same scale
using a series of ranked constraints:
() HaveAgrWith/≫ HaveAgrWithPl≫ HaveAgr
where –
HaveAgrWith/: Assign one violation mark for every failure to represent the
ϕ-features of a st/nd-person argument on the finite verb.
HaveAgrWithPl: Assign one violation mark for every failure to represent the
ϕ-features of a plural argument on the finite verb.
HaveAgr: Assign one violation mark for every failure to represent the
ϕ-features of the designated argument on a finite verb. [=()]
 TAKING STOCK: OBLIGATORY OPERATIONS AND VIOLABLE CONSTRAINTS
A proposal of this sort is advanced, for example, by Stiebels (). As with approaches based
directly on scales or “salience” hierarchies, this approach separates the choice of agreement
target from ϕ-agreement itself—the choice of target is treated as an autonomous component
of ϕ-agreement (in particular, one that is governed by the logic of violable ranked constraints,
like the ones in ()). As discussed in §.., such an approach cannot account for the fact
that the markers that arise when the agreement target is st/nd-person (which resemble the
corresponding strong pronouns, and encode number distinctions suppletively) have diﬀerent
morpho-phonological properties than those that arise when the target is rd-person (which
do not resemble the corresponding pronouns, and may involve an isolable plural morpheme).
The account presented in §. derives both these morpho-phonological distinctions, and the
hierarchy eﬀects that a system like () is meant to account for, in the first place.
Crucially, the same considerations do not extend to a generalized HaveAgr constraint,
which only enforces that ϕ-agreement occur—since the ϕ-agreement process itself can still
be a non-uniform process, where the choice of agreement target interacts with the nature
of the resulting agreement morphology. In particular, it is compatible with st/nd-person
agreement markers arising via clitic-doubling, but rd-person (plural) ones arising by direct
exponence (as proposed in §..–§..), and can therefore handle the fact that the former
markers resemble the corresponding Kichean pronouns, but the latter markers do not.
It seems then that twomodels, the obligatory operations model and the violable constraints
model, are still in contention. To be able to distinguish between the two, we will have to
consider a diﬀerent sort of failed agreement—namely, defective intervention, which is the topic
of the next chapter.
WHY UNINTERPRETABLE FEATURES (AND OTHER DERIVATIONAL TIME-BOMBS) WON’T
WORK 
.A. Appendix: How did we get here? A historical interlude
In light of the inadequacy—as demonstrated in this chapter—of Chomsky’s (, )
uninterpretable features proposal (a sub-case of the more general derivational time-bombs
model; §..) as a means of enforcing the obligatoriness of ϕ-agreement, we might ask
ourselves how it is that this proposal originally came about. This appendix aims to address
that question.
Recent work in generative linguistics has seen a shift towards a radically reduced inventory
of operations—down to perhaps only two: Agree and Merge (see, for example, Chomsky ).
As an almost inescapable result, the explanatory burden has shifted onto more and more
articulated representations.9 The remaining operations, in turn, are seen as neither “obligatory”
nor “optional”, in any meaningful sense, but rather deployed freely by the computational
system in the interest of ultimately creating a well-formed representation.
Thus, while ultimately untenable on empirical grounds (§.), the uninterpretable features
approach took the obligatoriness of ϕ-agreement to be a property not of the operation that
manipulates ϕ-features (Agree; Chomsky , ), but of the ϕ-features themselves.
This representationally-driven approach to syntax was preceded, in the course of the
development of syntactic theory, by a transformational approach which shares interesting
similarities with the obligatory operations model espoused in §.. Thus, wh-movement for
example was seen as a transformation (or by other names, a rule or operation) labeled “Move
wh-phrase” (Chomsky :), whose obligatoriness was amatter of the transformation itself,
not a property of wh-phrases per se.
Historically, the shift from this transformational approach to the representational approach
discussed above coincided with a crucial shift in the perspective on movement. The various
empirical patterns that fall under the umbrella of Relativized Minimality (Rizzi )—for
example, superiority eﬀects in multiple-wh questions—prompted a shift to viewing movement
as a response to the needs of the landing-site, or an “attractor” structurally adjacent to the
landing-site (see Frampton ). Eventually, this led to the probe-goal model of how pairs of
positions come to be related in syntax (Chomsky ), a model used throughout this thesis,
as well.
An additional observation was then made regarding at least some of these probe-goal
relations—in particular, those that are referred to here as ϕ-agreement (§.)—regarding the
semantic contributions of the features that enter into these relations. The observation was
that features like [plural] or [participant] are meaningful on a noun-phrase, but they are
not meaningful on a verb or TAM-marker, even if they are morphologically expressed there
(Chomsky b:–).10 In other words, the idea was that ϕ-features can be interpreted
on the goal, but not on the probe—hence the terms interpretable and uninterpretable.
9A prime example of this shift is the exploded inventory of functional projections known as “cartography”,
espoused by authors like Rizzi (), Belletti (), and Cinque () (see also Starke’s  “Nanosyntax”
program, which represents perhaps the most extreme manifestation of this approach). Authors like Neeleman
and van de Koot () and van Craenenbroeck () have shown not only that these exploded functional
inventories can be dispensed with, given much more modest expansions to the inventory of operations, but
that such alternatives actually provide empirical coverage that is superior to their “cartographic” counterparts.
10This distinction might ultimately prove to be too simplistic, once issues such as pluractionality are
considered; it is presented here as a matter of historical faithfulness, not as a theoretical commitment.
 APPENDIX: HOW DID WE GET HERE? A HISTORICAL INTERLUDE
Given that accounting for the obligatory nature of ϕ-agreement is a desideratum for
any theory (§.), Chomsky moved to derive it from this interpretive asymmetry—based on
the conjecture that uninterpretable features cannot be handled by the semantic interface, and
would cause ill-formedness if they were still present at the point of semantic interpretation.
Agreement (or Agree), on this view, would serve to eliminate these problematic features from
the representation, or at least change their uninterpretable status (see §..). In other words,
the obligatoriness of ϕ-agreement had been “tethered” to the uninterpretability.
In this discussion, we have touched on two specific changes that have taken place in
the theory of syntax: the shift to a probe-goal perspective on syntactic relations, and the
tethering of obligatoriness to uninterpretability. Crucially, the former is logically independent
of the latter; indeed, the find(f ) proposal advanced in §. is probe-goal based, but eschews
uninterpretable features—as will the refinement of this proposal that will be pursued in
the next chapter. Instead, this proposal implements probe-goal relations as a matter of
valuation (see, in particular, §...), but with no special status aﬀorded to as-of-yet-
unvalued probes, beyond not having a value (in particular, they are not considered to carry
an “ungrammaticality diacritic”).
Furthermore, while the arguments for probe-goal were empirical in nature (superiority
patterns, etc.), the arguments for tethering obligatoriness to uninterpretability were purely
conceptual. It was an attempt to explain one observed phenomenon (the obligatoriness of
ϕ-agreement) in terms of another (interpretive diﬀerences between ϕ-features on the probe
and ϕ-features on the goal), and thus a completely reasonable null-hypothesis to pursue; but
one that can and should be abandoned in the face of contradictory evidence, which is exactly
what we have seen in this chapter.
I remain agnostic as to where the flaw lurks, exactly, in Chomsky’s argument. Perhaps
ϕ-features on verbs/TAM-markers are not “uninterpretable” in the first place; or alternatively,
perhaps uninterpretable features do not cause ill-formedness at the syntax-semantics interface,
and instead are simply ignored by the interpretive procedure. I leave these question for future
research. What is clear, following the results of §., is that uninterpretable features, if such a
thing exists, cannot be responsible for the obligatory nature of ϕ-agreement. See chapter —
and in particular, §.—for further discussion regarding the status of uninterpretable features
in syntactic theory, in general.
What this shows us is that the extreme shift of the explanatory burden onto representations
and away from the derivational engine is ill-conceived, at least in the domain of ϕ-agreement;
and that perhaps, the “representationalist tide” discussed here should be reversed, or at least
stemmed.
Chapter 
Datives, defective intervention, and
case-discrimination
In this chapter, we turn to another phenomenon that bears the hallmarks of failed agreement—
one that actually features much more prominently in the literature on ϕ-agreement than
patterns of the kind discussed in chapters – do—namely, defective intervention.
Descriptively, this term refers to instances where a particular phrase—in most of the cases
discussed, a dative DP/PP—is able to block agreement from targeting a more embedded noun-
phrase, but is unable to transfer its own ϕ-features to the agreement host. Whether examples
of this sort constitute a true failure of agreement is a matter of analysis, of course, and that
analysis is the topic of this chapter.
I will highlight a particular point of cross-linguistic variation in the behavior of defective
intervention—namely, that when movement is involved, defective intervention gives rise to
ungrammaticality, whereas when the putative agreement target is in situ, it gives rise to
“default” (e.g. rd-person singular) agreement. This property, I will argue, is best captured if
defective intervention is an instance of failed agreement proper: a case where ϕ-agreement (or
the operation responsible for it) is invoked, but fails to culminate successfully—just like the
Kichean Agent-Focus cases discussed in chapter .
The proposal will revive a common intuition in the analyses of movement and agreement,
that movement to canonical subject position is somehow parasitic on ϕ-agreement (see, for
example, Chomsky b); but in the current proposal, this will be parametrized—a property
only of non-quirky-subject languages (e.g. French, English), crucially not of quirky-subject
languages (e.g. Icelandic). I will show that this independently-observable parameterization
correctly predicts the distribution of ungrammaticality versus “default” agreement with
respect to defective intervention.
I begin with a discussion of the phenomenon of defective intervention itself (§.–§.),
followed by a survey of diﬀerent theoretical approaches to this phenomenon (§.). In
§.., I highlight recent work by Bobaljik () which shows—independently of defective
intervention—that any theory of ϕ-agreement must allow agreement to be discriminant
regarding the case-marking borne by its putative targets, a property I refer to as case-
discrimination.1 I show that while the particular extension of case-discrimination proposed by
1While case-discrimination requires a theory of case that is independent of ϕ-agreement, the need for such
a theory of case has been demonstrated by Marantz (), Zaenen, Maling, and Thráinsson (
 THE INABILITY OF DATIVES TO VALUE FEATURES ON A ϕ-PROBE
Bobaljik to handle defective intervention falls short (§...), the same case-discrimination
property he argues for—coupled with the results of chapter , regarding the existence
of tolerated failed agreement in grammatical utterances—furnishes a theory of defective
intervention that yields the correct results regarding the distribution of ungrammaticality and
“default” agreement. In §., I detail how this would work based on the obligatory operations
model outlined in chapter , and in particular, the operation find(f ), proposed in chapter .
Finally, in §., I argue that this behavior of defective intervention can distinguish between
this model and the violable constraints model (recall the conclusion of chapter , showing
that obligatory operations and violable constraints were the models capable of handing the
empirical patterns of failed agreement discussed there; see §.). I show that the behavior of
defective intervention, in particular in those instances where it gives rise to ungrammaticality,
favors an account in terms of obligatory operations over one based on violable constraints.
Section §. provides a summary.
.. The inability of datives to value features on a ϕ-probe
Icelandic provides a clear case where dative noun-phrases are unable to transfer their own
ϕ-features to the finite verb (Bobaljik , Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir , Sigurðsson
, , among others).2 To see this, consider first the following example:
() Morgum
many
studentum
students.pl.dat
liki/*lika
like.sg/*pl
verkið
the.job.nom
(Icelandic)
‘Many students like the job.’ [Harley ]
We can convince ourselves that examples like () are not a matter of some “preference” to
agree with a nominative, when possible; the same eﬀect arises in the absence of a nominative
noun-phrase altogether:
() Strákunum
the.boys.pl.dat
leiddist/*leiddust
bored.sg/*pl
‘The boys were bored.’ [Sigurðsson ]
The choice of the verb “leiddist” (‘be.bored’) in () (a choice due to Sigurðsson, op. cit.) is
particularly instructive, since the same stem has a second use in which it takes a nominative
argument, and means ‘walk hand in hand’; and in this second use, the verb obligatorily agrees
with its single nominative argument:
() Strákarnir
the.boys.pl.nom
leiddust/*leiddist
walked.hand.in.hand.pl/*sg
‘The boys walked hand in hand.’ [Sigurðsson ]
This pattern has received various treatments in the literature. For some, it is taken to be
the result of the Activity Condition (Chomsky ): the ϕ-features on the dative nominal
who show that nominative case in a language like Icelandic can arise on noun-phrases that ϕ-agreement has
demonstrably failed to reach (see also §., where a similar finding is demonstrated independently of defective
intervention).
2The inability of dative noun-phrases to transfer their own ϕ-features to the finite verb is not cross-
linguistically invariant; see Rezac a, as well as §.., for further discussion.
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enter into a checking relation with a silent preposition (McGinnis ), or with the K0 head
of a dative Kase Phrase (Bayer, Bader, and Meng , Bittner and Hale ), rendering
them inactive and unable to enter a ϕ-agreement relation with the finite verb; this approach is
discussed further in §... For others, it is a matter of locality: datives are PPs, and PPs are
locality domains (Baltin , van Riemsdijk , Abels , among others), preventing
the features of the enclosed nominals from being accessed from outside the PP (see, for
example, Rezac a); this approach is discussed further in §... For others yet, it has
been taken as evidence that ϕ-agreement discriminates among its potential targets based on
their (morphological) case-marking (Bobaljik , revising and extending the cross-linguistic
typology of agreement targets originally observed by Moravcsik , ); this approach is
discussed further in §...
Interestingly, while these approaches each oﬀer explanations for why the features of the
(enclosed) dative nominal cannot be accessed from the outside, they underdetermine what will
happen instead. Attempts to establish agreement with a dative target could conceivably result
in (i) ungrammaticality; (ii) default (e.g. rd-person singular) features on the agreement host;
or (iii) agreement with the next-closest potential agreement target in lieu of the dative (e.g. a
nominative noun-phrase that is the structurally closest target other than the dative). Teasing
apart these diﬀerent possibilities is the topic of the next section.
.. The Dative Paradox: Datives as defective interveners
While datives cannot transfer their own ϕ-feature values to the probe (§.), they do count as
potential targets for the calculus of Relativized Minimality (Frampton , Rizzi ) and its
contemporary counterparts (e.g. Chomsky’s b Minimal Link Condition, referred to here
as Closest). In other words, the same datives that appear inert for the purposes of ϕ-feature
valuation, are simultaneously able to prevent the probe from searching further for a non-inert
target with which to agree.
Consider the Icelandic transitive-expletive construction, a construction in which the subject
position of the finite clause is occupied by the expletive “það”. In this construction, just as in
(–), the dative cannot value the ϕ-features on the finite verb:3
() það
expl
finnst(/*finnast)
find.sg/*find.pl
[ mörgum
many
stúdentum ]dat
students.pl.dat
[sc tölvan
the.computer.sg.nom
ljótar
ugly
].
‘Many students find the computer ugly.’ [Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir :]
7
However, the dative experiencer in this construction precludes the ϕ-probe from searching
any further, and valuing its ϕ-features using the feature values found on the low nominative:
3There is one possible exception to this generalization, involving “dative harmony”: plural agreement on
the finite verb is judged as marginally acceptable by some speakers, provided that both the dative intervener
and the putative nominative target are plural (Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir :fn. ). A very similar eﬀect is
attested in Basque (see Etxepare , which is also where the term “case harmony” is coined). The fact that
this is the only part of the grammar where plural agreement on the finite verb depends on the plurality of two
arguments simultaneously, suggests that “dative harmony” might be more of a production/processing eﬀect.
 THE DATIVE PARADOX: DATIVES AS DEFECTIVE INTERVENERS
() það
expl
finnst(/*finnast)
find.sg/*find.pl
[einhverjum
some
stúdent]dat
student.sg.dat
[sc tölvurnar
the.computers.pl.nom
ljótar
ugly
].
‘Some student finds the computers ugly.’ [Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir :]
7
Compare the state of aﬀairs in () with (), where the dative has been moved out of its
intervening position, and agreement with the low nominative goes through:
() [Einhverjum
some
stúdent]1
student.sg.dat
finnast
find.pl
t1 [sc tölvurnar
the.computers.pl.nom
ljótar
ugly
].
‘Some student finds the computers ugly.’ [Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir :]
This state of aﬀairs diﬀers crucially from the patterns discussed in chapter . Setting aside
ϕ-agreement for a moment, recall the behavior of wh-probing, as outlined in §..:
() a.
[
C0 [who]<+wh> gave [this dish] to [Bob]
]
[=()]
−→
[
C0 [who]<+wh> gave [this dish] to [Bob]
]
−→ Who gave this dish to Bob?
b.
[
C0 [John] gave [what]<+wh> to [Bob]
]
−→
[
C0 [John] gave [what]<+wh> to [Bob]
]
−→ What did John give to Bob?
c.
[
C0 [John] gave [this dish] to [who]<+wh>
]
−→
[
C0 [John] gave [this dish] to [who]<+wh>
]
−→ Who did John give this dish to?
In (a–c), we see that phrases that lack the feature that the wh-probe is searching for do not
preclude the probe from searching further, a property I have labeled relativized probing; the
same was observed in chapter  for [participant]-probes and [plural]-probes.
With respect to the behavior of datives under ϕ-agreement, this means that it cannot be
the case that datives are truly bereft of the features that the ϕ-probe is searching for. This
might seem trivially true in the sense that dative noun-phrases can be singular or plural,
st/nd/rd-person, etc.; but that is not the sense that is relevant here: the question here
is whether datives, when viewed “from the outside” by a probe searching for an agreement
target, behave like a node that carries ϕ-features or not.
The results surveyed in §. might suggest that whatever ϕ-features are contained within
a dative noun-phrase, they are not visible to outside probes—since, after all, they cannot
be transfered to an agreement host; but the diﬀerence between (–) and patterns like
(a–c) suggests otherwise. If datives behaved as nodes with no ϕ-features at all (for the
purposes of agreement “from the outside”), they would be skipped by ϕ-probes entirely, much
like the non-wh phrases in (a–c). Recall from the discussion in §.. that if projections that
completely lacked ϕ-features were relevant for ϕ-probing, then the ϕ-probe would not even be
able to look past nodes like VP, intransitive vP, etc., along the clausal spine; we must therefore
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conclude that projections that lack ϕ-features entirely do not interact with ϕ-probing, and
concomitantly, that this cannot be the status of the outermost projection of a dative argument.
This is, in essence, the reason for the term defective in “defective intervention”: datives
cannot be thought of as non-bearers of ϕ-features, because they interact with ϕ-probing; but
they cannot be thought of as full-fledged bearers of ϕ-features, since they quite plainly do
not behave as such, as detailed in §. (see also Preminger , for evidence from Basque
that defective intervention by datives is indeed sensitive to structural prominence, rather than
to the linear sequence of elements, just like relativized probing). This leads to an apparent
paradox: how can a node simultaneously bear ϕ-features and not bear them? In what follows,
I will refer to this as the dative paradox.
In §., I will argue that the existence of failed agreement in grammatical utterances—
argued for independently of defective intervention, in chapter —holds the key to a cross-
linguistically viable account of the dative paradox. First, however, I turn to a survey of several
existing treatments of the dative paradox, in §..
.. Existing treatments of the Dative Paradox
There are several approaches to the dative paradox (§.) that one finds in the literature. In
this section, I survey and critique these diﬀerent approaches.
... The Activity Condition
One approach to the dative paradox, already mentioned in §., is the Activity Condition.
The basic idea is that features that have already entered into a ϕ-agreement relation are
inactive, and therefore unable to enter into additional ϕ-agreement relations. As it pertains
to datives, one could assume that the ϕ-features on the dative nominal have already entered
into a ϕ-agreement relation with a local case assigner (a null preposition, or the head of a Kase
Phrase; see §.), rendering them inactive.
Crucially, however, if this is to serve as a solution to the dative paradox, then having
inactive ϕ-features must be syntactically distinguishable from having no ϕ-features at all
(cf. having no wh-features at all, as in (a–c)). This means that activity is, in essence, a
diacritic: ϕ-features enter this derivation with the diacritic set to “on”, and the first agreement
relation they enter into sets it to “oﬀ”; coupled with the assumption that valuation can only
occur when the diacritic on the target is set to “on”, we get the eﬀect in ()—namely, the
inability of datives to transfer their ϕ-feature values to the finite verb (in Chomsky’s ,
 original implementation of the Activity Condition, the activity diacritic was unified with
the uninterpretable case feature borne by the nominal; but such an approach is untenable given
the existence of nominals that are successfully case-marked without being agreed with; see
Marantz , Zaenen, Maling, and Thráinsson , among others, as well as the discussion
of DP licensing in Kichean in §.).
The fact that (in)activity is a diacritic is not necessarily a fatal flaw in the Activity Condition
approach; alternative approaches to the dative paradox require similarly stipulative moves. It
is simply meant to highlight that theActivity Condition approach, too, is rooted in a stipulation.
Thus, the decision between this approach and others will have to be based on other factors.
 EXISTING TREATMENTS OF THE DATIVE PARADOX
This is where empirical comparisons between the diﬀerent approaches come into play. It
turns out that the Activity Condition is empirically problematic, independently of the dative
paradox. I will demonstrate this point using data from Tsez, as discussed by Polinsky and
Potsdam (). Tsez is not necessarily unique in providing evidence against the Activity
Condition; instances of so-called hyper-raising may furnish a similar argument, depending
on their precise analysis (see Ferreira  and Rodrigues  on Brazilian Portuguese, for
example). Tsez, however, furnishes perhaps the clearest case against the Activity Condition.
As shown in (a–b), the verb in Tsez agrees in noun-class (i–iv) with the absolutive
argument (the subject of an intransitive / object of a transitive):
() a. ziya
cow.iii.abs
b-ik’i-s
iii-go-past.evid
‘The cow left.’
b. eniy-a¯
mother-erg
ziya
cow.iii.abs
b-is˘er-si
iii-feed–past.evid
‘The mother fed the cow.’ [Polinsky and Potsdam :]
However, as Polinsky and Potsdam show, arguments in Tsez can trigger overt ϕ-agreement
on more than one agreement host; in particular, embedded topics trigger agreement on the
embedding predicate, as well:
() a. eni-r
mother-dat
[uz˘i
boy.i.abs
ø-a¯y-ru-łi]
i-arrive-past.prt-nmz
ø-iy-xo
i-know-pres
‘The mother knows that as for the boy, he arrived.’
b. eni-r
mother-dat
[uz˘-a¯
boy-erg
magalu
bread.iii.abs
b-a¯c’-ru-łi]
iii-eat-past.prt-nmz
b-iy-xo
iii-know-pres
‘The mother knows that as for the bread, the boy ate it.’
[Polinsky and Potsdam :]
A few comments are in order about these data. First, notice that this “secondary”
agreement on the embedding predicate does not come instead of agreement on the embedded
predicate. In an example like (b), both the matrix verb “b-iy-xo” (‘iii-know-pres’) and
the embedded verb “b-a¯c’-ru-łi” (‘iii-eat-past.prt-nmz’) exhibit overt agreement with the
embedded absolutive noun-phrase “magalu” (‘bread.iii.abs’). Second, if topichood of the
relevant embedded noun-phrase is forced, this “secondary” agreement is obligatory (see
Polinsky and Potsdam  for details).
These data do not involve datives, of course, and in fact datives cannot be agreed with
in Tsez, just as in Icelandic and other languages; this therefore sheds no particular light on
the dative paradox itself. It does, however, show that ϕ-features that have entered into an
agreement relation with the embedded predicate are not inactivated, but rather active and
available to be agreed with by subsequent agreement hosts. Note that verbs in Tsez only ever
agree with their arguments in noun-class. Thus, in examples like (a–b), the sets of features
that enter into agreement with the embedded predicate and with the matrix verb are the same
set. Making an ad-hoc distinction between the agreement found on the embedded predicate
and the agreement found on the matrix predicate—positing that one is “defective” or “partial”,
while the other is “complete”—would be little more than a description of the observed fact,
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that theϕ-features on the nominal can enter into more than one agreement relation. I therefore
take these facts to show that the Activity Condition cannot be correct.
Regarding whatever residual empirical coverage the Activity Conditionmight have, outside
of the domain of datives, I refer the reader to Nevins  for an illustration that better
empirical coverage can be achieved by independently motivated alternatives.
... Functional Shells
A potentially more promising approach, mentioned in §., involves the idea that datives come
enclosed in additional functional structure—structure that is either absent in non-oblique DPs,
or at least has diﬀerent properties than the structure found in those cases. The ideas in this
sub-section are largely adapted from Rezac a, who draws on Richards  regarding the
approach to defective intervention.
In what follows, I discuss an implementation where datives are enclosed in a PP structure,
following Rezac (a); but nothing significant would change if we opted instead for a Kase
Phrase approach (Bayer, Bader, and Meng , Bittner and Hale ), where the particular
type of K0 head associated with dative case would replace P0dat in all the relevant respects.
Suppose that the structure of dative nominals is as follows:
() functional structure around dative noun-phrases
PPdat
DP
· · ·
· · ·
D0
· · · ϕ-features · · ·
P0dat
I assume the null hypothesis, that the DP enclosed in this structure is like any other DP, and so
its full set of ϕ-features is visible at the DP level (i.e., on D0). This abstracts away from which
of these features (if any) were base generated on D0, and which of them got there derivationally
(as in Ritter , , and much subsequent work); whichever mechanisms are responsible
for transferring these features to D0 in structurally case-marked DPs (nominatives, absolutives,
etc.) will presumably operate here as well.
If PPs constitute a locality domain (for example, a phase)—as argued by Baltin (),
van Riemsdijk (), Abels (), and others—then the features on D0 are not visible to
probes outside of the PP. Now, if P0dat has no ϕ-features of its own, then the PP in its
entirety should be invisible for the purposes of ϕ-probing (like a non-wh noun-phrase in the
wh-probing case; see §.). Given that this is not the behavior of datives vis-à-vis agreement,
we must conclude that P0dat has some ϕ-featural content.
A similar conclusion obtains if PPs do not constitute a locality domain: if a probe outside of
PP can see into the complement of P0dat, then in the absence of intervening ϕ-featural content
on P0dat, the features on D
0 can and will be probed. Given that is not the behavior of datives
vis-à-vis agreement, either, wemust again conclude that P0dat hasϕ-featural content of its own.
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There are thus two logical possibilities: P0dat could be inserted into the derivation bearing
valued ϕ-features, or bearing unvalued ones (within a feature-geometric view of ϕ-features,
the latter case is actually represented by a placeholder looking for a piece of ϕ-geometry with
which to be filled; see §..). Insofar as the approach presented in this sub-section is correct,
it seems that both possibilities are attested.
In the usual case, intervention by a dative noun-phrase triggers “default agreement” on the
finite verb, meaning rd-person singular (abstracting away from [gender], for the purpose of
the current discussion); see, for example, the Icelandic data in §.–§.. Within a feature-
geometric approach to ϕ-features—as proposed by Harley and Ritter (), McGinnis (),
and Béjar and Rezac (), and discussed in §..—rd-person singular corresponds to the
root of the ϕ-geometry, [ϕ]. Thus, if we stipulate that dative P0dat carries valued [ϕ], we are
able to derive both sides of the dative paradox: on the one hand, datives count for ϕ-probing
(contra non-wh phrases in wh-probing), because their head (P0dat) carries a valued ϕ-feature;
on the other hand, the enclosed nominal cannot transfer its own features to the finite verb,
because the ϕ-features on P0dat will be closer, in structural terms, to any probe located outside
of the PP.
On this view, the reason “default morphology” (rd-person singular) is found in defective
intervention scenarios is that P0dat is valued for [ϕ], not for some more-specified point on the
ϕ-feature geometry. This is schematized below:
() functional structure around dative noun-phrases:
the usual case [=(–)]
PPdat
DP
· · ·
· · ·
D0
· · · ϕ-features · · ·
P0dat
[ϕ]
⇒
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
DP’
· · ·
· · ·
D0
· · · ϕ-features · · ·
· · ·
PPdat
DP
· · ·
· · ·
D0
· · · ϕ-features · · ·
P0dat
[ϕ]
· · ·
H0
ϕ?
An important property of this approach is that it takes defective intervention to be
an instance of successful ϕ-agreement: the ϕ-probe in () successfully agrees with the
structurally closest agreement target, P0dat (which bears valued [ϕ], and therefore acts like
any other rd-person singular agreement target).
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In the complementary scenario, P0dat would be base-generated bearing unvaluedϕ-features
(or the feature-geometric counterpart thereof; see above), which would result in P0dat acting as
a ϕ-probe in its own right. Given that its complement is a regular DP, there is no obstacle to
P0dat valuing its own features with the values found on that DP. This would render the PP layer
“transparent”, in some sense, since it would bear the same ϕ-feature values as the enclosed
nominal; the dative would then be able to agree as if it were a bare DP.
Something like this seems to be going in the languages that Dryer () refers to as
primary-/secondary-object languages. In these languages, the agreement morphology controlled
by the Patient in a mono-transitive is obligatorily controlled by the applicative argument
in ditransitives and other applicative constructions (with the Patient controlling no overt
ϕ-agreement in those cases). Such languages are sometimes thought of as having only a double-
object construction, but no “true datives”. An example of such a language is Chol (Mayan):
() agreement with applicative argument in lieu of Patient
a. Tyi
prfv
aw-ilä-yoñ
.erg-see-.abs
(Chol)
‘You saw me.’
b. Tyi
prfv
i-ch’äx-be-yoñ
.abs-boil-appl-.abs
ja'
water
x-'ixik
clf-woman
‘The woman boiled me water.’
[Coon a:, ; glosses simplified slightly]
Let us refer to behavior of this sort, where the dative controls agreement morphology normally
controlled by the Patient, as agreement displacement (following Rezac a).
If applicative arguments are generated in the specifier of a dedicated ApplP projection
(Anagnostopoulou , Collins , Marantz , McGinnis , Pylkkänen , Ura
, among others), and are therefore structurally closer to the ϕ-probe than the Patient is,
a dative PP whose P0dat bears ϕ-feature values that it copied from the enclosed dative DP will
appear to have subsumed the duties of “direct object agreement” (as in (a–b)):
 EXISTING TREATMENTS OF THE DATIVE PARADOX
() agreement with applicative argument in lieu of Patient – derivation
PPdat
DP
· · ·
· · ·
D0
· · · ϕ-features · · ·
P0dat
ϕ?
⇒
ApplP
· · ·PPdat
DP
· · ·
· · ·
D0
· · · ϕ-features · · ·
P0dat
· · · ϕ-features · · ·
⇒
· · ·
ApplP
· · ·
· · · DPPatient
· · ·D0
· · · ϕ-features · · ·
· · ·
PPdat
DP
· · ·
P0dat
· · · ϕ-features · · ·
· · ·
H0
ϕ?
In (), the dative PP asymmetrically c-commands the Patient DP; since this PP bears
ϕ-features, minimality/Closest dictates that the finite verb must agree with it—yielding the
apparent agreement displacement (i.e., the dative controlling the agreement morphology that
is controlled, in mono-transitives, by the Patient).
There exist more complicated patterns, where certain ϕ-feature combinations on the
dative nominal trigger agreement displacement of the kind shown above, but other ϕ-feature
combinations do not. These are handled by Rezac (a), within a similar system to the one
outlined above, by positing a P0dat probe that is searching not for [ϕ] (the root of ϕ-geometry),
but rather for some other node in the ϕ-geometry—such as [participant] or [author]. This is
essentially the PP-internal counterpart of relativized probing, as it was formulated in §...
Unfortunately, this approach—as a solution to the dative paradox—runs into several
problems. I will review these in rising order of severity. First, to handle the standard
defective intervention data, we had to stipulate that P0dat carries valued [ϕ]. The problem
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is not the stipulation itself; as discussed in §.., above, it seems that any approach to the
dative paradox will have to make one stipulation or another. The point is that this particular
stipulation leads to the expectation that in some languages, P0dat will bear other valued
ϕ-featural combinations—meaning we expect some language where datives are invariably
agreed with as, say, nd-person plurals, regardless of the ϕ-features of the actual dative
nominal; I know of no such language.
While this concern could potentially be handled in terms of markedness—by appealing to
the special status of [ϕ] as the root of the ϕ-geometry—similar solutions are not available, it
seems to me, to the problems that follow.
The next problem is a morphological one. On the approach sketched here, agreement
displacement cases (where the dative subsumes the agreement duties normally associated with
the Patient) are a matter of the P0dat head entering into its own PP-internal agreement relation
with the enclosed dative DP. It is therefore surprising that the languages that show complete
agreement displacement with datives are often languages where there is no dative morphology
to speak of (as is the case, for example, in Chol; see ()). If agreement displacement
were a matter of a featurally rich PP-internal ϕ-probe, one would expect such cases to show
richer dative morphology; but in fact the opposite is true: Icelandic, for example, has overt
dative morphology, and unlike Chol, exhibits standard defective intervention eﬀects (and not
agreement displacement). Recall (), repeated here:
() það
expl
finnst(/*finnast)
find.sg/*find.pl
[ mörgum
many
stúdentum ]dat
students.pl.dat
[sc tölvan
the.computer.sg.nom
ljótar
ugly
].
‘Many students find the computer ugly.’ [Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir :]
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Finally, the most important problem with this approach is that it predicts that intervention
by a dative should never lead to ungrammaticality, because—as noted earlier—defective
intervention is taken to be an instance of formally successful agreement with P0dat that bears
valued [ϕ] (i.e., rd-person singular, ϕ-geometrically). This seems consistent with what we
have seen so far, but crucially, there are instances of defective intervention that do result in
ungrammaticality:
() a. Il
Jean
semble
seems
(à
to
Marie)
Marie
[ que
that
Jean
Jean
a
has
du
of
talent
talent
]. (French)
‘It seems (to Marie) that Jean has talent.’
b. Jean1
Jean
semble
seems
(?*à
to
Marie)
Marie
[ t1 avoir
have.inf
du
of
talent
talent
].
‘Jean seems (to Marie) to have talent.’ [McGinnis :–]
While the verb “semble” (‘seem’) in French generally allows an optional dative experiencer, as
in (a), the same dative experiencer causes ungrammaticality in (b). This particular data
set is taken from McGinnis , but similar patterns have been observed in Spanish (Torrego
), Greek (Anagnostopoulou ), Italian (Rizzi ), and even in English (Hartman
, to appear).
 EXISTING TREATMENTS OF THE DATIVE PARADOX
Of course, examples like this diﬀer from the examples we have been examining up until
this point in another important way: (b) involves not only ϕ-agreement across a dative,
but also movement across that dative. We could therefore explore the possibility that it is
movement, rather than ϕ-agreement, whose disruption dooms an example like (b).
Crucially, if we continue to pursue the hypothesis that datives are interveners by virtue of
the featural content of their outermost head—P0dat, in the current implementation—then we
are faced with a familiar choice, this time with respect to movement of the dative PP: either
P0dat bears the kind of features that the attractor seeks, or it does not (the latter option would
make sense, for example, if the EPP amounted to a need to match a D0 feature). If it does not
bear the relevant feature, we predict that the intervener will simply be skipped, which means
that (b) should be grammatical, contra to fact.
We must therefore conclude that P0dat does bear the features relevant to the attractor. In
this case, however, we would predict that in French (as well as in the other languages where this
behavior arises, such as Spanish, Italian, and Greek), datives could move to canonical subject
position. In other words, we predict that these languages would be quirky-subject languages,
like Icelandic. This is not the case, either; the corresponding derivations where the dative has
moved to subject position, in lieu of the non-dative argument, are no better:
() * [À
to
Marie]1
Marie
semble
seem
t1 [ Jean
Jean
avoir
have.inf
du
of
talent
talent
]
[McGinnis :]
As demonstrated by McGinnis (), the ungrammaticality of () is not a matter of
some licensing failure of the embedded subject, “Jean”; this much is already suggested by
comparison with the corresponding example in Icelandic, a language where datives can move
to canonical subject position:
() [Einhverjum
some
stúdent]1
student.sg.dat
finnast
find.pl
t1 [sc tölvurnar
the.computers.pl.nom
ljótar
ugly
].
‘Some student finds the computers ugly.’ [=()] [Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir :]
Even within French, however, the concerns regarding the licensing of the embedded subject
can be independently assuaged, by changing the embedded clause to a finite clause; crucially,
this does not improve the status of a dative in canonical subject position:
() * [À
to
Marie]1
Marie
semble
seem
t1 [ que
that
Jean
Jean
a
has
du
of
talent
talent
].
‘It seems to Marie that Jean has talent.’ [McGinnis :]
We must therefore conclude, under the approach pursued in this sub-section, that there
is a second kind of defective intervention—one that cannot be handled only in terms of the
featural content of the outermost head of the dative argument. Manipulating this featural
content can only lead to two kinds of behavior—being ignored by the attractor, or being
targeted by the attractor—neither of which is the correct result for data like (–, )
and its counterparts in other languages. Instead, this second kind of intervention causes
what looks like a breakdown of the probing process itself, leading in this case to outright
ungrammaticality.
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The obvious question, then, is the following: given that this second kind of intervention
is independently necessary, is there a way to subsume the first kind of intervention (the kind
that gives rise to what looks like default ϕ-agreement, e.g. rd-person singular) under the
latter kind (which causes breakdown of the probing process). In §., I propose a way of
doing exactly that, building on recent observations by Bobaljik (), as well as the results
of chapters –. I begin by discussing Bobaljik’s proposal itself, which is the topic of the next
sub-section.
... Case-Discrimination
As noted in §., a recent proposal by Bobaljik () oﬀers an alternative explanation for why
it is that dative nominals—as in the Icelandic data in §.–§., for example—cannot transfer
their own ϕ-feature values to the finite verb. This proposal revises and extends observations
that are originally due to Moravcsik (, ).
.... Bobaljik’s () proposal
The point of departure for this proposal is the Moravcsik Hierarchy, a set of proposed
implicational universals concerning which arguments can and cannot be targeted for
ϕ-agreement in a given language (Moravcsik ):
() theMoravcsik Hierarchy
Subject≫ Direct Object≫ Indirect Object≫ Adverbs
The way to read () is as follows: no language has agreement with the direct object without
also having sentences in which the subject is agreed with; no language has agreement with the
indirect object without also having sentences in which the subject is agreed with, and sentences
in which the direct object is agreed with; and so forth.
These universals are largely confirmed by typological surveys, with two important caveats.
The first caveat concerns quirky-case languages. Notice that () is stated over grammatical
function (subject, direct object, etc.), not over case-markings (nominative, accusative, etc.). In
many languages, this distinction is immaterial, at least in finite clauses (which are the ones
that typically exhibit overt ϕ-agreement in the first place). In other words, in a finite clause
in a language without quirky subjects, the subject is always nominative and the nominative is
always the subject. Therefore reformulating () as () would not change its coverage:
() theMoravcsik Hierarchy, first revision (Bobaljik )
nominative≫ accusative≫ dative≫ (other) obliques
However, we have already seen a language in which this is not true. Icelandic is a quirky-case
language, meaning it has finite clauses where the subject bears case other than nominative:
() Morgum
many
studentum
students.pl.dat
liki
like.sg
verkið
the.job.nom
(Icelandic)
‘Many students like the job.’ [=()] [Harley ]
I will not review here the evidence showing that phrases such as the dative “morgum
studentum” (‘many students.pl.dat’) in () are indeed grammatical subjects; the reader
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is referred to the literature on quirky subjects in Icelandic, beginning with Andrews (),
Thráinsson (), Zaenen, Maling, and Thráinsson (), and Sigurðsson (), for
extensive evidence to this eﬀect (see also Thráinsson , for a recent review).
What is crucial for the current purposes—and has already been demonstrated, in §.—is
that these non-nominative subjects never control agreement in Icelandic. Moreover, when the
clause has a quirky subject of this sort, a nominative non-subject (if present) will still control
agreement (the reader is again referred to the aforementioned sources for arguments that the
dative argument of “líka” ‘like’ is indeed a grammatical subject):
() Jóni
Jon.dat
líkuðu
liked.pl
[þessir
[these
sokkar
socks
]
].nom
‘Jon liked these socks.’ [Jónsson :]
Data like () do not falsify the original formulation of the Moravcsik Hierarchy outright.
This example exhibits agreement with a direct object (see Harley  and Jónsson 
for arguments that the nominative noun-phrase in an example like () is indeed a direct
object); and it is clearly true that Icelandic has agreement with subjects in some of its sentences
(namely, in every finite clause where the subject does not have quirky case). Data of this sort is
therefore technically in compliance with (). However, as argued by Bobaljik (), this
way of viewing things misses an important generalization—namely, that in every instance
where grammatical function and morphological case diverge, ϕ-agreement appears to quite
neatly track morphological case, more or less disregarding grammatical function.
Thus, through the prism of the revisedMoravcsik Hierarchy (based onmorphological case, as
in ()), Icelandic is a perfectly well behaved agreement-with-nominatives-only language—
no diﬀerent in that respect from, say, English (a fact that has been observed in the literature on
Icelandic going back to Sigurðsson ).
The second way in which the original formulation of the Moravcsik Hierarchy is imprecise
concerns ergative languages. In ergative languages, the notion “subject” conflates two case-
markings, namely absolutive (in an intransitive clause) and ergative (in a transitive clause).
Once again, the problem is not necessarily the outright falsification of the original formulation
of the Moravcsik Hierarchy, based on grammatical function. Consider a language that exhibits
agreement with the absolutive argument only, such as Tsez (examples repeated from §..):
() a. ziya
cow.iii.abs
b-ik’i-s
iii-go-past.evid
‘The cow left.’ [=(a)]
b. eniy-a¯
mother-erg
ziya
cow.iii.abs
b-is˘er-si
iii-feed–past.evid
‘The mother fed the cow.’ [=(b)] [Polinsky and Potsdam :]
If we classify an example like (b) as agreement with a direct object, Tsez is technically in
compliance with the original formulation, since it also has agreement with the subject in some
sentences (e.g. (a)).
The problem is, once again, that the characterization in terms of grammatical fashionmisses
an important generalization—in this case, the fact that there are no languages that exhibit
agreement only with ergative noun-phrases, to the exclusion of absolutive ones (see also
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Woolford ). This possibility should be allowed, given the original Moravcsik Hierarchy,
since it is a sub-case of agreement with subjects only. As Bobaljik observes, however, the
implicational universal in ()—given here in both its grammatical function andmorphological
case forms—has a counterpart on the ergative side, in ():
() a. agreement with objects =⇒ agreement with subjects
b. agreement with accusatives =⇒ agreement with nominatives
() agreement with ergatives =⇒ agreement with absolutives
The idea is therefore to combine (b) and () under a single, case-based formulation. To
do this, Bobaljik appeals to the disjunctive case hierarchy:
() disjunctive case hierarchy (Marantz )
lexical/oblique case→ dependent case→ unmarked case
Regarding the motivations behind this hierarchy, the reader is referred to Marantz , as
well as §.; I will summarize only the results of that discussion here. The term lexical/oblique
case refers to any case-marking whose appearance is idiosyncratically associated with a specific
lexical item (rather than, say, an entire lexical category). Case assigned by prepositions falls
under this rubric (in particular, in a language like German, where diﬀerent prepositions
govern diﬀerent case-markings on their nominal complements), as do quirky verbs such as
the Icelandic “líka” (‘like’) discussed earlier, as well as more widespread patterns involving
lexically-determined case on the complement of verbs (e.g. the dative case often found on the
complement of a verb like “help”, cross-linguistically).
The term dependent case refers to case-marking whose appearance is contingent, roughly
speaking, on the presence of two distinct non-lexical/oblique-marked nominals in a single
clausal domain (see Marantz , as well as §., for a more careful formulation). This is
the category to which accusative and ergative case belong.4
Finally, the term unmarked case refers to case-markings that do not fall in either of the
previous categories—namely, nominative and absolutive. While sometimes confused with the
notion of “default case” or “citation form”, this is not what unmarked case refers to: in English,
for example, fragment answers and other free-standing forms appear in accusative(/objective)
(“Who came to the party? Him/*He.”). Instead, the term unmarked case refers to case-marking
whose appearance, in the context of a clause, is neither idiosyncratically conditioned, nor
dependent on the appearance of other nominals in the clause.
As its name suggests, unmarked case is often phonologically null, or phonologically lighter
than the other members of the disjunctive case hierarchy—though that is a tendency, rather than
a universal.
Given the disjunctive case hierarchy, we can unify (b) and () under a single
formulation:
4Normally, the appearance of accusative or ergative is conditioned by the appearance of a nominative or
absolutive noun-phrase, respectively; but as examples like (i) demonstrate, this is not always the case. In this
example, accusative(/objective) case can be conditioned by the appearance of a distinct noun-phrase that is
also marked with accusative(/objective):
(i) It is possible for her to meet him.
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() theMoravcsik Hierarchy, second (and final) revision (Bobaljik )
unmarked case≫ dependent case≫ lexical/oblique case
As we have seen, the virtues of this formulation are twofold. First, it captures the behavior
of instances in which grammatical function and morphological case diverge (since agreement
is shown to track morphological case, in those instances; see the discussion of quirky
subjects in Icelandic, above). Second, it allows us to capture the implicational universals
in a nominative-accusative language/construction (as in ()) and in an ergative-absolutive
language/construction (as in ()) in a unified manner.
Note that this formalism is not meant to replace the notion of structural prominence, or
minimality/Closest; there will be situations in which more than one argument in the domain
of a single agreement host will be deemed by () as accessible for agreement—and in these
situations, it is the structurally highest argument that will be targeted for ϕ-agreement.
Bobaljik provides an example of such an interaction, from Nepali. In terms of (), Nepali
makes the accessibility cutoﬀ after the second member of the hierarchy; finite ϕ-agreement
in Nepali can target nominals bearing either unmarked case (labeled “nom”, in the glosses
below), or dependent case (labeled “erg”). Crucially, when both are present in a given clausal
domain, structural prominence determines which of the two will actually be targeted, as
demonstrated by (a–b), below:
() agreement accessibility: Nepali (cf. Icelandic, below)
unmarked case≫ dependent case︸                                         ︷︷                                         ︸
accessible for
ϕ-agreement
≫ lexical/oblique case
() agreement accessibility: Icelandic
unmarked case︸              ︷︷              ︸
accessible for
ϕ-agreement
≫ dependent case≫ lexical/oblique case
() a. ma
sg.nom
[ yas
dem.obl
pasal-ma¯
store-loc
] patrika¯
newspaper.nom
kin-ch-u
buy-nonpast-sg
(Nepali)
‘I buy the newspaper in this store.’
b. maile
sg.erg
[ yas
dem.obl
pasal-ma¯
store-loc
] patrika¯
newspaper.nom
kin-e¯/*kin-yo
buy.past-sg/*buy.past-sg.M
‘I bought the newspaper in this store.’
[Bickel and Ya¯dava :]
The same interaction of case with structural prominence is shown by Bobaljik to derive yet
another typological fact, concerning the possible alignments of case and agreement within a
single language:
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() a typological gap in case vs. agreement alignments (Dixon )
agr. alignment
nom-acc erg-abs
case
alignm
ent
n
o
m
-a
c
c
4 (English,
Icelandic)
7
e
r
g
-a
b
s
4 (Warlpiri,
Chukchi)
4 (Basque,
Tsez)
It is rather well-known that there are languages that show a mismatch between case-alignment
and agreement-alignment: in Warlpiri, DP arguments show an ergative-absolutive case-
marking system, but agreement exhibits a nominative-accusative alignment (i.e., a morpheme
that co-indexes the subject, regardless of whether it is the subject of an intransitive or a
transitive, and a morpheme that co-indexes the transitive object when present; see Legate
). The converse is unattested: no language exhibits a nominative-accusative alignment
in its case-marking, while showing an ergative-absolutive alignment in its agreement system.5
Importantly, Bobaljik’s approach derives this gap. Suppose a language has a nominative-
accusative alignment in its case-marking. If this language makes the cutoﬀ between the first
and second members of the revised Moravcsik Hierarchy (in ()), only the unmarked noun-
phrase will be able to serve as an agreement target, meaning we will see agreement with the
nominative noun-phrase only (as is the case in English). If it makes the cutoﬀ after the second
member in the hierarchy, both the subject and the object will be accessible (in a transitive
clause)—but structural prominence still dictates that if anything will control agreement, it
will be the subject. Thus, deriving an ergative-absolutive alignment for such a language is
impossible, in this system, deriving the desired gap.
Compare this with the converse (and attested) scenario, involving ergative-absolutive
languages. If such a language makes its cutoﬀ after the second member in the hierarchy, both
the ergative and the absolutive will be accessible for agreement. Given that the subject is still
structurally higher than the object, the ergative noun-phrase will be targeted for agreement
in a transitive clause, while the single absolutive argument will be targeted in an intransitive
clause—yielding a nominative-accusative pattern of agreement.
The conclusion is therefore that agreement is case-discriminating: the case-marking borne
by potential agreement targets plays a role in whether or not they will actually be targeted for
ϕ-agreement. This was already made clear, to some extent, by the dative paradox itself; what is
highlighted by () is that it is case-related properties in particular (rather than, say, thematic
or argument-structural properties) that are responsible for these eﬀects.6
5The one potential counter-example of which I am aware is Kutchi Gujarati; however, there is evidence
that the apparently exceptional examples might involve a diﬀerent mechanism altogether. The reason is that
these examples exhibit so-called “semantic” agreement, ignoring grammatical gender and tracking semantic
gender instead (Patel ). The correct analysis of these examples is beyond the scope of the current work.
6David Pesetsky (p.c.) points out that strictly speaking, it does not follow from Bobaljik’s () argument
that the determining factor in the calculus of ϕ-agreement is morphological case per se; it is possible that there
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This view would be incoherent in a system where the assignment of case is contingent
on, or even caused by, ϕ-agreement (see, for example, Chomsky b); but Icelandic data
of the sort discussed here demonstrate quite clearly that such a view is untenable, in the first
place (an observation that goes back to Zaenen, Maling, and Thráinsson ). We have seen
that nominative noun-phrases can exist where ϕ-agreement has demonstrably failed to reach
them (see also the discussion in §., regarding ϕ-agreement and the licensing of arguments in
Kichean). We therefore need a theory where case-assignment does not depend on ϕ-agreement
(at least any kind of ϕ-agreement that is overtly detectable); Marantz () provides a theory
of this sort, and an adaptation of that theory will be discussed and defended in chapter .
The astute reader will also notice that this view of the interplay of case and ϕ-agreement
appears to have profound implications regarding the modular locus of ϕ-agreement; indeed,
the thrust of Bobaljik’s proposal as it is originally written concerns this point. If morphological
case is computed post-syntactically (as Marantz  contends), then any operation that relies
onmorphological case as its input must be post-syntactic as well (notice that what the Icelandic
quirky-case examples demonstrate is that abstract case cannot be the notion that is relevant to
a hierarchy like ()). However, the premise—that morphological case is computed post-
syntactically—will be shown in §. to be flawed; I therefore set aside this modularity issue
for the purposes of the current discussion.
.... Prospects for solving the dative paradox
Turning to the dative paradox itself, this proposal clearly accounts for one half of it—namely,
why datives (at least in some languages) are unable to value the ϕ-features on the finite verb.
If the set of possible agreement targets in a given language is determined according to the
hierarchy in (), then in any language that makes the cutoﬀ between the first and second
members of the hierarchy, or between the second and third, ϕ-agreement will not be able to
target datives—which generally fall into the third category, lexical/oblique case.
The converse behavior, termed agreement displacement in §.., involves the dative
argument obligatorily controlling the agreement morphology that in a mono-transitive is
controlled by the Patient. As noted in §.., this behavior tends to arise in languages that
lack any overt dative morphology to speak of. The revised Moravcsik Hierarchy in ()
makes sense of this pattern: in such a language, dative case would be indistinguishable
from unmarked/dependent cases—or at least, it would not count as oblique case. In a
language like Chol, then, the absence of any dative case to speak of results in the case-
discrimination mechanism being unable to distinguish Source/Goal and other applicative
arguments from noun-phrases bearing unmarked or dependent case (both of which are
generally accessible for ϕ-agreement in Chol; see Coon a). The behavior of agreement
in ditransitives/applicatives in Chol therefore arises naturally in this system, given the
is some third property, internal to the syntactic computation, which (a) uniquely determines morphological
case, once morphological spellout is reached, and (b) serves as the conditioning property for ϕ-agreement,
following a logic similar to (). Note, however, that positing such a third property would only be meaningful
if morphological case is indeed computed outside of syntax (as claimed by Marantz ); if it is computed
within syntax, there is no need for a separate property of this sort, and it would in fact constitute an
unwarranted duplication. Given that this is exactly what I argue in chapter  regarding morphological case, a
third property of this sort is unnecessary here.
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independently-motivated provision that applicative arguments are introduced higher in the
structure than Patient arguments (data repeated from §..):
() agreement with applicative argument in lieu of Patient [=()]
a. Tyi
prfv
aw-ilä-yoñ
.erg-see-.abs
(Chol)
‘You saw me.’
b. Tyi
prfv
i-ch’äx-be-yoñ
.abs-boil-appl-.abs
ja'
water
x-'ixik
clf-woman
‘The woman boiled me water.’
[Coon a:, ; glosses simplified slightly]
Alternatively, agreement displacement could be handled as an instance of a language
making the cutoﬀ after the third member of the revised Moravcsik Hierarchy in (). This
would probably require further articulating the hierarchy itself, since other oblique phrases
(e.g. prepositional phrases headed by semantically “heavy” prepositions) in these languages
still cannot be targeted for ϕ-agreement. This would correspond to the intuition that the
dative is, in some sense, the “least oblique” of the oblique cases. This alternative, of course,
would not capture the correlation between lack of overt dative case-marking and agreement
displacement; but it is perhaps exactly what is going on in languages that do have overt dative
case (such as Basque, for example), and still exhibit some degree of agreement displacement.
It is especially suggestive that these are the languages where more complicated patterns of
agreement displacement arise (i.e., where some ϕ-featural combinations on the dative nominal
trigger agreement displacement, while others do not; see Rezac a). It is in these instances
that there might still be a PP or Kase Phrase layer that syntactically distinguishes datives from
nominals bearing unmarked/dependent case, and which plays a role in “filtering” diﬀerent
ϕ-featural combinations on the enclosed nominal (see §.. for further discussion). I will not
speculate on this further, here.
What is less clear, under this approach, is how the other half of the dative paradox is to
be handled: why do datives—in a language where they are not viable agreement targets—
interact with ϕ-probing at all? Bobaljik does not oﬀer a conclusive view on this issue, instead
entertaining two possible alternatives. Below, I will demonstrate that both alternatives fall
short of accounting for the cross-linguistic typology of defective intervention—in particular,
for the fact that intervention gives rise to outright ungrammaticality in some instances, and
to “default” (e.g. rd-person singular) agreement morphology in others. In §., I will argue
that defective intervention actually arises as an interaction between case-discrimination, which
rules out agreement with a dative, and minimality/Closest, which rules out agreement with
anything other than the dative, ultimately resulting in failed agreement.
Let us first review the alternatives proposed by Bobaljik, for why datives interact with
ϕ-agreement at all, given that they are not viable agreement targets in their own right. One
involves a reinterpretation of long-distance agreement as phrasal movement where both PF
and LF interpret the lower copy (building on his own work on a single-output syntax, starting
with Bobaljik ; and in particular, the proposal in Bobaljik ). I think we can safely
dismiss this possibility here, due to the same considerations discussed towards the end of
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§..: if agreement is nothing but phrasal movement, the prospects of accounting for the
diﬀerence between examples like the French () (where intervention results in outright
ungrammaticality) and examples like the Icelandic () (where intervention results in a
default/rd-singular form of the verb) seem particularly bleak.
() ?* Jean1
Jean
semble
seems
[à
to
Marie]dat
Marie
[ t1 avoir
have.inf
du
of
talent
talent
].
‘Jean seems to Marie to have talent.’ [=(b)] [McGinnis :]
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() það
expl
finnst(/*finnast)
find.sg/*find.pl
[einhverjum
some
stúdent]dat
student.sg.dat
[sc tölvurnar
the.computers.pl.nom
ljótar
ugly
].
‘Some student finds the computers ugly.’ [=()] [Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir :]
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The second possibility that Bobaljik () entertains is a domain-based approach: he
suggests that agreement may be unable to cross any clausal boundaries—not even the
boundaries of a non-finite clause—and thus, instances where agreement seems to target an
embedded noun-phrase must be instances of restructuring/clause-union (building on work by
Wurmbrand , Polinsky , and Bobaljik andWurmbrand ). As Bobaljik points out,
this approach crucially relies on the view that a single embedding verb may be a restructuring
verb in some instances, and a non-restructuring verb in others, and that this diﬀerence might
not be marked by any overt morphology (see, in particular, Wurmbrand ).
On this view, “semble” (‘seem’) in an example like (), below, can optionally be a
restructuring verb, and this is what allows agreement with (and raising of) the embedded
subject “Jean”:
() Jean1
Jean
[RD semble
seems
[ t1 avoir
have.inf
du
of
talent
talent
]]. (French; RD=restructuring domain)
‘Jean seems to have talent.’ [=(b)]
Compare this with an example like (), above; there, “semble” takes a dative experiencer
argument, and agreement with (as well as raising of) the embedded subject “Jean” is
impossible. The restructuring analysis shown in () is assumed to be impossible in the
presence of a dative experiencer, which is what rules out agreement (and raising) in that
example.
In support of this restructuring-based approach, Bobaljik points out the fact that defective
intervention eﬀects disappear in Icelandic in true mono-clausal configurations—that is, when
the dative and nominative arguments in question are co-arguments:
() a. það
expl
voru
were.pl
konungi
king.dat
gefnar
given
ambáttir
slaves.pl.nom
í
in
vettur
winter
‘A king was given maidservants this winter.’
[Zaenen, Maling, and Thráinsson :–]
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b. það
expl
voru
were.pl
einhverjum
someone.dat
gefnir
given.pl
þessir
these
sokkar
socks
‘Someone was given these socks.’ [Jónsson :]
Thus, the restructuring approach assimilates examples like () to themono-clausal examples
in (a–b).
However, it is not clear that the diﬀerence between examples like (a–b), where
agreement is possible (and in fact, obligatory), and examples where the dative and the
nominative are not co-arguments—as in (), above—where agreement is impossible, is a
matter of the presence or absence of infinitival clause boundaries. Other syntactic treatments
of defective intervention have observed that the level of granularity relevant to conditions like
minimality/Closest is the level of maximal projections, rather than that of individual nodes:
() intervention: structural description7
A node δ can intervene in the relation between α and β only if:
(i) δ is in the domain of α (i.e., α c-commands δ); and,
(ii) the maximal projection immediately-containing β is in the domain of δ
(i.e., there is an XP that contains β such that δ c-commands XP)
[Anagnostopoulou , Collins , among others]
This way of conceiving of intervention was proposed by Anagnostopoulou () and Collins
() to prevent the specifier of an XP from intervening in relations targeting the phrase in
[Compl,XP] (as shown in (a), below), as well as to prevent multiple specifiers of a single XP
from inducing intervention eﬀects with respect to one another (as shown in (b), below; see
also Ura ):8
() a. spec.-compl.: no intervention
· · ·
XP
X’
βX0
δ
· · ·
α
no intervention
b. multiple specs.: no intervention
· · ·
XP
X’
X’
· · ·X0
β
δ
· · ·
α
no intervention
Note that () is not a bi-conditional: if the structural conditions on intervention are
met, whether or not intervention actually arises will still depend on whether the potential
intervener carries the kind of features that the probe is searching for, as discussed extensively
7Note that this condition on intervention amounts to asymmetric m-command.
8The most notable exception to this condition, as it pertains to multiple specifiers, involves multiple
CP-specifiers in intermediate wh-movement (see Richards ). Given that proposals like Anagnostopoulou’s
() and Ura’s () involve ϕ-agreement and/or A-movement, I take this to be a distinction, whether
primary or derivable, between A-bar syntax and A-syntax.
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in §... Thus, (a–b) are structural configurations in which intervention is possible, and
will depend on whether or not δ carries the features that α is probing for:
() δ and β in separate maximal projections: intervention possible
a.
· · ·
· · ·
XP
X’
βX0
· · ·
δ
· · ·
α
intervention possible
b.
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
XP
X’
βX0
· · ·
· · ·
δ
· · ·
α
intervention possible
Given the co-argumenthood of the dative and the nominative in examples like (a–b), it
is reasonable to assume that at some level of representation, the two were either complement
and specifier of a single projection (such as VP), or alternatively, occupied multiple specifiers
of a single projection (for example, ApplP or vP).
On the other hand, instances where the nominative is an argument of an embedded
predicate, separate from the predicate that selects the dative—e.g. (), repeated below—
do not lend themselves to an analysis of this sort:
() það
expl
finnst(/*finnast)
find.sg/*find.pl
[einhverjum
some
stúdent]dat
student.sg.dat
[sc tölvurnar
the.computers.pl.nom
ljótar
ugly
].
‘Some student finds the computers ugly.’ [=()] [Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir :]
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The presence of a TP or small-clause layer in between the dative and the nominative gives
an example like () the sort of structure shown in (), predicting that the possibility of
intervention would arise precisely in this type of example. This approach follows Sigurðsson
and Holmberg (:), who argue that the relevant diﬀerence between the co-arguments
case and cases like () is whether or not the nominative is “protected by its own TP”.
To summarize, a more careful examination of the structural conditions on intervention,
as proposed independently by authors like Anagnostopoulou and Collins, reveals that these
structural conditionsmake the same cut (between the case where the dative and nominative are
co-arguments, and the case in which they are not) as a restructuring-based approach would—
which removes these data as evidence for or against the restructuring approach (crucially, the
account of the dative paradox that will be pursued in §., while relying on case-discrimination,
will not involve restructuring; it would therefore be relevant if there were an independent
argument in favor of a restructuring-based account).
The restructuring-based approach faces a significant problem, however, when it comes to
movement of the dative intervener. As brought to light by Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir ()
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(who attribute the original observation to Halldór Ármann Sigurðsson), both A-movement and
A-bar movement of the dative out of its intervening position alleviate defective intervention:
() [Einhverjum
some
stúdent]1
student.sg.dat
finnast
find.pl
t1 [sc tölvurnar
the.computers.pl.nom
ljótar
ugly
].
‘Some student finds the computers ugly.’ [=()]
[Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir :]
() Hverjum1
who.dat
hafa
have.pl
strákanir2
the.boys.nom
virst
seemed
t1 [ t2 vera
be
gáfaðir
intelligent
] ?
‘To whom have the boys seemed (to be) intelligent?’
[Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir :]
It is obvious that more needs to be said about examples like (–), under any approach to
defective intervention, to explain why the trace of a moved dative argument does not intervene
in the same way that an in-situ dative argument does (cf. (), above). However, this eﬀect can
be rather easily accommodated into standard accounts of defective intervention, by restricting
intervention to heads of chains (or in Copy Theory of Movement terms, restricting intervention
to the highest copy of a given node).
Under the restructuring-based approach, things are not so simple. The argument structure
of “finnast” (‘find’) and “virðast” (‘seem’) in (–) includes a dative experiencer argument
(much like the instance of “semble” ‘seem’ in the French (), above). Thus, by hypothesis,
these instances of “finnast” and “virðast” should not allow restructuring—falsely predicting
that agreement with (or raising of) the embedded nominative subject would be impossible.9
In summary, Bobaljik’s () proposal provides a novel answer for one half of the dative
paradox: why dative nominals fail to transfer their ϕ-feature values to the finite verb. These
eﬀects can be seen as an instance of a more general—and independently-motivated—property
of ϕ-agreement: as shown above, the set of viable ϕ-agreement targets in a given language is
best characterized in terms of morphological case, and tracks the implicational hierarchy given
in (), repeated below.
() theMoravcsik Hierarchy, second (and final) revision (Bobaljik )
unmarked case≫ dependent case≫ lexical/oblique case
I have labeled this the case-discrimination property of ϕ-agreement. On this view, the fact
that datives fail to transfer their ϕ-feature values to the finite verb in a language like English,
French, or Icelandic, is simply a sub-case of case-discrimination ruling out agreement with
oblique phrases.
The same view, however, has so far failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the
second half of the dative paradox: why nodes that cannot be targeted for ϕ-agreement due
9One might hypothesize that the restructuring variants of verbs like “finnast” (‘find’) and “virðast”
(‘seem’) are like Postal’s () wager-class verbs, in that what they lack is the ability to leave the dative
argument in situ, rather than the ability to project it in the first place. On this view, the only instances of a verb
that are necessarily non-restructuring would be those instances where the dative argument remains in-situ. If
one adopts this approach, the restructuring-based account will be able to handle data like (–), but it
becomes a notational variant of an account based on ()—since restructuring would then emerge precisely
(and only) when a dative that is not a co-argument of the target nominative has remained in situ.
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to case-discrimination interact with ϕ-probing at all. As discussed here, neither the approach
that views ϕ-agreement as covert phrasal movement, nor the restructuring-based approach,
are able to provide viable answers to this question.
Crucially, it turns out that once we allow for the possibility of failed agreement, argued for
independently in chapter , case-discrimination can provide an explanation for the second half
of the dative paradox, as well. This is the topic of §., below.
.. Case-discrimination and failed agreement
In chapter , I argued that the behavior of ϕ-agreement in the Agent-Focus construction of
Kichean shows that there are instances of bona fide failure of ϕ-agreement, that are tolerated
by the grammar—despite the fact that ϕ-agreement is generally obligatory (when possible),
even in the Kichean Agent-Focus construction itself.
Once we are forced to admit the possibility of failed agreement in grammatical utterances,
a previously unavailable analytical possibility arises with respect to defective intervention—
especially within a feature-geometric approach to ϕ-agreement, as pursued in §.. (or
any other approach where ϕ-features are privative, rather than bivalent). This analytical
possibility stems from the fact that a ϕ-probe that has successfully targeted a node that
happens to be rd-person singular may not always be distinguishable, morphologically, from
a ϕ-probe that has failed to agree in person and number altogether (I abstract away from
gender, though the same logic extends to that domain, as well). Recall the ϕ-feature geometry
presented in §..., following Harley and Ritter (), McGinnis (), and Béjar and
Rezac (), and repeated here:
() a simplified ϕ-feature geometry [=()]
[ϕ]
[number]
[plural]
[person]
[participant]
[author]
In this ϕ-feature geometry, [plural] distinguishes plural noun-phrases from singular ones;
[participant] distinguishes st/nd-person pronouns from rd-person pronouns and other
noun-phrases, and [author] further distinguishes st-person from nd-person. Notions like
“rd-person” or “singular”, then, amount to the absence of privative features like [participant]
or [plural], respectively (recall that [author] cannot, by hypothesis, exist on a noun-phrase that
lacks [participant]).
The valuation that occurs when a ϕ-probe has successfully agreed with a rd-person
singular noun-phrase therefore consists, at most, of copying the [ϕ], [person], and [number]
nodes in the ϕ-geometry (and may consist of less, depending on feature relativization; see
§...). However, even if these parent nodes are copied when agreement obtains, they may
not receive overt exponence of their own; the agreement morphology identified as “rd-person
singular” in a given language may simply be the exponence assigned to a probe that lacks
[plural] and [participant] features (and by extension, [author] features).
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In fact, in Preminger , I argued that it was generally a property of ϕ-agreement that
when it has failed to locate an appropriate target, the result is the appearance of a morpheme
exhibiting “default”ϕ-feature values (e.g. rd-person singular)—in contrast to clitic-doubling,
whose failure results in the outright disappearance of the agreement morpheme (and that the
two can thus be distinguished if “default” agreement in the language in question happens to
be non-null):
() diagnostic for “pure” agreement vs. clitic-doubling (Preminger )
Given a scenario where the relation R between an agreement-morphemeM and the
corresponding full noun-phrase F is broken—but the result is still a grammatical
utterance:
a. M shows up expressing “default” ϕ-features =⇒R is “pure” agreement
b. M disappears entirely =⇒R is clitic-doubling
The distinction in () was illustrated in Preminger  using the morphosyntax of the
Basque auxiliary; to the extent that it proves to be cross-linguistically stable (see, for example,
Kramer , on Amharic), the property in (a) suggests a cross-linguistic tendency for the
“meta-nodes” [ϕ], [person], and [number] to have no overt exponence of their own—and
thus, for complete lack of valuation to be morphologically indistinguishable from a lack of
[participant], [author], and [plural] features.
Whether this is a cross-linguistic universal or not, however, it is clearly possible that
in a given language, there would be no observable diﬀerence between a ϕ-probe that has
successfully agreed with a rd-person singular noun-phrase, and one that has failed to agree
with anything—if in this language, “rd-person singular agreement” were simply the overt
exponence given to a ϕ-probe that lacked [participant], [author], and [plural] features.
The analytical possibility created by the results of chapter  is therefore that defective
intervention, which looks like it triggers rd-person singular agreement on the ϕ-probe, is
really an instance of failed agreement altogether (given the possibility of failed agreement
in a grammatical utterance, which was motivated on the basis of the Kichean Agent-Focus
construction, and independently of defective intervention).
Consider the obligatory operations approach to ϕ-agreement, implemented through the
operation find(f ), given in §. and repeated here (see §., for a discussion of an alternative
based on the violable constraints model):
() find(f ): given an unvalued feature f on a head H0, find an XP bearing a valued
instance of f , and assign that value to H0 [=()]
Recall also that the terms “unvalued feature f ” and “XP bearing a valued instance of f ” in
() are shorthand for feature-geometric notions of valuation; see §.. (as well as §.).
Given that case-discrimination (§..) was motivated by Bobaljik () independently
of defective intervention (for example, by the behavior of ϕ-agreement in quirky-subject
languages, as well as by the absence of languages with an ergative-absolutive agreement
alignment but a nominative-accusative case alignment; see §..), I will assume it is
correct. Suppose that the way case-discrimination is implemented in the grammar is not
by further constraining the XPs that () can target—since that would cause datives and
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other discriminated-against XPs to simply be skipped, like non-wh phrases in wh-probing—
but rather by causing the find(f ) operation to abort:
() findϕ(f ): given an unvalued feature f on a head H0, find an XP bearing a valued
instance of f . If such an XP is found, check whether its case is allowed by
case-discrimination—
yes→ assign the found value to H0
no → abort.
This is admittedly a stipulative addition to (); but as discussed in §.., it seems that any
approach that would derive the dative paradox will have to make some stipulation or other.10
The question is which stipulation actually derives the correct array of facts.
Let us therefore investigate the consequences of (). Consider Icelandic; as discussed in
detail in §. and §.., only nominative noun-phrases are ever targeted for ϕ-agreement in
Icelandic. Thus, Icelandic makes the case-discrimination cutoﬀ between the first and second
members of the disjunctive case hierarchy:
() case-discrimination: Icelandic
unmarked case︸              ︷︷              ︸
accessible for
ϕ-agreement
≫ dependent case≫ lexical/oblique case [=()]
In an example like (), below, the ϕ-probe searches for an XP with valued number/person
features (abstracting away, for the purposes of the current discussion, from the possibility
that in Icelandic, like in Kichean, person and number probe separately from one another; see
Sigurðsson and Holmberg ):
() það
expl
finnst(/*finnast)
find.sg/*find.pl
[einhverjum
some
stúdent]dat
student.sg.dat
[sc tölvurnar
the.computers.pl.nom
ljótar
ugly
].
‘Some student finds the computers ugly.’ [=(–)]
[Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir :]
The dative nominal is unambiguously the closest XP bearing valued features of this sort (see
(), above); it therefore must be the XP identified by findϕ(number/person) (as formalized
in ()). This XP—the dative nominal—is then evaluated with respect to case-discrimination,
which in Icelandic is set in the manner shown in (), ruling out datives. The formulation of
() then dictates that findϕ(number/person) be aborted, which means that no valuation of
the features on the ϕ-probe will take place.
Thus, no [participant], [author], or [plural] features will be copied onto the ϕ-probe. I will
assume, as discussed above, that “rd-person singular” agreement morphology in Icelandic
is simply the spellout of a ϕ-probe that lacks [plural] and [participant] features (and by
10Here, I build the case-discrimination clause into a version of find(f ) that is only relevant to ϕ-features—
namely, findϕ(f ). It is not clear to me what the counterpart of this clause would be for other kinds of
features. Again, while it is stipulative to include this proviso only in theϕ-version of find(f ), this stipulation is
motivated independently of defective intervention or datives: as shown in §.., the cross-linguistic typology
of noun-phrases that can and cannot be targeted for ϕ-agreement is what leads to the formulation of case-
discrimination—and this typology has no self-evident correlates outside the domain of ϕ-agreement.
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extension, [author] features). The result of aborting findϕ(number/person) will therefore
be morphologically indistinguishable from successful agreement with a rd-person singular
noun-phrase. This is the correct result, as shown in ().
So far, it seems we have not achieved that much beyond what was already available: we
now have yet another explanation for how it is, exactly, that datives come to be inert for the
purposes of ϕ-agreement, in a language like Icelandic; but we already had at least two possible
explanations for this (namely, the functional shells approach, and Bobaljik’s  original
proposal, which did not resort to failed agreement; recall also that the Activity Condition was
shown to be untenable on independent grounds; see §..–§.. for detailed discussion of
all three approaches).
Where these two previous approaches ran into trouble was when faced with defective
intervention that seems to lead to outright ungrammaticality, as in the French examples
discussed in §..–§.., which have close counterparts in languages like Spanish, Italian,
and Greek:
() ?* Jean1
Jean
semble
seems
[à
to
Marie]dat
Marie
[ t1 avoir
have.inf
du
of
talent
talent
].
‘Jean seems to Marie to have talent.’ [=()] [McGinnis :]
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As observed earlier, these patterns—namely, those in which defective intervention gives rise to
actual ungrammaticality—seem to be cross-linguistically associated withmovement (note the
diﬀerence between () and (), for example).
I propose that this ungrammaticality arises precisely at the juncture of ϕ-agreement and
movement, due in particular to the fact that defective intervention leads to the outright failure
of ϕ-agreement.
To see this, let us first consider languages that do not have quirky subjects, such as English
or French.11 Note that for the purposes of this discussion (and in fact, throughout this thesis),
I am using the term quirky subject to refer specifically to instances of non-nominative noun-
phrases that pass the full battery of subjecthood diagnostics (as in Icelandic; Sigurðsson ,
Zaenen, Maling, and Thráinsson , among others), rather than non-nominative noun-
phrases that merely c-command other noun-phrases in the clause (as is the case with certain
datives in German, for example; see Haider and Rosengren , Wurmbrand ).
What it means for a language not to have quirky subjects is that the canonical subject
position (in finite clauses) is always occupied by a nominative noun-phrase; but correlation
is of course not necessarily causation, and moreover, it does not dictate the directionality of
causation should such causation exist. Traditionally, movement to canonical subject position
(henceforth,MtoCSP) was seen as the cause of this nominatives-only property—either because
canonical subject position was the locus of nominative case assignment (as in Chomsky and
Lasnik , for example), or because the syntactic element responsible for movement to
subject position (e.g. Infl0) was also the assigner of nominative case (as in later analyses).
11As both languages are well into the process of losing their overt case-marking, this is of course not directly
observable on the basis of the forms of full noun-phrases. In both languages, the familiar move of examining
the pronoun/clitic system, where the relevant distinctions are still morphologically observable, reveals this
nominatives-only property.
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However, once the empirical base was broadened to include languages with quirky subjects,
these approaches were no longer tenable, insofar as one wished to maintain a notion of
“nominative” that has anything to do with morphologically-observable distinctions (as argued
in detail by Marantz ). In lieu of assuming that this correlation (in a non-quirky-subjects
language) is just a coincidence—or perhaps caused by some third factor, which is neither the
movement or the case-marking itself—one could entertain the possibility that it is nominative
case that makes a noun-phrase in English or French eligible for MtoCSP, in the first place.
Again, such a view would be incoherent in a system where nominative case is assigned as
part of, or as the result of, MtoCSP; but languages with quirky subjects make such a system
untenable, in the first place. Since languages of that sort (e.g. Icelandic) require a theory of
the assignment of nominative where this assignment is not associated with MtoCSP, I assume
that such a theory generalizes to English and French, as well (which a system like that of
Marantz  indeed does; see chapter  for further discussion). It is then coherent to discuss
nominative case as a precursor to—and potentially, a precondition for—MtoCSP.
If nominative case is a precondition for MtoCSP (in a language like French or English),
then an interesting parallelism can be observed between ϕ-agreement and MtoCSP—namely,
that both are case-discriminating. This is not an entirely new idea, of course; in theories where
Infl0 was responsible for all three properties—ϕ-agreement, nominative case assignment, and
MtoCSP—this commonality betweenϕ-agreement andMtoCSPwas straightforwardly derived.
However, given that such theories of ϕ-agreement and case fail to generalize (as Icelandic
demonstrates), it is no longer a trivial fact that this commonality exists.
In §.., I reviewed Bobaljik’s () argument that ϕ-agreement is case-discriminating;
importantly, this was demonstrated independently of MtoCSP—for example, by the typological
gap in alignments of agreement and case, whereby languages with nominative-accusative case
systems but ergative-absolutive agreement systems do not seem to exist. There are therefore
three logical possibilities regarding the genesis of case-discrimination in MtoCSP: (i)MtoCSP
is independently case-discriminating (i.e., the case-discrimination found with ϕ-agreement is
duplicated as part of MtoCSP); (ii) there is an independent mechanism of case-discrimination,
and both ϕ-agreement and MtoCSP make use of it; or (iii) MtoCSP is case-discriminating
derivatively, because it can only see noun-phrases through the prism of ϕ-agreement.
Naturally, simplicity would favor (ii–iii) over (i). Crucially, there is an additional, empirical
reason to favor (iii) over the other two, having to do with the typology of case-discrimination
in ϕ-agreement and in MtoCSP, and in particular, the relation between the set of noun-phrases
(in terms of their possible case markings) that can undergo MtoCSP in a given language, and
the set of noun-phrases (again, in terms of possible case-markings) that can be targeted by the
finite ϕ-probe.
Before detailing the typological issue at hand, I would like to stress that this discussion
involves, on the ϕ-agreement side, the question of whether a single ϕ-probe can or cannot
target noun-phrases with diﬀerent case-markings (in other words, we are interested in what
Bobaljik  terms single agreement). Thus, examples like the Basque (), below, are not
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directly relevant, since per morphological slot on the finite auxiliary, only noun-phrases with
a single case-marking are ever targeted:12
() Guraso-e-k
parent(s)-artpl-erg
niri
me.dat
belarritako
earring(s)
ederr-ak
beautiful-artpl(abs)
erosi
bought
d-
.abs-
i-√ -
zki-
pl.abs-
da-
sg.dat-
te.
pl.erg
(Basque)
‘(My) parents have bought me beautiful earrings.’ [Laka ]
Instead, an example of a single ϕ-probe being able to target noun-phrases with multiple
diﬀerent case-markings would be finite ϕ-agreement in Nepali (as noted in §..). Recall
that on the case-discrimination analysis, Nepali is a language that makes the cutoﬀ after the
second member of the revised Moravcsik Hierarchy (following Bobaljik ):
() case-discrimination: Nepali (cf. Icelandic, in ())
unmarked case≫ dependent case︸                                         ︷︷                                         ︸
accessible for
ϕ-agreement
≫ lexical/oblique case
[=()]
Thus, in Nepali, a single ϕ-agreement host (the finite verb) can target nominals bearing either
unmarked case (labeled “nom”, here), or dependent case (labeled “erg”):
() a. ma
sg.nom
[ yas
dem.obl
pasal-ma¯
store-loc
] patrika¯
newspaper.nom
kin-ch-u
buy-nonpast-sg
(Nepali)
‘I buy the newspaper in this store.’ [=(a)]
b. maile
sg.erg
[ yas
dem.obl
pasal-ma¯
store-loc
] patrika¯
newspaper.nom
kin-e¯/*kin-yo
buy.past-sg/*buy.past-sg.M
‘I bought the newspaper in this store.’ [=(b)]
[Bickel and Ya¯dava :]
Having elucidated this distinction, we are now in a position to formulate the relevant
typological observation. We have already seen a language—Icelandic—where the set of noun-
phrases that can undergo MtoCSP (in terms of possible case-markings) is a superset of the
set of noun-phrases that can be targeted by the finite ϕ-probe; in Icelandic, nominatives,
accusatives, datives and genitives can move to canonical subject position, but only nominatives
can be agreed with (Sigurðsson , ). We have also seen languages where the two sets
converge: in English for example, only nominatives can be targeted for finite verb agreement,
and only nominatives can undergo MtoCSP. I know of no language, however, where the set of
noun-phrases that can undergo MtoCSP is a proper subset of the set of noun-phrases that can
be targeted by the finite ϕ-probe:
12Exceptions to this statement involve agreement displacement (see Rezac , a, as well as
§..–§..); importantly, however, agreement displacement arises in Basque only under well-defined
circumstances (see Rezac a for details), and we can therefore safely abstract away from it here.
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() a. Icelandic: candidates for MtoCSP:{nom, acc, dat, ...} )
candidates for finite ϕ-agreement:
{nom}
b. English: candidates for MtoCSP:{nom} =
candidates for finite ϕ-agreement:
{nom}
c. *unattested: candidates for MtoCSP:{nom/abs} (
candidates for finite ϕ-agreement:
{nom/abs, acc/erg, ...}
In Nepali, for example, where ϕ-agreement can target noun-phrases bearing unmarked or
dependent case, there is crucially no MtoCSP operation that targets only unmarked noun-
phrases (cf. (c)).
Another hypothetical example of a (c)-type language would be an inverse version
of Icelandic, where the ϕ-probe could target nominatives, accusatives, datives or genitives,
but only nominatives could move to canonical subject position. With a raising verb that
also takes a dative experiencer (like the Icelandic “finnast” ‘find’, above), the dative would
control agreement on the finite verb, but nothing could move to subject position (since the
dative would bear the wrong case-marking, but the lower nominative subject would violate
minimality/Closest), meaning only the expletive-associate variant of this construction would
be possible; but again, this seems to be unattested.
In other words, it seems that the capacity of MtoCSP for case-discrimination is derivative
of the case-discrimination exhibited by ϕ-agreement (as in (iii), above).
Suppose then that MtoCSP is case-discriminating precisely because it views noun-phrases
through the prism of ϕ-agreement, and in particular, of findϕ(f ) (see (), above). If MtoCSP
is designed to move precisely that XP that has been identified by findϕ(f ), it follows that
MtoCSP will manifest the same case-discrimination properties exhibited by ϕ-agreement. The
idea that MtoCSP relies on findϕ(f ) for its input also recalls an intuition reflected in various
existing proposals, that MtoCSP is in some sense “parasitic” on ϕ-agreement (see, for example,
Chomsky b:).
Of course, MtoCSP is not case-discriminating in every language. The reason for abandoning
a theory that took MtoCSP, ϕ-agreement, and nominative case to be intrinsically linked (such
as Chomsky’s b theory) was the existence of quirky subject languages. As shown in
§.–§., ϕ-agreement and nominative case—or more accurately, unmarked case—remain
intrinsically linked in such a language, but MtoCSP operates independently, appearing to
simply target the structurally closest nominal (with certain complications that arise when the
closest nominal node is in fact the trace of a moved phrase; see, for example, the discussion of
() in §..).
There is therefore a way of thinking of the diﬀerence between quirky-subject languages
and non-quirky-subject languages that goes at least one step beyond simply naming the two,
tracing the diﬀerence to whether or not MtoCSP operates on the target of findϕ(f ):
DATIVES, DEFECTIVE INTERVENTION, AND CASE-DISCRIMINATION 
() movement to canonical subject position (MtoCSP):
two typological variations
13
a. in a quirky-subject language (e.g. Icelandic)
MtoCSPQSL: Move(closest DP)
b. in a non-quirky-subject language (e.g. English, French)
MtoCSPNQSL: Move(XP targeted by findϕ)
It might seem at first glance that this view of the typology of MtoCSP runs into its own
duplication problem, this time with respect to Closest (since Closest is part of findϕ(f ), but
now also part of (a), which does not involve findϕ(f )). Like c-command, however, Closest
can be viewed not as an explicit condition or rule, but simply as a reflex of hierarchical
structure—and in the case of Closest, the sequential searching of that structure. Since both
findϕ(f ) and (a) involve searching the structure for a particular kind of target, they will by
their very definition have to obey Closest. A more accurate definition of (a) would therefore
take Closest to be a consequence, not part of the definition itself:
() movement to canonical subject position (MtoCSP):
two typological variations – revised version
a. in a quirky-subject language (e.g. Icelandic)
MtoCSPQSL: Move(DP)
b. in a non-quirky-subject language (e.g. English, French)
MtoCSPNQSL: Move(XP targeted by findϕ)
Notice also that (b)/(b) comes very close to certain other models proposed in the
literature, in which Move is contingent on Agree (see, for example, Chomsky , ).
There are several important diﬀerences, however: (i) on the current view, this contingency
of movement on agreement only holds in non-quirky-subject languages, crucially not in a
language like Icelandic, for example; (ii) the kind of agreement implicated in (b) is
morphologically detectable, verb-argument agreement in ϕ-features—rather than an abstract
formal relation that might involve features like [epp], etc.; and perhaps most importantly,
(iii) the agreement operation in (b) is findϕ(f ), which as we have already seen (in §.),
sometimes occurs without culminating successfully (contra Chomsky’s ,  Agree).
Let us now illustrate how the model in () derives the typology of defective intervention,
discussed earlier—and in particular, the conditions under which defective intervention gives
rise to actual ungrammaticality, as opposed to a morphological “default”.
Recall the treatment of an example like (), repeated below, within the findϕ(f ) model:
the ϕ-probe searches for a ϕ-bearing XP; the structurally closest such XP is the dative nominal;
but case-discrimination dictates that this dative nominal is an illicit ϕ-agreement target,
causing findϕ(f ) to abort.
13This account relies on the idea that one operation can be specified to operate on the output of another—in
this case, MtoCSPNQSL, which must operate on the XP that findϕ(f ) comes up with—which recalls functional
composition in mathematics (the composition operator is represented by “◦”):
(i) (f ◦ g) (x) = f (g (x))
I assume here that in the grammar, too, operations can in principle operate on the output of other operations.
 CASE-DISCRIMINATION AND FAILED AGREEMENT
() það
expl
finnst(/*finnast)
find.sg/*find.pl
[einhverjum
some
stúdent]dat
student.sg.dat
[sc tölvurnar
the.computers.pl.nom
ljótar
ugly
].
‘Some student finds the computers ugly.’ [=(–)]
[Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir :]
The result is a lack of valuation. Thus, the probe will lack any [plural] or [participant]
features (and by extension, any [author] features), and therefore—as discussed above—will
be morphologically akin to a probe that has successfully agreed with a rd-person singular
target.
Now consider once more the French (), repeated here:
() ?* Jean1
Jean
semble
seems
[à
to
Marie]dat
Marie
[ t1 avoir
have.inf
du
of
talent
talent
].
‘Jean seems to Marie to have talent.’ [=()] [McGinnis :]
In this example, the ϕ-probe will similarly search for a ϕ-bearing XP, find the dative, and
abort due to case-discrimination; in terms of ϕ-agreement alone, then, we expect () to be
well-formed, exhibiting some sort of default ϕ-agreement on the finite verb. This, however,
is where examples like () and () diverge: given the surface string, MtoCSP is visibly
instantiated in (), but not () (and Icelandic being a quirky-subject language, MtoCSP in
() would yield movement of the dative experiencer, not the embedded nominative subject;
cf. (), above).
We now have an explanation for the ungrammaticality of (): it requires instantiating
an operation—namely, MtoCSPNQSL of “Jean”—in a derivation where the necessary input to
that operation is not available. In other words, the surface string in () has “Jean” to the
left of the finite verb, meaning “Jean” has undergone MtoCSPNQSL; but given the proposed
formulation MtoCSPNQSL (as in (b), above), it operates on the XP that has been targeted by
findϕ(f ); and in (), findϕ(f ) has been aborted, therefore not providing MtoCSPNQSL with
an XP on which to operate.
An example like () is therefore similar to the examples of “gratuitous non-agreement”
discussed in §.: it is ruled out not because of any particular diacritic or property of the
representation, but because there is simply no derivation made available by the grammar
that leads to this surface structure. As discussed in §., ruling out certain structures on the
grounds that there is simply no well-formed derivation that leads to them is independently
necessary tomodel the eﬀects of minimality/Closest; on the current view, the ungrammaticality
of () is just another instance of the same logic at work.
In this account, the reason datives intervene in MtoCSPNQSL just as they intervene in
ϕ-agreement is because MtoCSPNQSL can only target that XP which has been targeted for
ϕ-agreement.
Since the account proposed here crucially implicates movement in the ungrammaticality
of an examples like (), this generates the predication that a variant of () in which the
nominative has remained in situ would be grammatical. As pointed out by Bošković (,
), this is in fact the case. One cannot demonstrate this with a nominative noun-phrase
such as “Jean”, due to the Definiteness Eﬀect (Milsark , and much subsequent work; see
also §..); but such examples are possible with an indefinite nominative:
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() a. Il
expl
semble
seem(sg)
au
to.the
général
general
être
to.be
arrivé
arrived
deux
two
soldats
soldiers
en
in
ville.
town
‘There seem to the general to have arrived two soldiers in town.’
b. Il
expl
semble
seem(sg)
au
to.the
général
general
y avoir
to.have
deux
two
soldats
soldiers
manquants
missing
à
at
la
the
caserne.
barracks
‘There seem to the general to be two soldiers missing from the barracks.’
[Bošković :]
In other words, when the nominative remains in situ, French is no diﬀerent from Icelandic.
It is only when MtoCSPNQSL is forced by the surface string (i.e., the nominative noun-phrase
occurs to the left of the finite verb), but the subject could not be target for ϕ-agreement (due
to defective intervention by the dative), that ungrammaticality arises—exactly as predicted on
the current account.
Before concluding this section, two notes about English are in order. First, as is well-known,
English diﬀers from French and Icelandic alike in allowing agreement across an intervening
dative experiencer (as in ()), and from French in particular in allowing raising across an
intervening datives (as in ()):
() a. There seems/??seem [to every attorneyi] to be [some client of hisi who is innocent].
b. There seem/%seems [to every attorneyi] to be [several clients of hisi who are innocent].14
() [Some client]1 seems [to every attorney] [to t1 be innocent].
Recent work by Hartman (, to appear) suggests that this is a property of English “seem”
and “appear”, in particular—and it does not extend to other instances of dative intervention,
even in English.
Regardless, it is worth noting that the pattern in (–) does not counter-exemplify
the current proposal, involving MtoCSPNQSL. The prediction of () is that movement to
canonical subject position, in a non-quirky-subject language like English, will be able to target
a noun-phrase exactly when that noun-phrase has been successfully targeted by ϕ-agreement
(implemented here as findϕ(f )). As shown in (), the subject of the non-finite complement
of “seem” in English can be successfully targeted by ϕ-agreement; regardless of what the
particular explanation of this is (see Anagnostopoulou , Collins , Hartman 
for an array of proposals), the formulation of MtoCSPNQSL proposed here predicts that this
embedded subject will be able to undergo movement to canonical subject position, exactly as
attested in ().
The second point regarding English involves the overt ϕ-agreement found on non-past,
non-participle main verbs—and in particular, the age-old observation (going back at least
as far as Chomsky ) that the /-z/ rd-person singular agreement marker represents a
misalignment of overtness and markedness. Again, this is an instance of exceptionality that
is localizable to exactly one property, rather than a counter-exemplification of the logic of
14See Boeckx () (who attributes the observations to Howard Lasnik) regarding some apparent dialectal
variation with respect to the acceptability of the singular form (“seems”), in examples like (b).
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the current proposal. If we accept that in this paradigm, /-z/ is the overt spellout of a
ϕ-probe that lacks [plural] and [participant] features (and by extension, [author] features),
then the actual distribution of the forms in question is well-behaved, from the perspective of
the current proposal.15 In the terms used in §., (b) below is an instance of “gratuitous
agreement” (in particular, plural agreement morphology in a derivation where the structurally
closest noun-phrase, the subject, is singular); conversely, (b) is an instance of “gratuitous
non-agreement” (in particular, singular agreement morphology in a derivation where the
structurally closest noun-phrase, the subject, is plural).
() a. This boy enjoys cartoons.
b. * This boy enjoy cartoons.
() a. These boys enjoy cartoons.
b. * These boys enjoys cartoons.
Thus, English—despite exhibiting certain characteristics that are, to some degree, unique—
does not counter-exemplify the current proposal.
In summary, an approach that takes case-discrimination to result in the outright failure of
agreement—coupled with the results of chapter , where by the failure of agreement does
not, in itself, give rise to ungrammaticality—is able to predict which instances of defective
intervention will lead to ungrammaticality, and which will not. This sets the current approach
apart from its competitors, surveyed in §..–§...
More generally, this account provides an explanation for both sides of the dative paradox:
the reason dative nominals cannot transfer their own features to the finite verb (in the relevant
languages) is because of case-discrimination, a mechanism needed independently of datives (for
example, to capture the absence of languages with an ergative-absolutive agreement alignment
but a nominative-accusative case alignment; see §..); the reason datives still interact with
ϕ-probing is because the way case-discrimination is implemented in the grammar is through a
failure condition within theϕ-agreement operation (findϕ(f ), in the current implementation).
This failure is not, in itself, fatal to the derivation; as in the cases discussed in chapter ,
failed agreement is tolerated by the grammar, resulting only in the lack of valuation on the
ϕ-probe; but it can lead to ill-formedness of derivations involving an operation that relies
for its input on ϕ-agreement. On the account proposed here, movement to canonical subject
position in a non-quirky-subject language (MtoCSPNQSL) is such an operation; thus, a surface
string that forces a parse where MtoCSPNQSL has taken place, but where the structure is one
that would cause ϕ-agreement to fail, is (correctly) predicted to be ungrammatical.
15Note that saying that /-z/ is the spellout of a ϕ-probe that lacks [participant], [author], and [plural]
features is not the same as saying that /-z/ is the spellout of [ϕ], [person], and/or [number] (though the
two may be empirically indistinguishable within English)—since the former specification can be negatively
stated using [participant] and [plural] features alone, without reference to the “meta-nodes” [ϕ], [person],
and/or [number]. See the discussion earlier in this section, regarding the possibility that the “meta-nodes” in
the ϕ-geometry never receive overt exponence of their own.
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.. Against a violable constraints alternative
The reader will notice that the discussion in §. has been phrased in terms of the obligatory
operations implementation proposed in §. (based on the find(f ) operation). At the end of
chapter , however, it was shown that two models were still in contention as viable accounts
of ϕ-agreement—not only the obligatory operations model, but also the violable constraints
model.
The account developed in §., however, has relied crucially on the notion that actual
failure to agree is implicated in the derivation of defective intervention by dative nominals.
In this section, I briefly demonstrate why this state of aﬀairs is incompatible with the violable
constraints model.
Consider once more an example like the Icelandic (), repeated here:
() það
expl
finnst(/*finnast)
find.sg/*find.pl
[einhverjum
some
stúdent]dat
student.sg.dat
[sc tölvurnar
the.computers.pl.nom
ljótar
ugly
].
‘Some student finds the computers ugly.’ [=(–)]
[Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir :]
Suppose there is a constraint mitigating against agreement across a dative intervener—or more
generally, across any bearer of valued ϕ-features:
() *CrossPhi: Assign one violation mark for each noun-phrase β located between x and
a noun-phrase α, if x bears agreement morphology that co-indexes α.(
i.e., *x [ϕi] » β
[
ϕj
]
» α [ϕi], where ‘»’ indicates c-command
)
We could then account for the impossibility of agreement with the lower nominative in ()
as follows:
() . . . finiteverb datDP[ϕk] nomDP[ϕi] . . . *CrossPhi HaveAgr
a. + . . . finiteverb[Ø] datDP[ϕk] nomDP[ϕi] . . . *
b. . . . finiteverb[ϕi] datDP[ϕk] nomDP[ϕi] . . . *!
We must also prevent ϕ-agreement from targeting the dative itself—as demonstrated by (),
repeated here:
() það
expl
finnst(/*finnast)
find.sg/*find.pl
[ mörgum
many
stúdentum ]dat
students.pl.dat
[sc tölvan
the.computer.sg.nom
ljótar
ugly
].
‘Many students find the computer ugly.’ [Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir :]
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To capture these eﬀects—a sub-case of case-discrimination (§..)—we could add a constraint
mitigating against agreement with oblique noun-phrases:
() *OblTarget: Assign one violation mark for each oblique noun-phrase (including
datives) targeted for ϕ-agreement.
 AGAINST A VIOLABLE CONSTRAINTS ALTERNATIVE
In fact, it is quite straightforward to recast the entire revised Moravcsik Hierarchy (in §..)
as a series of constraints mitigating against agreement with nominals bearing lexical/oblique
case, *OblTarget, above; against agreement with nominals marked with dependent case,
*DepTarget; and perhaps even against agreement with nominals with unmarked case,
*UnmrTarget. In a language like Icelandic, only *UnmrTarget would be ranked below
HaveAgr, yielding the attested case-discrimination behavior. Note however, that the set
{*OblTarget, *DepTarget, *UnmrTarget} would have to be extrinsically ranked with
respect to one another to yield the correct implicational universals; this constraint-based
approach to the Moravcsik Hierarchy therefore provides no particular insight into the nature
of case-discrimination, and I will leave it aside for now, focusing instead on *OblTarget in
particular.
If *OblTarget and *CrossPhi were both ranked above HaveAgr, we would derive the
correct behavior of agreement in the Icelandic transitive-expletive construction:
() . . . finiteverb datDP[ϕk] nomDP[ϕi] . . . *OblTarget *CrossPhi HaveAgr
a. + . . . finiteverb[Ø] datDP[ϕk] nomDP[ϕi] . . . *
b. . . . finiteverb[ϕi] datDP[ϕk] nomDP[ϕi] . . . *!
c. . . . finiteverb[ϕk] datDP[ϕk] nomDP[ϕi] . . . *!
This correctly predicts that the result of defective intervention, in Icelandic, is a non-agreeing
form of the verb.
Let us now turn to the French example in (), repeated here:
() ?* Jean1
Jean
semble
seems
[à
to
Marie]dat
Marie
[ t1 avoir
have.inf
du
of
talent
talent
].
‘Jean seems to Marie to have talent.’ [=()] [McGinnis :]
As demonstrated in §., the ungrammaticality of () is crucially tied to the presence
of a dative experiencer; corresponding examples that lack a dative experiencer altogether
are grammatical, as are examples where the dative experiencer is a pronominal clitic (see
Anagnostopoulou , McGinnis ). Thus, treating () as unrelated to other cases
of defective intervention by datives (such as the Icelandic cases discussed throughout this
chapter) would miss an important generalization—namely, the generalization which I have
called the dative paradox.
Initially, the prospects for a constraint-based account of (), along the lines of (),
seem promising: *OblTarget and *CrossPhi would mitigate against agreement with the
dative itself, and against agreement with the nominative “Jean” across the dative, just as in
the Icelandic example. We could perhaps even generalize *OblTarget and *CrossPhi so that
they applied to agreement and movement equally, thus ruling out the raising of the dative or
the nominative in () in the same manner that agreement with each of the two is ruled out.
The problem arises with the very logic of a violable constraints approach: in this kind of
framework, no candidate is “well-formed” or “ill-formed”, independently of other candidates;
the candidate that is comparatively better than all of its competitors is predicted to be a viable
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surface form. The only way a given string can be ungrammatical, then, is if it constitutes a sub-
optimal candidate, dispreferred to another realization of the same input. Crucially, however,
there is no realization involving themain verb “semble”, a full lexical noun-phrase (rather than
a pronominal clitic) as an experiencer argument, and an embedded non-finite clause [<Jean>
avoir du talent ], that results in a grammatical string.16
Thus, the formalism used to model ϕ-agreement must be capable of introducing outright
ungrammaticality—whether this arises at the juncture of ϕ-agreement and MtoCSP (as in
the account proposed in §.), or as part of MtoCSP itself. While this might technically be
possible in a violable constraints model—for example, by introducing ungrammaticality as a
candidate in its own right (the so-called “null parse”), and allowing it to compete with the
other, grammatical candidates and emerge as optimal under specific circumstances—the idea
is fundamentally alien to the spirit of this approach. Insofar as a violable constraints approach
constitutes a falsifiable hypothesis, rather than an unrestrictive descriptive apparatus, this is
precisely what a falsification of it would look like.
.. Summary
In this chapter, I have extended the account of ϕ-agreement proposed in chapter  to account
for instances of defective intervention by dative nominals, and what I have called the dative
paradox (§.): the fact that dative nominals interact with ϕ-probing at all, given the inability
of dative nominals to transfer their own ϕ-features to the ϕ-probe (§.).
The proposal was based crucially on Bobaljik’s () observation that ϕ-agreement is case-
discriminating: characterizing the set of noun-phrases that ϕ-agreement can and cannot target
in terms of case (and in particular, morphological case, rather than grammatical function)
predicts the behavior of ϕ-agreement in quirky-subject languages like Icelandic, and it also
provides an explanation for the absence of languages that exhibit a nominative-accusative
alignment in their system of case-marking, but an ergative-absolutive alignment in their
agreement system.
16As discussed in §.., the variant of () in which the embedded clause is finite is grammatical (as
shown in (a)). One might therefore entertain the possibility that the finite variant is the optimal candidate
that competes with and outperforms (), resulting in the ungrammaticality of (). However, there are
interpretive diﬀerences between the finite and non-finite versions of this construction; this can be discerned
by looking at cases where there is no dative experiencer, or the experiencer is cliticized to verb—in which case
both the finite and non-finite variants are grammatical (Anagnostopoulou , McGinnis ). The finite
and non-finite variants diﬀer, for example, in their temporal interpretation (as in “It seems that Stewie will
be a maladjusted adult” vs. “Stewie seems to be a maladjusted adult”)—as one would expect, when dealing
with a distinction between a finite embedded clause and a raising infinitive. Thus, attempting to derive the
finiteness of the embedded clause (as opposed to stipulating it as part of the input to the system of constraints)
amounts to an attempt to use the set of violable constraints to derive the speaker’s intentions.
It is also worth noting here that in French, a definite nominative like “Jean” cannot remain in situ with
the expletive “il” filling the matrix subject position in its stead (as discussed in §.); but this cannot be the
cause of ungrammaticality, in a violable constraints model. First, note that an expletive is not part of apparent
input in an example like (); but even if we assume that an expletive can be inserted by the computation
(contra the manipulation of finiteness, as discussed above), then the inability of definites to serve as associates
in French simply means there is an undominated constraint like *DefinAssoc, preventing the an expletive
from being inserted (and the definite nominative from remaining in situ). If so, some candidate should still
outperform the expletive-associate candidate, emerging as the optimal one—and therefore, the point in the
main text still holds.
 SUMMARY
Importantly, it was shown that existing accounts of defective intervention—such as
the Activity Condition (Chomsky ) (§..), or the idea that datives are enclosed in a
characteristic layer of functional structure (as exemplified by Rezac’s a proposal; §..),
or even Bobaljik’s own domain/restructuring-based approach (§..)—could not account for
the fact that defective intervention causes outright ungrammaticality in some cases, but merely
“default” agreement morphology in others.
This last point also proves crucial in ruling out a violable constraints account of agreement
and its failures (§.). Simply put, ungrammaticality that arises through defective intervention
furnishes a case of the best not being good enough: in this case, no possible output in the pool
of candidates that can reasonably correspond to a given input turns out to be grammatical—
counter-exemplifying the very logic that a violable constraints model is built upon (namely,
that grammaticality is simply a matter of incurring the least costly set of violations among the
set of competing candidates).
In §., I presented an account based on the notion that case-discrimination causes outright
failure of the operation responsible for ϕ-agreement (namely, findϕ(f )). Crucially, this
failure—unto itself—results only in the absence of the eﬀects of the operation, namely
valuation of the ϕ-features on the probe. However, it was argued that in non-quirky-subject
languages, movement to canonical subject position (MtoCSP) depends on ϕ-agreement to
identify the moving noun-phrase (an idea for which there seems to be some direct typological
support; see (), above). Thus, a sentence (in a non-quirky-subject language) which can
only receive a parse in which MtoCSP has taken place—but where defective intervention
would prevent ϕ-agreement from obtaining—will be ungrammatical, simply because there
is no derivation allowed by the grammar that would lead to such a string.
The essential components of this account are repeated below:
() findϕ(f ): given an unvalued feature f on a head H0, find an XP bearing a valued
instance of f . If such an XP is found, check whether its case is allowed by
case-discrimination— [=()]
yes→ assign the found value to H0
no → abort.
() theMoravcsik Hierarchy, second (and final) revision (Bobaljik )
unmarked case≫ dependent case≫ lexical/oblique case [=()]
() movement to canonical subject position (MtoCSP):
two typological variations – revised version [=()]
a. in a quirky-subject language (e.g. Icelandic)
MtoCSPQSL: Move(DP)
b. in a non-quirky-subject language (e.g. English, French)
MtoCSPNQSL: Move(XP targeted by findϕ)
As noted earlier, the fact that MtoCSPNQSL (in (b)) is computed on the basis of findϕ(f )
(in ())—which in turn, makes reference to case-discrimination, which operates on the basis
of the revised Moravcsik Hierarchy (in ())—means that we need a case calculus capable of
producing the results in () while operating entirely in syntax. This issue is taken up in the
next chapter.
Chapter 
Where’s ϕ? In syntax.
In this chapter, I will argue that ϕ-agreement is part of syntax. While this might seem like
an obvious point from certain perspectives, recall that ϕ-agreement was shown in chapter 
to operate on the output of morphological case (based on Bobaljik’s  argument for case-
discrimination; see §..), which in turn has been argued, contra abstract case, to be post-
syntactic (part of the morpho-phonological computation; Marantz ). This has been
argued, by Bobaljik (), to constitute an argument that ϕ-agreement itself is post-syntactic.
The significance of this question pertains to how the results of – should be interpreted.
If ϕ-agreement is part of syntax, these results demonstrate the existence of a syntactic
phenomenon whose obligatory nature cannot be modeled in terms of derivational time-bombs
(such as Chomsky’s ,  uninterpretable features; see §.) or in terms of violable
constraints (§.), but instead require the logic of obligatory operations (implemented in
chapter  in terms of the operation findϕ(f )). If ϕ-agreement were not part of syntax, then
these conclusions would pertain to a diﬀerent computational module entirely (and would, a
fortiori, be irrelevant to uninterpretable features).
I will contend that the argument that morphological case (and by extension, ϕ-agreement)
is post-syntactic is based on a false premise, that there are no examples where morphological
case (rather than the syntactic structure that gives rise to it) is implicated in the computation
of a process or property that in turn must be construed as part of syntax itself. I will show
that the results of chapter  furnish precisely such a scenario: in a quirky-subject language,
morphological case feeds ϕ-agreement (see above); however, following §., ϕ-agreement in
a non-quirky-subject language feeds movement to canonical subject position, an operation
that is clearly syntactic. Thus, insofar as ϕ-agreement is to be treated in a cross-linguistically
consistent manner, both what we have come to call “morphological case” and ϕ-agreement
itself must be part of the syntactic computation.
This necessitates a re-envisioning of the calculus that leads to “morphological case”—and
in particular, case-competition, and the disjunctive case hierarchy (Marantz )—in a way
that could be computed within syntax proper. As a further demonstration of this need, I
review Baker and Vinokurova’s () argument that case in Sakha, a non-quirky-subject
language, cannot be computed without case-competition, either—showing that case-competition
is part of the case calculus even in a non-quirky-subject language, rather than a morphological
peculiarity of quirky-subject languages alone.

THE ARGUMENT FOR MORPHOLOGICAL CASE AND ϕ-AGREEMENT AS POST-SYNTACTIC
OPERATIONS
I proceed to show how what we have come to know as “morphological case” can be
reimplemented in syntax proper, showing that such an implementation may actually derive
the disjunctive case hierarchy itself.
I begin by reviewing the arguments for morphological case and ϕ-agreement being post-
syntactic, in the first place (§.). Next, I demonstrate that the premise that these arguments
are based on—that the results of these computations never feed syntax—is falsified by the
results of chapter , concerning defective intervention (§.). I proceed to review Baker and
Vinokurova’s () analysis of Sakha, and in particular, the argument from Sakha that case-
competition is necessary even in a non-subject language (§..). I then present a case calculus
that is able to replicate the results of Marantz  entirely within syntax, while potentially
deriving the disjunctive case hierarchy itself (§..). Finally, I summarize the chapter and
situate its results within the broader context of this thesis (§.).
.. The argument for morphological case and ϕ-agreement as post-
syntactic operations
As noted in §.., Bobaljik’s () argument for the case-discrimination property of
ϕ-agreement is actually presented as an argument for ϕ-agreement being post-syntactic—
a part of the morpho-phonological computation, not the syntactic one. I will review the
argument here.
Consider first the issue of case-morphology in Icelandic. As shown by Marantz ()—
building on Zaenen, Maling, and Thráinsson (), Sigurðsson (), and others—Icelandic
exhibits all the properties that in classical Case Theory (Chomsky , Chomsky and Lasnik
, among others), were related to the property of abstract case (including A-movement, the
EPP, etc.); but these properties in Icelandic are entirely dissociable from the morphological
case borne by the noun-phrases in question. That is not to say that the two systems are
entirely disjoint; for example, subjects of finite clauses in Icelandic will be nominative unless
a diﬀerent case-marking is licensed by a particular lexical item. However, these deviations
from the canonical pattern are crucial: as these authors show, there is no combinatorial
mapping in Icelandic from the abstract case that classical Case Theory would assign to a given
noun-phrase, to the morphological case actually observed on that noun-phrase (independently
of other noun-phrases in the local domain, and/or the identity of the lexical heads in that
domain).
As an example of this kind of dissociation, consider a case like ():
() Fiskinum1
fish.the.dat
er
is
talið
believed
[ (t1) hafa
have.inf
verið
been
hent
discarded
t1 ]. (Icelandic)
‘The fish is believed to have been discarded.’ [Thráinsson :]
It is an idiosyncratic property of the predicate “henda” (‘throw, discard’) in Icelandic that its
Patient must bear dative case, hence the term quirky dative (or more generally, quirky case).
Crucially, as shown in (), when this predicate is passivized, the Patient undergoes the same
kind of obligatory A-movement familiar from English; it even continues its A-movement when
embedded under a passivized version of the ECM predicate “taldi” (‘believe’), just as it would
in English. Unlike in English, however, this noun-phrase bears no sign of nominative case,
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even when it undergoes this A-movement; it is morphologically indistinguishable from other
datives (see the references above for details, as well as Thráinsson  for a recent review). It
is because of patterns of this sort that we need something other than classical Case Theory to
predict the distribution of the diﬀerent cases in Icelandic.
To achieve this, Marantz () proposes the disjunctive case hierarchy:
() disjunctive case hierarchy (Marantz ) [=()]
lexical/oblique case→ dependent case→ unmarked case
Let us briefly review how () works. First, all noun-phrases that are selected by lexical items
which idiosyncratically specify a particular case-marking for their arguments (prepositions,
quirky-case verbs like “henda” ‘throw, discard’ above, etc.) are assigned the specified case-
marking.
Next, all those noun-phrases which did not receive case in the previous step are evaluated.
For every pair of as-of-yet-caseless noun-phrases within a local domain, one will be assigned
dependent case (in an ergative language/construction, the higher of the two will get this case-
marking, and we can informally call it “ergative”; otherwise, the lower of the two will get this
case-marking, and we can informally call it “accusative”):
() case-competition→ dependent case (Marantz )
a. DP . . . DP“acc” (nominative-accusative alignment)
b. “erg”DP . . . DP (ergative-absolutive alignment)
This stage of the algorithm is sometimes referred to as case-competition—the idea being that
dependent case is assigned to a noun-phrase by virtue of a “competing” as-of-yet-caseless noun-
phrase; and this term is also used sometimes to refer to the entire disjunctive case hierarchy
proposal. Note that case-competition cannot be a reciprocal relation, since that would falsely
predict that both of the competing arguments could be assigned dependent case; instead,
it must be unidirectional, with the direction parametrized as in (a–b) (this is what the
ergativity parameter amounts to, according to Marantz ).
In the final step, every noun-phrase that has not been assigned lexical/oblique case or
dependent case in the previous steps will be assigned unmarked case (which we can informally
call “nominative” or “absolutive”; or in the nominal domain, “genitive”). As noted in §..,
the term unmarked case is not to be confused with “default case” or “citation form”: in English,
for example, fragment answers and other free-standing forms bear accusative(/objective), the
dependent case (“Who came to the party? Him/*He.”). Instead, the term unmarked case refers
to case-marking whose appearance is neither idiosyncratically conditioned, nor dependent on
the appearance of other nominals in the clause. What its name is meant to suggest is a cross-
linguistic tendency to be phonologically empty, or phonologically lighter than dependent case
and lexical/oblique cases.1
1This is a tendency, not a universal: the Baltic languages, as well as Aymara, are examples of nominative-
accusative languages where nominative cannot be construed as morpho-phonologically unmarked or less-
marked than other case-markings; similarly, the Northwest Caucasian languages, as well as Nias, are examples

THE ARGUMENT FOR MORPHOLOGICAL CASE AND ϕ-AGREEMENT AS POST-SYNTACTIC
OPERATIONS
Thus, a quirky-subject verb such as “líka” (‘like’) in () will assign lexical dative case
to its experiencer argument, leaving the other argument to receive unmarked case (see the
authors cited above for evidence that () is not an inversion structure of some sort; that is,
that the dative “Jóni” is a bona fide subject):
() Henni
her.dat
líkuðu
liked.pl
hestarnir
horses.nom
(Icelandic)
‘She liked the horses.’ [Thráinsson :]
If the verb is not a quirky-case assigner, however, then neither the subject nor the object will
be assigned lexical/oblique case, leaving both arguments caseless after the first stage of the
algorithm; given that Icelandic is a nominative-accusative language, it is the lower of the two
(the object) that will then receive dependent case, leaving the higher of the two (the subject) to
receive unmarked case:
() Hún
she.nom
las
read
bókina
book-the.acc
‘She read the book.’ [Thráinsson :]
See Zaenen, Maling, and Thráinsson (), Yip, Maling, and Jackendoﬀ (), Marantz
(), and McFadden (), among others, for related examples and further discussion.
Importantly, as shown by Bobaljik () and detailed in §.., ϕ-agreement is sensitive
to the morphological case borne by putative agreement targets, not to their conjectured abstract
case. Thus, in examples like () and (), the dative subjects behave—for the purposes of
ϕ-agreement—like non-subject datives do (namely, they are inaccessible for ϕ-agreement), not
like non-dative subjects do; see chapter  for details.
Marantz () argues that the disjunctive case hierarchy operates post-syntactically, as part
of the morpho-phonological computation. It is an argument from the lack of a certain kind
of evidence: the claim is that while morphological case is computed on the basis of syntactic
structure, it does not inform syntax. In other words, Marantz contends that there are no known
instances where morphological case, rather than the syntactic structure used to compute it, has
proved necessary in order to determine an operation or property that is necessarily syntactic.
Bobaljik points out that if this is correct, it furnishes an order-of-operations argument
for ϕ-agreement being post-syntactic, as well. The argument proceeds as follows: given
that it is morphological case (rather than, say, abstract case) that ϕ-agreement is sensitive
to, ϕ-agreement must be computed at a stage in the derivation where morphological case is
already available (though see fn. , in §..). Therefore, if morphological case is computed
post-syntactically, ϕ-agreement must be computed post-syntactically, too.
Below, I will argue that this argument is based on a false premise (in particular, the
post-syntactic nature of morphological case). Note, however, that if this argument were
correct, it would have profound implications for the current thesis: the central argument of
this thesis concerns the logic that relates ϕ-agreement to grammaticality/ungrammaticality,
and the inadequacy of certain models (such as Chomsky’s ,  uninterpretable features
of ergative-absolutive languages where absolutive cannot be construed as morpho-phonologically unmarked
or less-marked than other case-markings (Maria Polinsky, p.c.).
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approach) in capturing these empirical patterns. If Bobaljik’s extension of Marantz’s argument
were correct, then the conclusions of chapters – would be applicable not to the syntactic
computation itself, but rather to the morphological component.
It is therefore rather crucial to determine in which module of the grammar ϕ-agreement
occurs, and therefore, to which module these conclusions apply.
.. The missing evidence: Non-quirky-subject languages
As noted in §., Marantz’s () argument that morphological case is post-syntactic was
based on the absence of a certain kind of evidence—namely, grammatical processes that
make crucial reference to morphological case (rather than grammatical function or structural
prominence), and which inform processes that must be thought of as part of syntax proper.
Recall now the results of chapter , concerning howmovement to canonical subject position
(MtoCSP) operates in quirky-subject and non-quirky-subject languages:
() movement to canonical subject position (MtoCSP):
two typological variations – revised version [=()]
a. in a quirky-subject language (e.g. Icelandic)
MtoCSPQSL: Move(DP)
b. in a non-quirky-subject language (e.g. English, French)
MtoCSPNQSL: Move(XP targeted by findϕ)
As shown in §., this way of conceiving of movement to canonical subject position
captures the cross-linguistic typology of defective intervention—in particular, it predicts when
defective intervention will result in outright ungrammaticality, and when it will simply result
in a morphological “default” (e.g. rd-person singular agreement morphology).
Now consider (b), which represents how movement to canonical subject position
proceeds in a non-quirky-subject language such as French or English. In (b), MtoCSPNQSL
is fed by ϕ-agreement (implemented as findϕ , but this detail is not crucial here). The idea
that ϕ-agreement feeds MtoCSPNQSL was crucial to derive the following facts: (i) movement
to canonical subject position—in a non-quirky-subject language—exhibits the same case-
discrimination property demonstrated with respect to ϕ-agreement: it can only apply to noun-
phrases bearing unmarked case; and more importantly, (ii) it is exactly when ϕ-agreement has
been intervened with but MtoCSPNQSL is nonetheless instantiated that defective intervention
yields outright ungrammaticality, rather than some morphological “default” (see §. for
details).
At this juncture, it might be instructive to sort out which of these arguments comes from
which languages. The arguments for a notion of morphological case that is independent from
abstract case or grammatical function come from quirky-subject languages (namely, Icelandic;
see Marantz  and references therein). On the other hand, the arguments presented in
chapter  in favor of (b) come from the complementary set of languages (namely, non-
quirky-subject languages, such as French or English). There is therefore no single language in
our sample so far which provides support for an independent notion of morphological case as
well as for a feeding relation between ϕ-agreement and MtoCSP (though see the discussion of
Sakha, below, which may be precisely such a language).
 THE MISSING EVIDENCE: NON-QUIRKY-SUBJECT LANGUAGES
It is therefore logically possible that in non-quirky-subject languages, it is abstract case
(rather than morphological case) that feeds ϕ-agreement, and therefore ϕ-agreement in these
languages can be part of syntax proper, and feed MtoCSP (as in (b)); whereas in quirky-
subject languages, ϕ-agreement relies on morphological case, does not feed MtoCSP (as in
(a)), and is post-syntactic. Notice, however, that such a theory would take ϕ-agreement
in English/French/etc., on the one hand, and ϕ-agreement in Icelandic, on the other hand, to
be not only two diﬀerent processes—but processes that occur in two diﬀerent computational
modules (syntax proper for ϕ-agreement in English/French/etc., and morpho-phonology for
ϕ-agreement in Icelandic):
() syntax morpho-
phonology
English/French/etc.: abstractcase → ϕ-agreement
Icelandic:
(
abstract
case
)
morphological
case → ϕ-agreement
This would mean that the overarching similarities between ϕ-agreement in English, French,
etc., and ϕ-agreement in Icelandic—that they both involve overt matching in ϕ-features
between a verb or TAM-marker and a verbal argument, that they can both be intervened with
by dative nominals (as discussed in detail in chapter ), etc.—are coincidental. I therefore take
such a theory to be a non-starter.
Given Bobaljik’s () argument that ϕ-agreement operates on the basis of morphological
case in quirky-subject languages (reviewed in §..), any theory that takes ϕ-agreement to be
a cross-linguistically uniform phenomenon is thus forced to concede that the notion of case to
which it is sensitive is morphological case. Following the results of chapter , MtoCSPNQSL is
computed on the basis of ϕ-agreement. By transitivity, then, MtoCSPNQSL is computed on the
basis of morphological case. Crucially, MtoCSPNQSL is a syntactic process proper: it has both
phonological eﬀects (i.e., where the subject is pronounced), and semantic ones (e.g. in terms
of binding).
We therefore have an instance of morphological case feeding a process that is properly
syntactic—exactly the sort of evidence that Marantz () conjectured not to exist, and whose
alleged absence is what motivated the assertion that morphological case is post-syntactic, in
the first place:
() syntax morpho-
phonology
English/French/etc.: “morphological”case → ϕ-agreement→ MtoCSP . . .
This, of course, means that morphological case cannot be computed post-syntactically, and
that the “morphological” part of this term is therefore a misnomer. In particular, to preserve
the success of Marantz  in accounting for the observable case patterns of a language like
Icelandic, we must assume that the disjunctive case hierarchy, repeated in (), operates within
syntax proper:
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() disjunctive case hierarchy (Marantz ) [=()]
lexical/oblique case→ dependent case→ unmarked case
There is nothing particularly problematic in assuming that the assignment of lexical/oblique
case occurs within syntax proper, conceived of as a featural relation between the lexical case-
assigner and the case-marked nominal. On the other end of the disjunctive case hierarchy,
unmarked case can also be handled easily, as the morphological realization of a noun-phrase
that has not been assigned case-related features in the course of the syntactic computation at
all (recall that in the system proposed by Marantz , case plays no role in licensing, and
therefore nothing goes wrong within syntax with a caseless nominal).
It is dependent case that does not have an immediately evident correlate in syntactic theory.
The reason is that case-competition involves the assignment of case as the result of a local
relation between two DPs—whereas case/agreement relations are normally modeled in syntax
as relations between a maximal projection and a head, not between two maximal projections.2
In this regard, it is interesting to note recent evidence that case-competition is a necessary
component of case assignment even in non-quirky-subject languages; the evidence in
question comes from Baker and Vinokurova’s () analysis of the Turkic language Sakha,
and is reviewed in §.., below. Recall that MtoCSP in a non-quirky-subject language is case-
discriminating (in fact, definitionally so). If case-competition is part of the case calculus in such a
language, it follows that there must be case-competition in syntax (given the obviously syntactic
nature of MtoCSP).
In the next section, I review Baker and Vinokurova’s analysis of the relevant Sakha data,
and proceed to outline how case-competition can be implemented in syntax proper, subsuming
“morphological case” and furnishing a syntax-internal notion of case that is morphology-
faithful (i.e., it correctly generates the observed case-markings in a quirky-subject language
like Icelandic), and can therefore serve as the input to ϕ-agreement. Interestingly, this unified
syntactic case calculus, I will show, may also be able to derive another component of the system
proposed by Marantz ()—namely, the disjunctive case hierarchy itself.
.. Case-competition in syntax
As noted in §., the argument for the computation of “morphological case” being post-
syntactic was based on the conjecture that there are no processes in syntax proper that
operate on the basis of the output of this computation. In §., I showed that the results
of chapter  furnish precisely this allegedly missing feeding relation: movement to canonical
subject position—an operation that must be part of syntax proper (since it informs components
of semantic interpretation, e.g. binding)—is fed by ϕ-agreement, which in turn is fed by the
case computation that gives rise to observable surface case in a language like Icelandic.
This forces us to adopt a model where the computation of so-called “morphological case”
takes place within syntax proper—in other words, where the logic of case-competition employed
by Marantz () operates as part of the syntactic derivation, rather than part of the morpho-
phonological one.
2There are proposals in the literature that come close to implementing case-competition in syntax. See, for
example, Bittner and Hale .
 CASE-COMPETITION IN SYNTAX
In §.., I review Baker and Vinokurova’s () analysis, which provides evidence that a
case-competition logic is necessary even in a non-quirky-subject language like Sakha. In §..,
I discuss the prospects for implementing case-competition in syntax, showing that not only is it
able to achieve the same results achieved by a post-syntactic computation, but it may actually
derive the disjunctive case hierarchy (Marantz ) itself.
... Case assignment in Sakha (Baker and Vinokurova )
Baker and Vinokurova () (henceforth, B&V) present a detailed analysis of case in Sakha, a
Turkic language spoken in Northern Siberia. Their argument, in a nutshell, is that the patterns
of morphological case found in Sakha require a hybrid system of case-assignment, one that is
partly based on case-competition (Marantz ), and partly based on the assignment of case
by functional heads (as in Chomsky , ); and that these patterns are not amenable to
an analysis using one of these systems alone. Below, I argue that contra B&V’s claims, there is
actually no need for recourse to assignment of case by functional heads in Sakha, allowing a
uniform treatment of case in Sakha using the disjunctive case hierarchy alone.
Crucially, however, accusative and dative case in Sakha (even on B&V’s original proposal)
constitute an instance of case-competition in a non-quirky-subject language, lending support to
the idea that case-competition is part-and-parcel of the calculus of case in general, rather than
a property of case realization only in quirky-subject languages like Icelandic, for example.
In §..., I review the argument that accusative (and dative) in Sakha can only be
modeled adequately by appealing to a case-competition logic (i.e., that accusative and dative
are dependent cases in Sakha). In §..., I review (and ultimately argue against) the claim
that genitive (and nominative) in Sakha can only be modeled adequately in terms of case-
assignment by functional heads.
.... Accusative in Sakha
The strongest argument provided by B&V for case-competition in Sakha comes from the
behavior of raising-to-object constructions, and the distribution of accusative case (the paper
contains additional arguments pertaining to accusative case, as well as a parallel set of
arguments regarding dative case; I will not review these here).
Raising-to-object has been subject to considerable debate in the linguistic literature, mostly
concerning whether or not it is the correct analysis of ECM constructions in a language like
English (an analysis that goes back to Postal ); in the Turkic languages, however, the
existence of raising-to-object is well-established (see George and Kornfilt , Moore ,
Sener to appear, among others). Its distribution is also much wider than the distribution of
ECM in a language like English; for example, it takes place out of embedded finite clauses:
() a. min
I(nom)
ehigi(-ni)
you(-acc)
bügün
today
kyaj-yax-xyt
win-fut-pl.subj
dien
that
erem-mit-im
hope-prt-sg.subj
(Sakha)
‘I hoped that you would win today.’
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b. min
I(nom)
[ sarsyn
tomorrow
ehigi(*-ni)
you(*-acc)
kel-iex-xit
come-fut-pl.subj
dien
that
] ihit-ti-m
hear-past-sg.subj
‘I heard that tomorrow you will come.’
[B&V:–]
As demonstrated in (a–b), the presence of an overt accusative marker on the subject of
a finite embedded clause co-varies with the availability of a parse in which this embedded
subject has moved out of its embedded clause; in (b), where “ehigi” (‘you’) appears to the
right of the embedded-clause adverb “sarsyn” (‘yesterday’), it cannot bear overt accusative
marking.3
B&V demonstrate that overt accusative marking on a raised embedded subject (as in (a))
co-varies with the noun-phrase behaving as if it is in the matrix clause for binding purposes,
as well. Thus, when it lacks overt accusative marking, a pronominal embedded subject can
co-refer with the matrix subject (as in (a)); but when it carries overt accusative marking, it
cannot (as in (b)).
() a. [ sarsyn
tomorrow
mini
I(nom)
bar-a-byn
leave-aor-sg.subj
dien
that
] ihit-ti-mi
hear-past-sg.subj
‘I heard that I am leaving tomorrow.’
b. * miigini
I.acc
sarsyn
tomorrow
bar-a-byn
leave-aor-sg.subj
dien
that
ihit-ti-mi
hear-past-sg.subj
[B&V:]
This too is consistent with a raising-to-object analysis: a pronominal that has undergone
raising-to-object into the matrix clause is expected to trigger a Condition B violation with
respect to a co-referential subject.
Finally, B&V demonstrate that this raising-to-object pattern in Sakha cannot be reanalyzed
in terms of a proleptic object analysis, whereby the accusative-marked nominals in question are
actually optional arguments of the matrix predicates “erem” (‘hope’) or “ihit” (‘hear’). Under
a proleptic object analysis, an example like (a) would be better translated as “I heard of you
that you would win today”. B&V argue against such an alternative based on the distribution
of “kim daqany” (‘who pcl’), a Negative Polarity Item (NPI) in Sakha that can only be licensed
in the scope of negation:
() * min
I(nom)
[kim-ŋe
who-dat
daqany]
pcl
[ kel-bet
come-neg.aor.sg.subj
dien
that
] et-ti-m
tell-past-sg.subj
‘I told no one that he should come.’ [B&V:]
Crucially, this same NPI is licensed in those constructions that have been analyzed as raising-
to-object:
() a. min
I(nom)
kim-i
who-acc
daqany
pcl
[ kyaj-ba-ta
win-neg-past-sg.subj
dien
that
] eren-e-bin
hope-aor-sg.subj
‘I hope that nobody won.’
3This relies on a fairly standard linking hypothesis, but one that is worth indicating nonetheless, that
adverbials like “sarsyn” (‘yesterday’) cannot move out of their clause.
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b. min
I(nom)
kim-i
who-acc
daqany
pcl
[ kyaj-bataq-yn
win-neg.prt-sg.poss.acc
] ihit-ti-m
hear-past-sg.subj
‘I heard that nobody won.’
[B&V:–]
Having established that this is indeed an instance of raising-to-object, B&V proceed to
investigate the implications of this construction for the theory of case, in particular as it
pertains to accusative in Sakha.
At first glance, it seems that this pattern is compatible with accusative being assigned
either by a functional head, or via case-competition. Within a theory of case-assignment by
functional heads, let us assume that accusative is assigned by v0, or some other head in the
immediate extended projection of the verb. Given familiar notions of locality, this head would
be unable to assign case to a nominal that resides within an embedded CP, proper (note that
Sakha, like other Turkic languages, is verb-final; these diagrams are formatted verb-initially to
simplify reading hierarchical relations oﬀ of the linear schematization):
() v0 . . . [CP . . . DP . . . ] (assignment of acc ruled out by locality)
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On the other hand, a DP that has moved out of the embedded clause will conceivably be in a
local enough configuration with this functional head to facilitate case-assignment:
() v0 . . . DPacc1 . . . [CP . . . t1 . . . ] (assignment of acc possible)
On a case-competition theory, DPs are assigned dependent case (such as accusative)
when there is another nominal within the same local domain that has not been assigned
lexical/oblique case (Marantz ). Thus, the availability of accusative case on the embedded
subject will again co-vary with whether or not it has moved into the higher domain:
() DPnom . . . [CP . . . DP . . . ] (dependent case ruled out by locality)
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() DPnom . . . DPacc1 . . . [CP . . . t1 . . . ] (dependent case possible)
However, B&V proceed to present data that is quite problematic for the assignment of
accusative by a functional head. First, Sakha allows raised subjects to receive accusative case
even in matrix clauses where the relevant functional head (v0) should not have accusative-
assigning capabilities:
() a. Keskil
Keskil
Aisen-y
Aisen-acc
kel-bet
come-nag.aor.sg.subj
dien
that
xomoj-do
become-sad-past.sg.subj
‘Keskil became sad that Aisen is not coming.’ [Vinokurova :]
b. Masha
Masha
Misha-ny
Misha-acc
yaldj-ya
fall.sick-fut.sg.subj
dien
that
tönün-ne
return-past.sg.subj
‘Masha returned (for fear) that Misha would fall sick.’ [B&V:]
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Crucially, the verbs in (a–b) are the intransitive members of a transitivity alternation
(cf. (a–b)); and in Sakha, as in other languages, the intransitive member of a transitivity
alternation does not allow its sole argument to bear accusative case, as shown in (a–b):
() a. “xomoj” (‘become sad’) — “xomot” (‘make sad’) [B&V:]
b. “tönün” (‘return’) — “tönnör” (‘make return’)
() a. min
I(nom)
oloppoh-u
chair-acc
aldjat-ty-m
break-past-sg.subj
‘I broke the chair.’
b. caakky(*-ny)
cup(*-acc)
aldjan-na
break-past.sg.subj
‘The cup broke.’
[B&V:]
If accusative were assigned by a functional projection associated with the verb (such as v0),
then given its unavailability in (b), we would expect it to be unavailable in (a–b) as
well—contra to fact.
A related but distinct problem for a theory of accusative case in Sakha as assigned by a
functional head in the verbal projection comes from cases like (), below, where raising-
to-object facilitates assignment of accusative case to the raised embedded subject, in a matrix
clause that simultaneously contains a distinct accusative-marked argument:
() Masha
Masha
[Misha-ny]i
Misha-acc
[ti kel-ie
come-fut.sg.subj
dien]
that
djie-ni
house-acc
xomuj-da
tidy-past.sg.subj
‘Masha tidied up the house (thinking) that Misha would come.’
[Vinokurova :]
Within a functional head theory of accusative case assignment, this requires a one-to-many
relation between case-assigner and case-assignees to be possible; but if that were so, we would
predict acc-acc dyadic predicates to be possible in Sakha, contra to fact (B&V:–).
In contrast, the data in (a–b) and () can be readily handled within a case-competition
approach to accusative case. On this approach, accusative case arises when a noun-phrase is in
a local enough configuration with another noun-phrase that is not marked with lexical/oblique
case (Marantz ; see §. for a review), and does not depend on the thematic or argument-
structural properties of the predicates that take these noun-phrases as arguments.
Thus, raising-to-object into a matrix clause anchored by an unaccusative verb does not
preclude the raised embedded subject from receiving accusative case under case-competition:
() DPnom . . . v/Vtrans/intrans/... . . . DPacc1 . . . [CP . . . t1 . . . ] (dependent case possible)
Similarly, nothing precludes two noun-phrases from qualifying for accusative case based on
case-competition with the same noun-phrase; or alternatively, one of them depending on the
matrix subject for its accusative case, and the other depending on the first accusative noun-
phrase:
 CASE-COMPETITION IN SYNTAX
() a. DPnom . . . DPacc . . . DPacc1 . . . [CP . . . t1 . . . ]
b. DPnom . . . DPacc . . . DPacc1 . . . [CP . . . t1 . . . ]
The latter configuration, in fact, is precisely the case-competition analysis given by Marantz
() for ECM configurations such as ():
() Henom expects themacc to invite heracc.
Importantly, just as in the case-competition account of (), this does not predict that acc-
acc dyadic predicates should exist, since case-competition cannot be a reciprocal relation (see
the discussion in §.).
We have thus seen an argument by B&V in favor of a case-competition approach to
the assignment of accusative case in Sakha, and against the assignment of accusative by a
functional head in the verbal projection (as noted earlier, B&V provide additional arguments to
this eﬀect with regard to both accusative and dative case in Sakha, which I do not review here).
I now turn, in §..., to B&V’s argument that genitive case in Sakha (as well as nominative)
is best handled in terms of case-assignment by a functional head.
.... Genitive in Sakha
In this sub-section, I review B&V’s argument that the behavior and distribution of genitive case
in Sakha—in contrast to accusative (§...), for example—favors an account where genitive
is assigned by a functional head (as with accusative and dative, B&V provide a parallel set
of arguments for nominative and genitive; I concentrate here on the arguments pertaining to
genitive case, since unlike nominative, genitive case in Sakha is at least sometimes overtly
detectable; see fn. , below).
Sakha allows participial relative clauses, as shown in (a–b) (see also Kornfilt ,
):
() a. [ cej
tea
ih-er
drink-aor
] caakky
cup
‘a cup that one drinks tea from’
b. [ aaq-ar
read-aor
] kinige
book
‘a book for reading’
[B&V:]
Overt subjects can be realized in these participial clauses only under very specific conditions.
One option is a bare, indefinite nominal, string-adjacent to a participial verb that is
unaccusative:
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() a. sibekki
flower
tyll-ar
bloom-aor
kem
time
‘a time when flowers bloom’
b. oton
berry
buh-ar
ripen-aor
sir
place
‘a place where berries ripen’
() * Masha
Masha
cej
tea
ih-er
drink-aor
caakky
cup
‘a cup that Masha drinks tea from’
[B&V:]
B&V analyze cases like (a–b), as well as (a) above, as instances of
(pseudo-)incorporation of the Patient into the unaccusative verb. Examples that do not
obey these conditions, such as (), are ruled out on their account by a generalized Case
Filter. This is a requirement that all full noun-phrases receive case, resembling the Case
Filter of Chomsky and Lasnik ()—except that this requirement can be satisfied, on B&V’s
account, not only through case assignment by a functional head (as in Chomsky , ),
but also through case-competition (as in §...).
Importantly, examples of participial relatives involving a non-incorporable subject (along
the lines of (), above) can be repaired if the head noun shows possessive agreement with
the embedded subject:
() [ [Masha
Masha
aqa-ty]-n
father-sg.poss-gen
] atyylas-pyt
buy-prt
at-*(a)
horse-sg.poss
‘the horse that Masha’s father bought’ [B&V:]
As () demonstrates, this also results in genitive case-marking on the embedded subject.4
B&V take this possessive agreement on the head noun to be the overt manifestation of a
D0 head, which assigns genitive case to the embedded subject, thus averting a violation of the
generalized Case Filter. Crucially, on their proposal, the reason such possessive agreement
only shows up in examples like () is that the presence of this D0 is only required—in these
participial relatives—in the presence of an embedded subject that is not incorporable, and
therefore requires case-licensing.
They argue that nominative case is assigned in a similar fashion, except that the functional
head implicated in the assignment of nominative case is T0, rather than D0.
I would like to suggest an alternative to this analysis of genitive (and nominative) in Sakha,
which does not require recourse to case-assignment by functional heads. Note that there is no
morpheme in () that one could identify as the exponence of D0, independently of possessive
agreement. This is not evidence, of course, that there is no D0 there; in fact, I suggest the exact
opposite: that a D0 head—or more precisely, a possessive ϕ-probe, whether or not is it situated
on D0 proper—is present in all of these participial relatives.
4This genitive noun-phrase must itself be possessed to demonstrate its genitive case overtly, because Sakha
has lost its overt genitive marking in all other contexts (i.e., only possessed genitives show overt genitive
marking; see Baker and Vinokurova :).
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When there is no noun-phrase inside the participial relative, as in (b)—or when the
nominal in the participial relative has been incorporated into the verb (and therefore does
not behave as a phrasal category), as in (a, a–b)—this ϕ-probe will fail to find an
appropriate agreement target.5 As argued in detail in chapter , this failure to agree will
not result in ill-formedness; it will simply result in the lack of valuation on the ϕ-probe.
One diﬀerence between this pattern and the patterns explored in chapters – is that here,
a ϕ-probe that has successfully agreed with a rd-person singular target receives exponence
that does not show up in cases where valuation has failed. Following §., there are at least
two ways this could come about. First, consider oncemore theϕ-feature geometry presented in
§.., following Harley and Ritter (), McGinnis (), and Béjar and Rezac ()—and
repeated here:
() a simplified ϕ-feature geometry [=()]
[ϕ]
[number]
[plural]
[person]
[participant]
[author]
Recall that within a feature-geometrical approach to ϕ-agreement, valuation consists of
copying the ϕ-geometric specification borne by the target noun-phrase onto the probe (see
§..). Recall also that rd-person noun-phrases are not empty ϕ-geometries; they merely
lack the [participant], [author], and [plural] nodes. Thus, if the ‘sg.poss’ suﬃx in Sakha is
actually the overt spellout of [ϕ]—in particular, the allomorph of valued [ϕ] on a possessive
ϕ-probe that lacks [participant], [author], and [plural]—we would predict that it would be
present upon successful agreement with a rd-person singular noun-phrase, but absent when
agreement has failed.
In §., however, I suggested that there may a cross-linguistic tendency (if not a universal)
for the “meta-nodes” [ϕ], [person], and [number] to receive no exponence of their own—
based on the results of Preminger , repeated here:
() diagnostic for “pure” agreement vs. clitic-doubling (Preminger )
Given a scenario where the relation R between an agreement-morphemeM and the
corresponding full noun-phrase F is broken—but the result is still a grammatical
utterance:
a. M shows up expressing “default” ϕ-features =⇒R is “pure” agreement
b. M disappears entirely =⇒R is clitic-doubling
5If the possessive ϕ-probe is located higher than the head noun, e.g. on D0, then there must be something
that prevents the head noun itself from qualifying as a possible target for possessive agreement; but a provision
of this sort is necessary in any analysis of possessive agreement. A likely solution, that may also subsume the
phrasal/non-phrasal distinction invoked with regard to incorporated nominals in (a, a–b), is to assume
that only the maximal extended projection of a nominal counts as a possible agreement target. If so, then the
possessive ϕ-probe, located within the extended projection of the head noun, will be unable to target its own
maximal extended projection for agreement.
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If () holds in Sakha, as well, then we might conclude that what we have been calling
“possessive agreement” in Sakha is actually clitic-doubling, triggered when a genitive noun-
phrase is probed by the possessive ϕ-probe. If so, it would be akin to st/nd-person
“absolutive agreement” in Kichean, which was argued—in chapter —to be an instance
of clitic-doubling, triggered when the absolutive noun-phrase is probed by the clausal
[participant]-probe—a proposal that itself followed Béjar and Rezac’s () analysis of
“indirect object agreement” in PCC contexts as clitic-doubling triggered when the indirect
object is probed by the person-probe (see §.).
This would constitute an instance of obligatory (and semantically indiscriminate) clitic-
doubling—just as in these other empirical domains (Kichean st/nd-person “absolutive
agreement”, and “indirect object agreement” in PCC contexts), as well as in Basque (Arregi
and Nevins , in prep., Preminger ).
This view, of “possessive agreement” as clitic-doubling triggered by the possessiveϕ-probe,
still preserves the logic of successful and failed agreement, stated above: when there is no
unincorporated noun-phrase inside the participial relative, the possessive ϕ-probe will fail to
locate an agreement target, naturally ruling out clitic-doubling, but with no ill-formedness
arising (again, following the results of chapter ). When a noun-phrase is present in the
participial relative, it will be probed by the possessive ϕ-probe, and clitic-doubling will be
triggered.
On either of these views, overt agreement must be present when the participial relative
contains a full, unincorporated nominal (as in (), above) not because of a Case Filter,
but rather for the same reason any other instance of ϕ-agreement is obligatory: because
there is simply no derivation in which the larger noun-phrase (consisting of the head noun
and the participial relative) lacks a possessive ϕ-probe, and thus no derivation where the
agreement operation, findϕ(f ), is not invoked; and in derivations where there is an accessible
agreement target, this agreement operation will invariably find that target (see, in particular,
the discussion of “gratuitous non-agreement” in §.).
This sheds an interesting light on a question raised in §.—namely, why it is that authors
such as Chomsky (b, , ) thought that ϕ-agreement had anything to do with the
licensing of noun-phrases, in the first place. Looking at cases like (–), it is indeed the
case that the presence of overt ϕ-agreement co-varies with the presence of an overt noun-
phrase; but on the current proposal, ϕ-agreement does not license the presence of a noun-
phrase; it is the presence of a noun-phrase that provides ϕ-agreement with a viable target
(in a sense, we could actually say that “noun-phrases license ϕ-agreement”, a view suggested
already by Bittner and Hale :).
Genitive case, on this account—just like nominative, in the verbal domain—is simply the
unmarked case, assigned to DPs within the nominal that are not otherwise case-marked by a
case-competitor or a lexical/oblique case assigner (see §., as well as §.., below), and its
assignment is not directly triggered by any functional head.
This represents a departure from the analysis put forth by B&V, who take these data to
show that nominative and genitive are assigned in Sakha by means ofϕ-agreement by T0 and D0,
respectively, following Chomsky , . As already noted in chapter , this alternative—
where case arises as the result of ϕ-agreement—is empirically untenable once we broaden the
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empirical domain under consideration to include quirky-subject languages, such an Icelandic
(as already observed by Zaenen, Maling, and Thráinsson , among others), since these show
that nominative case can arise on noun-phrases that ϕ-agreement has failed to reach.
Furthermore, since the idea that ϕ-agreement is case-discriminating (§.., §.) is
predicated on case being computed independently of ϕ-agreement, the Chomskyan approach
is also incompatible with case-discrimination and the results that it provides—namely, the
account presented in §., which predicts when defective intervention does and does not
give rise to outright ungrammaticality, as well as Bobaljik’s () account for the absence of
languages with an ergative-absolutive agreement alignment but a nominative-accusative case
alignment.
Let us therefore examine the evidence put forth by B&V in favor of the Chomskyan
implementation proper, where case-assignment arises as a result ofϕ-agreement. The evidence
centers around the unavailability of “double agreement” in several constructions in Sakha
where one might otherwise expect it to be possible. Consider one such construction, involving
a participial verb selected by an auxiliary that is itself a participle:
() en
you
süüj-büt
win-prt
e-bik-kin
aux-prt-sg.subj
‘The result is that you won.’
() en
you
süüj-büt-kün
win-prt-sg.subj
e-bik
aux-prt
‘The result is that you won.’
[B&V:]
As (–) show, it is possible for either the participial lexical verb or the participial
auxiliary to exhibit overt ϕ-agreement with the subject. As one might expect, a version of
(–) where neither participle exhibits ϕ-agreement is impossible:
() * en
you
süüj-büt
win-ptpl
e-bik
aux-ptpl
[B&V:]
Interestingly, having agreement on both participles is also ruled out:
() * en
you
süüj-büt-kün
win-ptpl-sgs
e-bik-kin
aux-ptpl-sgs
[B&V:]
B&V take the ill-formedness of () to follow from Chomsky’s (, ) Activity
Condition—the inability of noun-phrases which have already entered into successful
agreement relations, and thus have been assigned case, to enter into further agreement
relations (see also §..); though they acknowledge that the Activity Condition cannot be
maintained as a cross-linguistic universal (B&V:, fn. )—a fact also shown in §.., on
the basis of data from Tsez (Polinsky and Potsdam ).
Notice, however, that on B&V’s account, the ungrammaticality of () and the
ungrammaticality of () receive diﬀerent explanations: agreement on neither participle, as
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in (), is ruled out by the generalized Case Filter, while agreement on both participles, as in
(), is ruled out by the Activity Condition—which itself must be parameterized, a property
of some languages but not others.
It seems to me that this is an unnecessarily complicated way of capturing a rather simple
pattern: in a structure like (–), agreement must happen exactly once. This behavior
is equally amenable to account that is based on the following premises:
() a. exactly one ϕ-probe is merged in this structure
b. if there is an accessible nominal goal, this ϕ-probe must agree with it
c. the overt spellout of this ϕ-probe can end up on either of the participles
Crucially, these premises are for the most part motivated independently of this empirical
pattern, or of Sakha in general. The premise in (a) is hardly a stipulation, any more than
the fact that finite clauses in English contain exactly one Infl0 is a stipulation; the premise in
(b) was discussed in detail, and independently motivated, in chapters – (and also earlier
in this sub-section; see also the discussion of “gratuitous non-agreement” in §.); finally, the
premise in (c) can follow from one of several fairly benign syntactic assumptions. For
example, the base-generated order of heads could be subject to variation, as in (a–b); or
alternatively, the two possible spellouts could arise via head-movement of the ϕ-probe, as in
(a–b):
() a. [ PrtAux0 [ Infl0 [ PrtV0 . . . ]]] ⇒ PrtAux0 [ϕ-agr.]-PrtV0 . . .
b. [ Infl0 [ PrtAux0 [ PrtV0 . . . ]]] ⇒ [ϕ-agr.]-PrtAux0 PrtV0 . . .
() a. [ PrtAux0 [ Infl0 [ PrtV0 . . . ]]] ⇒ PrtAux0 [ϕ-agr.]-PrtV0 . . .
b. [ Infl0-PrtAux0 [ tInfl0 [ PrtV
0 . . . ]]] ⇒ [ϕ-agr.]-PrtAux0 PrtV0 . . .
Admittedly, both () and () would be stipulative, to some degree; but this is the
only stipulation required here that is not independently motivated—and what it facilitates
is: (i) a unified account of () (the ungrammaticality of non-agreement) and () (the
ungrammaticality of “double agreement”); (ii) no need for recourse to a parameterized
Activity Condition; (iii) it lets us jettison the Chomskyan implementation of case arising via
ϕ-agreement.
Most important among these is (iii), because it allows us to maintain an account of case and
ϕ-agreement that generalizes to quirky-subject languages (Marantz , Zaenen, Maling, and
Thráinsson , and others), and it preserves the results of the case-discrimination proposal
in chapter  (the account given in §. for when defective intervention will and will not give
rise to ungrammaticality, as well as Bobaljik’s  account for the absence of languages with
an ergative-absolutive agreement alignment but a nominative-accusative case alignment).
We have therefore seen that contra B&V’s claims, the behavior of genitive (and nominative)
case and possessor (and finite) agreement in Sakha does not favor an account in terms of case-
assignment by functional heads (along the lines of Chomsky , ); the distribution of
genitive (and nominative) case in Sakha can just as easily be modeled in terms of the disjunctive
case hierarchy (Marantz )—with genitive as the unmarked case in the nominal domain—
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coupled with assumptions regarding ϕ-agreement that have been independently motivated in
chapters –.
.... Sakha: A summary
In §...–§..., we have reviewed B&V’s arguments that the patterns of case-assignment
in Sakha require a “hybrid” theory of case-assignment, consisting of case-competition alongside
assignment of case by functional heads, concluding that the latter part of their argument is
under-determined by the data (particularly in light of the results of chapters –). Instead, it
appears that the patterns of case-assignment in Sakha are amenable to an account using only
the disjunctive case hierarchy of Marantz .
Crucially, however, the fact that Sakha shows robust evidence for case-competition is
significant: it furnishes an instance where case-competition is required in a non-quirky-subject
language. Given the results of chapter  and the discussion in §., movement to subject
position in a non-quirky-subject language is fed by ϕ-agreement, which is in turn fed by the
calculus of case. Since movement to subject position is a syntactic operation par excellence,
these results mean we are in need of a syntactic case calculus that is compatible with case-
competition—which is the topic of the next sub-section.
... A syntactic case calculus6
In §., as well as §.., the need was demonstrated for a case calculus that operates within
syntax proper, yet replicates the eﬀects of case-competition (Marantz ). In this sub-section,
I present one such implementation of a syntactic case calculus—one that it may in fact derive
the disjunctive case hierarchy itself.7
The central idea is that the disjunctive case hierarchy is an artifact of the way arguments are
introduced into the structure. Consider first lexical/oblique case; this is case that is assigned
to a noun-phrase by virtue of the idiosyncratic properties of the particular lexical item that
selects that noun-phrase as an argument (see §.). Given that lexical selection is restricted to
sisterhood, this means that lexical/oblique case is case that is assigned to a noun-phrase upon
first merge, immediately when it is introduced into the derivation:
() lexical/oblique case: assignment of case upon first merge
DP
· · ·
V0/P0/...
Since the case calculus under discussion here is one that operates within syntax proper, I will
assume that the relation schematized in () is a featural one: the DP is merged into the
6The theory presented in this sub-section was developed, in large part, during a series of lectures in Leiden
on March –, ; my deepest thanks go to the audiences there, and especially to Roberta D’Alessandro
for giving me the opportunity to conduct these lectures in the first place.
7The proposal made here is similar, in certain respects, to Bittner and Hale’s () proposal; however,
as will be shown below, the implementation of case-competition diﬀers in ways that are crucial to correctly
deriving the behavior of dependent case in Sakha.
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structure with unvalued case features. Crucially, these unvalued case features—just like their
ϕ-feature counterparts—are not derivational time-bombs (§..; and see chapter , for the
argument regarding ϕ-features in particular); nothing goes wrong if they are never valued.
They can, however, be valued in a structural configuration like ().
The precise value transmitted to the case features on the noun-phrase in () will depend
on the lexical properties of the selecting head—namely, the case values that it carries, and
can therefore transmit—which is the desired result, as far as lexical/oblique case is concerned.
It allows, for example, diﬀerent verbs (or diﬀerent prepositions) to idiosyncratically assign
diﬀerent case-values to the noun-phrases they select.
This also allows for instances of V0 to exist that do not bear case-values at all—in which
case no valuation of the case features on the noun-phrase will take place upon first merger—
which as will be shown below, is again the desired result, in instances where the noun-phrase in
question receives not lexical/oblique case, but rather some other kind of case-marking, namely
dependent case or unmarked case.
Importantly, valuation by the selecting head—given a bottom-up approach to structure-
building—will be the first opportunity for the case features on a noun-phrase to be valued.8
We therefore have an explanation for why lexical/oblique case is the first step in the disjunctive
case hierarchy algorithm (on its current syntactic implementation).
If the case features on a noun-phrase have not been valued in a lexical/oblique configuration,
as described above, it will have an opportunity to value them through other means, which
is where case-competition comes into play. The results of §. and §.. demonstrate that
case-competition is a necessary component of syntax (in §., this was shown to follow from
typological considerations: the same ϕ-agreement operation that is fed by case-competition in
a language like Icelandic must feed movement to subject position, a syntactic phenomenon
proper, in non-quirky-subject languages; and in §.., it was shown that Sakha provides
evidence for case competition from a non-quirky-subject language directly).
The way I will implement case-competition in syntax is as follows: assume that case
features are DP-level features (i.e., that they are visible at the level of the maximal extended
projection of the nominal);9 suppose, then, that valuation of the case features on a single DP
can take place when two DPs with unvalued case features stand in a c-command relation that
does not cross relevant locality boundaries (e.g. the boundaries of a finite clause). On this view,
dependent case is a essentially a case-feature value indicating “I have (been) c-commanded (by)
another DP with unvalued case features” (where the directionality is parameterized, as discussed
in §.).
8I phrase these observations here in a particularly derivationalist manner, to highlight the parallelism that
is achieved between the current proposal and the disjunctive case hierarchy of Marantz , itself a sequential
algorithm. However, it seems to me that these derivational conditions have representationalist analogues, if
we demand that case-valuation relations be as local as possible. The reader should therefore not interpret
the expository use of derivationalist terminology in this particular sub-section as an argument for, or even a
commitment to, a derivational rather than a representational generative engine.
9It is well-established that case is a feature of nominals at the phrasal level, even if it is morphologically
instantiated on smaller pieces of the noun-phrase (e.g. on the determiner alone, as is the case in Basque, for
example). I leave aside the question of whether this means that case features are phrasal features sui generis, or
whether this is an instance of a more general syntactic principle that renders the maximal projection of a head
featurally identical to the head itself (see, for example, Chomsky a).
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This is admittedly a stipulative addition to the logic of syntactic valuation, and one that
seems to be restricted to the domain of case, to boot. I have no soothing words to oﬀer,
in this respect, except to say that the conclusion that case-competition must exist in syntax
seems to be forced by the empirical state of aﬀairs I have surveyed in this thesis, and I see no
simpler way—at the present time—of implementing it than the one outlined here. Specifically,
the fact that case-competition is a relation between two DPs directly, rather than one that is
mediated through a functional head (as in Bittner and Hale , for example), is supported
by the Sakha data discussed in §.., involving dependent case being assigned in a clause
with passive/unaccusative functional infrastructure.
There is one interesting benefit, however, to viewing case-competition in this manner:
given that selection is restricted to sisterhood, and that lexical/oblique case is restricted to
selectional relations (as discussed above), it follows that case-competition will only be possible
between two noun-phrases if those noun-phrases have failed to receive lexical/oblique case. The
reason is that the structure consisting of a noun-phrase and its potential lexical/oblique case-
assigner will be present prior to the larger structure, where both noun-phrases are present and
have a chance to enter into the aforementioned c-command relation:
() a. lexical selection (sisterhood):
potential for lexical/oblique case
DP
· · ·
V0/P0/...
b. larger structure:
potential for dependent case
· · ·
· · ·
DP
· · ·
V0/P0/...
(non-case-assigner)
· · ·
DP
· · ·
In other words, this approach derives the fact that lexical/oblique case takes precedence
over dependent case—as it does in the Marantz  proposal—by virtue of independently
motivated principles of syntactic structure-building (in particular, that lexical selection occurs
under sisterhood, the first structural relation that a noun-phrase has a chance to enter into).
One final note regarding dependent case concerns the intrinsically asymmetric nature of
case-competition. As noted in §., the case-competition relation (whether it is implemented
in syntax or not) cannot be reciprocal, since that would falsely predict that both competing
noun-phrases could be assigned dependent case, contra to fact (it is not, however, necessarily
one-to-one, meaning that two diﬀerent noun-phrases may be able to receive dependent case
through competition with the same third noun-phrase; see the discussion of (–), in
§...). Interestingly, there are a variety of proposals in the literature that discuss a condition
prohibiting two DPs that stand in too close a structural relation, roughly speaking, from
staying in that relation (Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou , Moro , Richards ,
). The kind of close structural relation that these proposals address is illustrated in (),
where two DPs are specifier and complement of the same immediately-containing XP:
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() two DPs in (too) close quarters
XP
X’
DP2X0
DP1
Strictly speaking, given the earlier discussion, there would be no obstacle to DP1 and DP2 in
() entering into a case-competition relation, since DP1 does asymmetrically c-command
DP2 here. However, imagine that the structural condition on case-competition were not
asymmetric c-command per se (as suggested above), but rather something closer to asymmetric
m-command (which recalls the more refined structural condition on intervention, discussed
in chapter ; see (), in §..). If so, the reason that a base-generated structure like ()
would have to be disrupted (as per the proposals cited above) might be in order to establish
a case-competition relation between the two DPs—which would require a more pronounced
structural asymmetry, as in ():10
() a sufficiently-asymmetric configuration for case-competition
YP
· · ·
XP
X’
DP2X0
tDP1
· · ·
DP1
Since these eﬀects (whereby structures like () are ruled out in favor of (), for example)
are not the topic of the current proposal, I will not speculate on them further here.
Returning to the syntactic calculus of case: since the unvalued case features on a noun-
phrase are not derivational time-bombs, nothing will go wrong if they are not valued at all in
the course of the derivation (much like unvalued ϕ-features; see chapter ). This, I argue, is
what unmarked case is: it is the morphological form given to a noun-phrase with no valued case
features (similarly to how “rd-person singular agreement” is really the morphological form
given to a ϕ-probe that lacks [participant] and [plural] features; see §..).
10One potential challenge to viewing case-competition as the source for the prohibition observed by Moro
(), Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou (), and Richards (, ), is the existence of superficially
similar eﬀects in derived positions:
(i) a. * I know everyone insulted someone, but I don’t know [DP who] [DP whom].
b. I know everyone danced with someone, but I don’t know [DP who] [PP with whom].
[Richards :]
Insofar as a constrast like (i) is an instance of the same phenomenon—and Richards (:–) provides
some typological support for the view that it is—then deriving it from case-competition will be considerably
more diﬃcult, since the two DPs in question will presumably have had ample chance to establish an adequately
asymmetric relation before moving to their ultimate clause-peripheral position.
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It therefore follows that this morphological form will only be available to a noun-phrase
that has failed to value its case features in one of the two ways described above (which we can
descriptively continue to call lexical/oblique case and dependent case).
In summary, by adopting the particular stipulation made above regarding case-competition
(namely, that when two DPs with unvalued case features enter into a c-command relation,
the case features of one of them are valued), we have eﬀectively derived the disjunctive case
hierarchy, repeated here:
() disjunctive case hierarchy (Marantz ) [=()]
lexical/oblique case→ dependent case→ unmarked case
The assignment of lexical/oblique case takes precedence because selection (i.e., sisterhood) is
the first structural relation that a noun-phrase enters into. Conversely, unmarked case is the
last possibility because it is simply the morphological expression of the absence of valued case
features, and will therefore only arise if the other case-assignment strategies have not come to
fruition (i.e., in the absence of a lexically-specified case assigner, and of a case-competitor). As
with ϕ-features (chapter ), this failure does not lead to ill-formedness, but rather results in
a characteristic morphological realization (which we are in the habit of descriptively labeling
nominative or absolutive; or in the nominal domain, genitive).
.. Summary and review
In this chapter, we have seen an argument that ϕ-agreement as well as what we have come
to call “morphological case” must be part of the syntactic computation, rather than the post-
syntactic, morpho-phonological one.
The argument was based on typological considerations (§.)—namely, the fact that
ϕ-agreement feeds movement to subject position in some languages (§.), and is fed by
“morphological case” in others (Bobaljik ; §..)—and strengthened by the need for a
case-competition logic even in a non-quirky-subject language like Sakha (Baker and Vinokurova
; §..). Consequently, there is a need for a system that can replicate the eﬀects of the
disjunctive case hierarchy (Marantz ), including case-competition, within syntax proper.
A proposal of this sort was advanced in §.., where I showed how the disjunctive case
hierarchy itself might derive from the way arguments are introduced in syntax, coupled with
the idea that unmarked case is essentially the morphological realization of a noun-phrase that
has gone through the derivation without valuing its case features.
Given this syntactically-computed notion of case, ϕ-agreement can then operate on the
basis of case—as argued by Bobaljik (), and reviewed in §..—while still feeding
movement to subject position, as argued in §..
In more concrete terms, this means that the ϕ-agreement operation findϕ(f ) (repeated
in (), below) can make reference to case-discrimination—which as Bobaljik shows, relies
crucially on a notion of case that is based on case-competition (as in the revised Moravcsik
Hierarchy, repeated in (), below)—while still serving as the input to MtoCSPNQSL
(movement to canonical subject position, in a non-quirky subject language, repeated in ()):
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() findϕ(f ): given an unvalued feature f on a head H0, find an XP bearing a valued
instance of f . If such an XP is found, check whether its case is allowed by
case-discrimination— [=()]
yes→ assign the found value to H0
no → abort.
() theMoravcsik Hierarchy, second (and final) revision (Bobaljik )
unmarked case≫ dependent case≫ lexical/oblique case [=()]
() movement to canonical subject position (MtoCSP):
two typological variations – revised version [=()]
a. in a quirky-subject language (e.g. Icelandic)
MtoCSPQSL: Move(DP)
b. in a non-quirky-subject language (e.g. English, French)
MtoCSPNQSL: Move(XP targeted by findϕ)
Importantly, this reaﬃrms that we can indeed take the conclusions of chapters – to be
about syntax itself, not about the post-syntactic morpho-phonological computation—which is
crucial, if these results are to tell us something about the adequacy or inadequacy of models
such as Chomsky’s (, ) uninterpretable features framework.
The results of this chapter, taken together with those of chapters –, thus indeed show that
ϕ-agreement is a syntactic phenomenon proper, whose obligatoriness can only be successfully
modeled in terms of obligatory operations, crucially not in terms of violable constraints (§.)
or derivational time-bombs (§.–§., §.).
 SUMMARY AND REVIEW
Chapter 
Another case-study in failed agreement:
Basque unergatives
In this chapter, I review another case-study on failed agreement in grammatical utterances,
involving unergative verbs in Basque.1
I argue for an analysis of simplex (non-periphrastic) unergative verbs in Basque as true
intransitives—one-place predicates that select a single, ergative-marked argument—contra the
traditional analysis, that takes them to involve an implicit object, in addition to the ergative
subject. The idea is that because simplex unergatives lack an object entirely, the ϕ-probe(s)
responsible for absolutive ϕ-agreement will search for, and fail to find, an agreement target;
and that just like the cases of failed agreement discussed in chapters –, this will result not
in ill-formedness, but rather in the typical spellout of probes that have failed to find [plural]
and [participant]/[author] features—in other words, what is usually referred to as “rd-person
singular” agreement morphology.
Crucially, this analysis of simplex unergatives will be shown to achieve better empirical
coverage than the traditional analysis does, in providing a uniform analysis for three types of
unergative constructions in Basque: simplex unergatives, periphrastic unergatives (involving
a light-verb), and the less often discussed iterative/repetitive unergative construction. This
last construction, it will be shown, cannot be handled by the traditional account of Basque
unergative morphosyntax, but is derived naturally on the failed agreement account.
Thus, the analysis of agreement in Basque unergatives will provide independent support
for the conclusions reached in earlier chapters—namely, that there are instances of failed
agreement in grammatical utterances (despite the fact that ϕ-agreement in Basque, as in
other languages, is decidedly obligatory under normal circumstances); and that these instances
result only in the lack of valuation on the relevant ϕ-probes, not in any kind of ill-formedness.
1The arguments and data in this section, unless otherwise attributed, are taken from a pair of papers
published as Preminger , to appear.
 THE CASE FOR THE IMPLICIT OBJECT CONJECTURE
.. The case for the implicit object conjecture
There are two constructions in Basque that are commonly regarded as “unergative”; these are
demonstrated in (a) and in (b):
() the “unergative alternation” in Basque
a. light-verb construction
Jon-ek
Jon-erg
dantza
dance
egin
do
d-Ø-u-Ø.
.abs-sg.abs-√ -sg.erg
‘Jon danced.’
b. simplex unergative
Jon-ek
Jon-erg
dantzatu
dance-prt
d-Ø-u-Ø.
.abs-sg.abs-√ -sg.erg
‘Jon danced.’
The light-verb construction (in (a)) is really not unergative in any meaningful sense. The
main verb, syntactically speaking, is the light-verb “egin” (‘do’), and this verb quite plainly
takes a direct object in “dantza” (‘dance’). One should not be confused by the fact that
the element semantically responsible for the open-class predicational meaning is “dantza”
(‘dance’), into thinking that there is anything unergative about this construction (such a claim
would be akin to saying that there is no direct object in “John broke the ice”, just because there
is no semantic Patient there).2
The same is not true for the construction in (b), at least not trivially; here, the main verb
is “dantzatu” (‘dance’)—and it appears that this verb selects an ergative argument (“Jon”), but
no absolutive one. I will refer to unergative constructions of the kind in (b) as simplex
unergatives.
Many authors have attempted to draw parallels between the light-verb construction and
the simplex unergative construction—arguing either that one derives from the other, or at
least that the light-verb construction reveals something about the underlying nature of simplex
unergatives—concluding that there is an implicit object of one sort or another in (b), as well
(see Bobaljik , Hale and Keyser , Laka b, Levin , Ortiz de Urbina ,
Uribe-Etxebarria , among others).
One source of evidence put forth in support of the implicit object approach to simplex
unergatives is the existence of alternations such as (a–b), in the first place. However, while
pairs like (a–b) certainly exist, there are several nominals that can appear in the light-
verb construction, for which there is no corresponding simplex unergative; and there may also
be examples of simplex unergatives that lack corresponding nominals in the language (see
Preminger to appear).
Another source of evidence concerns the form of the auxiliary verbs in (a–b). First,
both the light-verb construction and the simplex unergative construction take the so-called
“transitive” auxiliary, constructed from “*edun(/ukan)” (‘have’), rather than “izan” (‘be’).
2Dissociations of this sort—between the element that contributes the open-class, lexical meaning of event
predication (i.e., “dancing”, “jumping”, etc.), and the element that functions as the “main verb” syntactically—
are not uncommon (see for example Coon a,b).
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There is a rich tradition, in the linguistic study of Indo-European languages in particular, of
relating auxiliary selection—namely, the choice between have-type and be-type auxiliaries—
with transitivity in general, and with the presence of an underlying object in particular (see, for
example, Burzio  and related work). If the same principles extended to Basque, it would
be reasonable to take the facts regarding auxiliary selection as an indicator for the transitivity
of the verb, and thus for the presence of an (implicit) object.
In Basque, however, transitivity turns out to be an inadequate predictor of auxiliary
selection, in the first place. In particular, it has been argued that a better predictor of
which auxiliary root is chosen—“*edun(/ukan)” (‘have’) or “izan” (‘be’)—is the presence
of an ergative agreement target (Laka ), or simply the presence of ergative agreement
morphology elsewhere in the morpho-phonological domain of the auxiliary (Arregi ).
As an example of where these explanations make diverging predictions, consider allocutive
agreement (Eguren , Oyharçabal ). In allocutive agreement contexts, the auxiliary
exhibits agreement morphology co-indexing the addressee of the speech act. This “additional”
agreement morphology can appear in the ergative agreement slot or the dative agreement slot,
depending on which slots are not already occupied by agreement with the nominal arguments
of the verb. Consequently, one can find instances of ergative agreement morphology appearing
with verbs that are unambiguously intransitive:
() Jon-Ø
Jon(abs)
eror-i
fall-prfv
d-Ø-u-k.
.abs-sg.abs-√ -sg.erg
‘Jon has fallen. (sg allocution)’ [Arregi ]
Crucially, the auxiliary in examples like () must be built with the “*edun(/ukan)” (‘have’)
root, rather than the “izan” (‘be’) root, if the example is to contain allocutive agreement
morphology in the ergative agreement slot.3
Thus, the presence of an ergative agreement target (or simply, ergative agreement
morphology) is a better predictor of which auxiliary root is chosen than the transitivity of
the verb. As a result, the choice of “*edun(/ukan)” (‘have’) in both light-verb unergatives
and the simplex unergative construction is merely an indication that there is an ergative
agreement target (and/or ergative agreement morphology) in these examples—but this much,
of course, is uncontroversial: the fact that these examples contain an ergative subject (and
ergative agreement with that subject) is what has led to the classification of these predicates as
unergative in the first place. It therefore does not bear directly on the presence or absence of
an implicit object, which is focus of this chapter.
I abstract away, for the purposes of the current discussion, from the question of how
ergative agreement morphology arises on the Basque auxiliary (see Arregi and Nevins ,
in prep., as well as Preminger , for arguments that ergative and dative agreement
morphology on the Basque auxiliary arises through clitic-doubling of the relevant arguments).
Another property related to the form of the auxiliary that has been taken as evidence that
simplex unergatives involve an implicit object concerns the presence of absolutive agreement
morphology—recall (b), repeated here:
3Similar arguments can be made on the basis of absolutive displacement; see Arregi .
 THE CASE FOR THE IMPLICIT OBJECT CONJECTURE
() b. simplex unergative
Jon-ek
Jon-erg
dantzatu
dance-prt
d-Ø-u-Ø.
.abs-sg.abs-√ -sg.erg
‘Jon danced.’
The “d-” (‘.abs-’) morpheme found in the auxiliary, in simplex unergatives like (b), has
sometimes been taken to indicate successful agreement with the hypothesized implicit object.4
As discussed in chapter , however, the agreement morphology identified as “rd-person
singular” in a given language might simply be the exponence assigned to a probe that lacks
[plural] and [participant] features. Therefore, it is at least possible that the spellout ofϕ-probes
that have failed to find any target whatsoever would be identical to ϕ-probes that have entered
into a successful agreement relation with a noun-phrase that happens to be rd-person and
singular.
Thus, the presence of this agreement morphology is compatible with an analysis of (b)
in terms of successful agreement with a rd-person (and singular) implicit object, but also with
the absence of an absolutive agreement target altogether.
Finally, there is some case-theoretic motivation for pursuing the implicit object analysis: on
the surface, simplex unergatives like (b) appear to violate the generalization that ergative
is only assigned in the presence of another non-oblique noun-phrase (or in the parlance of
case-competition, as discussed in §, that ergative in Basque is a dependent case).
Regardless of the analysis of simplex unergatives, however, there is evidence that a verb in
Basque can have an ergative argument without an absolutive co-argument, from examples like
the following:
() [ [Harri
stone(s)
horiek]DPT
thosepl(abs)
altxa-tze-n
lift-nmz-loc
] probatu
attempted
[d-Ø/it-u-(z)te]aux
.abs-sg/pl.abs-√ -pl.erg
‘They have attempted to lift those stones.’
(subject is pro <pl.erg>) [Etxepare ]
If projecting an ergative subject were contingent on the presence of a direct object, overt or
implicit—then the only way the subject of () could be ergative is through the presence of
an implicit direct object of the matrix verb “probatu” (‘attempt’).
Importantly, absolutive ϕ-agreement in Basque is not omnivorous; there are no instances
where an accessible agreement target is skipped in Basque in favor of another, structurally
lower agreement target (contra Kichean, as discussed in chapter ). Since the absolutive noun-
phrase in the embedded clause is unambiguously farther away from the ϕ-probe(s) than an
implicit direct object in the matrix clause would be, the ϕ-probe(s) would have to target
this implicit matrix object—falsely predicting that agreement with the embedded absolutive
argument would be impossible (which is exactly what happens when there is a true absolutive
noun-phrase in the matrix clause; compare (), below). Even when agreement with the
4Arregi and Nevins (, in prep.) analyze the same prefixal “d-” as the result of morpho-phonological
epenthesis, satisfying a requirement that the exponence of tense (i.e., the auxiliary root) never be word-initial
in Basque. If one adopts this view, then an example like (b) actually lacks any true absolutive agreement
morphology, removing this as a source of evidence for the implicit object conjecture, in the first place.
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embedded absolutive argument obtains, however, the matrix subject in () is ergative (see
Etxepare , Preminger  for further discussion of this and related constructions).
It is worth noting that the case-competition proposal (Marantz ; chapter ) does not take
co-argumenthood to be the relevant locality condition on dependent case; recall (), repeated
from §..:
() Henom expects themacc to invite heracc. [=()]
It is therefore conceivable that as in (), the absolutive noun-phrase in the embedded non-
finite clause in () constitutes a case-competitor for the matrix ergative argument.
This approach, however, predicts that the presence of an absolutive argument in an
embedded non-finite clause like the one in () will be suﬃcient to trigger ergative case on
the matrix subject—an expectation that is not borne out:5
() [ Liburu-a
book-artsg(abs)
irakur-tze-n
read-nmz-loc
] saiatu
try
[dira]aux
pl.abs.
√
‘They have tried to read the book.’
(subject is pro <pl.erg>) [Etxepare ]
As we can discern from the morphology of the matrix auxiliary, the matrix subject in () is
absolutive, rather than ergative (cf. the auxiliary in ()).
Taken together, then, () and () demonstrate that case-competition cannot be the (only)
mechanism responsible for the assignment of ergative case in Basque (this does not falsify the
case-competition approach in general, of course; it simply means that ergative case in Basque
cannot be analyzed as dependent case; see Preminger to appear for an alternative analysis
of ergative case in Basque). Similar considerations apply to the Obligatory Case Parameter
approach of Bobaljik () and Laka (b) (roughly, the idea that in ergative languages,
ergative case arises as the result of the prior discharging of absolutive case).
These data do not pertain directly to failed agreement, of course; both in () and in (),
the ϕ-probes have established a successful agreement relation with an absolutive agreement
target (the embedded absolutive argument in (), and the matrix subject in ()). They
do, however, constitute an existence proof for ergative arguments in Basque in the absence
of a viable case-competitor. This, in turn, means that independently of simplex unergatives,
a dependent case analysis of ergative in Basque cannot be maintained, consequently removing
the case-theoretic motivations for the implicit object conjecture.
We have therefore seen that there is no conclusive evidence in favor of the implicit object
analysis of simplex unergatives in Basque.
5It is not inconceivable that () contains some phonologically-null structure that is absent in (), and
that this additional structure renders the embedded clause in () a separate case-competition domain from
the matrix clause, contra the state of aﬀairs in (). However, the overt morphosyntax in both examples is
identical; thus, the burden of proof rests on whoever would argue for a phonologically undetectable structural
diﬀerence of this sort between () and ().
I thank Marcel Den Dikken for helpful discussion of this point.
 SIMPLEX UNERGATIVES AS TRUE INTRANSITIVES
.. Simplex unergatives as true intransitives
In chapters –, I discussed instances of failed agreement that result from the outright absence
of an appropriate agreement target in the domain of the ϕ-probe. The relevant data involved
the Kichean Agent-Focus construction, and so-called “omnivorous” person and number probes
(analyzed formally as ϕ-probes relativized to [participant] and [plural], respectively). Thus,
in examples like (–) and (–), below, the relevant ϕ-probes successfully skip rd-
person and/or singular targets in search for an appropriate target with which to agree:6
() a. ja
foc
rat
you(sg.)
x-at/*Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/*sg.abs-hear-af
ri
the
achin
man
(Kaqchikel)
‘It was you(sg.) that heard the man.’ [=()]
b. ja
foc
ri
the
achin
man
x-at/*Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/*sg.abs-hear-af
rat
you(sg.)
‘It was the man that heard you(sg.).’ [=()]
() a. ja
foc
yïn
me
x-in/*Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/*sg.abs-hear-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was me that heard the man.’ [=()]
b. ja
foc
ri
the
achin
man
x-in/*Ø-axa-n
prfv-sg/*sg.abs-hear-af
yïn
me
‘It was the man that heard me.’ [=()]
() Ja
foc
rje’
them
x-e/*Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/*sg.abs-see-af
rja’
him
’It was them who saw him.’ [=()]
() Ja
foc
rja’
him
x-e/*Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-pl/*sg.abs-see-af
rje’
them
’It was him who saw them.’ [=()]
However, in examples like (–), where there are no appropriate agreement targets to be
found, no ungrammaticality arises (see chapter  for a detailed analysis):
() ja
foc
ri
the
tz’i’
dog
x-Ø-etzela-n
prfv-sg.abs-hate-af
ri
the
sian
cat
‘It was the dog that hated the cat.’ [=()]
() ja
foc
ri
the
xoq
woman
x-Ø-tz’et-ö
prfv-sg.abs-see-af
ri
the
achin
man
‘It was the woman who saw the man.’ [=()]
I will argue that simplex (non-periphrastic) unergatives in Basque furnish the same type
of scenario, where agreement fails due to the complete absence of an appropriate agreement
target.
6As detailed in chapter , overt ϕ-agreement with st/nd-person absolutive arguments in Kichean is not
the overt exponence of the person probe, but actually the result of obligatory clitic-doubling of the probed
argument. However, as explained in §., this does not change the logic of the claims regarding (–),
below.
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Given the absence of conclusive evidence in favor of the implicit object analysis of simplex
unergatives (§.), let us consider an analysis of simplex unergatives as true intransitives—
one-place predicates which select a single, ergative marked argument (recall that an analysis
of ergative case in Basque as depending on the presence of another noun-phrase, or on the
prior discharging of absolutive case, was shown to be problematic independently of simplex
unergatives).
On this analysis, probing for an absolutive agreement target in simplex unergatives will fail
to locate a suitable agreement target, just like in the derivation of Kichean Agent-Focus clauses
that lack st/nd-person or plural arguments (§.–§.); and as in Kichean, this failure will
not give rise to ungrammaticality, but rather to a mere lack of valuation on the ϕ-probes. On
the assumption that the absolutive agreement morphology identified as “rd-person singular”
in Basque is simply the spellout of ϕ-probes that have failed to find a [plural]-bearing or
[participant]-bearing absolutive agreement target, this is also the agreement morphology
expected to arise in this case.
As discussed in §. (and following Laka  and Arregi ), the best predictor of
auxiliary selection (have/be) in Basque is the presence of ergative morphosyntax—whether it
is the presence of an ergative-marked argument, or simply the presence of ergative agreement
morphology on the auxiliary. Since these predicates select an ergative argument (and exhibit
ergative agreement), they are expected to select the so-called “transitive” auxiliary, based on
“*edun(/ukan)” (‘have’), rather than “izan” (‘be’).
As noted earlier, these are precisely the properties that one finds with simplex unergatives
in Basque:
() simplex unergative
Jon-ek
Jon-erg
dantzatu
dance-prt
d-Ø-u-Ø.
.abs-sg.abs-√ -sg.erg
‘Jon danced.’ [=(b)]
Crucially, this analysis generalizes to a construction that cannot be as easily handled by the
traditional analysis of Basque unergatives. It is the case that many of the predicates that can
appear in the light-verb construction are also able to appear in a variation of this construction,
in which the complement of the light-verb is locative/adverbial, rather than nominal. This
variant results in an iterative reading:
() a. Dantza(-n)
dance-loc
egin
do
d-Ø-u-te.
.abs-sg.abs-√ -pl.erg
‘They danced (repeatedly).’
b. Laster(ka)
run-adv
egin
do
d-Ø-u-te.
aux
‘They ran (repeatedly).’
c. Borroka(-n)
fight-loc
egin
do
d-Ø-u-te.
aux
‘They fought (repeatedly).’
d. Oihu(-ka)
scream-adv
egin
do
d-Ø-u-te.
aux
‘They screamed/yelled (repeatedly).’
e. Errieta(n)
dispute-loc
egin
do
d-Ø-u-te.
aux
‘They disputed (repeatedly).’
[Etxepare ]
 SIMPLEX UNERGATIVES AS TRUE INTRANSITIVES
What is important to note, for the current purposes, is that the form of the auxiliary remains
the same regardless of whether the complement of the light-verb is nominal or adpositional:
it remains an “*edun(/ukan)” (‘have’) auxiliary, and continues to exhibit rd-person singular
absolutive agreement morphology.
Crucially, adpositional phrases, as well as the immediate complements of adpositions, are
not viable agreement targets in Basque; consider the adpositional construction (as discussed in
Preminger , following Etxepare ), where a nominalized embedded clause is selected
by the adposition “-n”:
() [ [Harri
stone(s)
horiek]DPT
thosepl(abs)
altxa-tze-n
lift-nmz-loc
] probatu
attempted
[d-it-u-zte]aux
.abs-pl.abs-√ -pl.erg
‘They have attempted to lift those stones.’ [=()]
(subject is pro <pl.erg>)
Examples like () show that the PP headed by “-n” is transparent for ϕ-agreement purposes.
This means that neither the PP in its entirety, nor the nominal that is the immediate
complement of “-n” (in this case, “altxa-tze” ‘lift-nmz’), are viable targets for ϕ-agreement.
Both the PP itself and the immediate nominal complement of “-n” are unambiguously closer
to the ϕ-probe in () than the embedded absolutive argument (“harri horiek” ‘stone(s)
thosepl(abs)’) is; therefore, if either were a viable agreement target, we would falsely rule out
ϕ-agreement with the embedded absolutive argument (by minimality/Closest).7
Thus, returning to the iterative/repetitive construction (in (a–e)), one is forced to
admit that absolutive agreement morphology in this construction—as well as the choice of
the “*edun(/ukan)” ‘have’ form of the auxiliary, for that matter—arises in some way other than
agreement with the open-class stem (e.g. “dantza” ‘dance’ in (a)). That is because the open-
class stem in the iterative/repetitive construction is enclosed within an adpositional phrase—
and as argued here, neither the entire PP nor the immediate complement of the adposition
constitute viable targets for ϕ-agreement.8
Note that while data like () are—as stated earlier—restricted to “substandard” varieties
of Basque, the behavior of the iterative/repetitive construction in those varieties is no diﬀerent
than in standard Basque; thus, data like (a–e) are attested within the very same varieties of
Basque that provide evidence against the PP or the immediate adpositional complement being
targeted for ϕ-agreement.
7A plausible explanation for why the immediate nominal complement cannot be targeted is that “-n”
selects a category smaller than a full DP; I will not speculate on this further here.
8David Pesetsky (p.c.) suggests an alternative to this line of reasoning, positing that the iterative/repetitive
construction involves a true nominal complement to the light-verb “egin” (‘do’), in the form of a phonologically
null noun whose meaning is ‘repetition’—which in turn, takes the adpositional phrase headed by “-n” as
its argument. If we adopt this approach, the iterative/repetitive construction could be viewed as properly
transitive (since this null nominal would serve as a non-oblique direct object), meaning it would no longer
require an analysis in terms of failed agreement per se.
It is indeed the case that most instances of failed agreement can receive an alternative analysis in
terms of a phonologically-undetectable-but-present agreement target (see also Preminger a)—though
this is crucially not true of failed agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus construction (see the discussion in
§.–§.). Note that even on this alternative account, the source of absolutive agreement morphology in the
iterative/repetitive construction is not the open-class predicate (e.g. “dantza” ‘dance’ in (a)), which is taken
by the implicit object approach to be the source of absolutive agreement morphology in the simplex unergative
construction.
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In contrast, the failed agreement approach oﬀers a uniform account of all three types of
unergative constructions surveyed here:
() the extended “unergative alternation” in Basque
a. light-verb construction
Jon-ek
Jon-erg
dantza
dance
egin
do
d-Ø-u-Ø.
.abs-sg.abs-√ -sg.erg
‘Jon danced.’ [=(a)]
b. simplex unergative
Jon-ek
Jon-erg
dantzatu
dance-prt
d-Ø-u-Ø.
.abs-sg.abs-√ -sg.erg
‘Jon danced.’ [=(b)]
c. iterative/repetitive construction
Dantza-n
dance-loc
egin
do
d-Ø-u-te.
.abs-sg.abs-√ -pl.erg
‘They danced repeatedly.’ [=(a)]
All three cases, on this approach, involve ϕ-probes that have failed to locate an absolutive
noun-phrase bearing [participant]/[author] and [plural] features. Note that the complement
of the light-verb in periphrastic unergatives, as in (a), is uniformly singular (and of
course, rd-person); thus, while an agreement relation between the ϕ-probe(s) and the
nominal complement has plausibly been established in this case, no valuation involving
[participant]/[author] or [plural] can occur.
As in the cases discussed in chapters –, failure to locate a viable agreement target results
not in any kind of ill-formedness, but simply in the typical form given by the language to
ϕ-probes that have not been valued for [participant]/[author] or [plural].
Of course, ϕ-agreement in Basque is not generally optional; thus, a mechanism is required
that enforces the obligatory nature of ϕ-agreement while not predicting ungrammaticality if
a ϕ-probe has failed to find an appropriate agreement target in a particular utterance. The
obligatory operations approach proposed in chapters –—based on the operation findϕ(f ),
repeated in ()—provides such an account:
() findϕ(f ): given an unvalued feature f on a head H0, find an XP bearing a valued
instance of f . If such an XP is found, check whether its case is allowed by
case-discrimination— [=()]
yes→ assign the found value to H0
no → abort.
If the case-discrimination parameter in Basque is set so that ϕ-probes can target absolutive
noun-phrases only (i.e., only unmarked noun-phrases), the same account also derives the
eﬀects of defective intervention by datives that have not been clitic-doubled, as discussed in
Preminger  (note that I follow Arregi and Nevins , in prep., as well as Preminger
, in taking the ergative and dative agreement morphology on the Basque auxiliary to be
the result of clitic-doubling of the relevant arguments, rather than “pure” ϕ-agreement).
 SUMMARY
It would still be technically possible to assume that a simplex unergative like (b),
above, involves a phonologically null implicit object—and that like in (a), this object is
rd-person and singular, resulting in the lack of [participant]/[author] and [plural] values on
the ϕ-probes; but crucially, given the evidence surveyed here, such an assumption would be
entirely unmotivated, producing no added empirical coverage whatsoever.
The historical development of the analyses of Basque unergatives therefore follows a
curious arc: the implicit object analysis was put forth, under the assumption that any
absolutive agreement morphology indicates successful agreement with an absolutive target,
to facilitate a uniform treatment of cases like (a) and (b). However, given that a parallel
analysis of (c) is not available, and given the possibility of tolerated failed agreement in
language, it is the exact opposite analysis of simplex unergatives (namely, that they lack an
absolutive argument entirely) that facilitates a uniform treatment of all three constructions.
.. Summary
We have seen, in this chapter, an analysis of Basque unergatives that crucially involved failed
agreement in grammatical utterances. In particular, an approach based on failed agreement
was shown to provide a unified account not only of the light-verb “unergative” construction
and of simplex unergatives—but also of the iterative/repetitive construction (where the open-
class nominal is overtly present, but introduced as the complement of an adposition, and thus
inaccessible for ϕ-agreement), which cannot be handled by the traditional analysis of Basque
unergatives.
Basque therefore provides independent support for the existence of failed agreement in
grammatical utterances—resulting merely in a lack of valuation of the relevant features on
the ϕ-probes, rather than in ungrammaticality—thus lending support to the conclusions of
chapters –.
Chapter 
Conclusions, Extensions, and Outlook
.. The thesis, reviewed
In the previous chapters, I have presented arguments that the obligatoriness of ϕ-agreement
is best handled in terms of an operation—one whose invocation is obligatory, but whose
successful culmination is not enforced by the grammar.
The argument was primarily based upon the behavior of ϕ-agreement in the Agent-Focus
construction in the Kichean branch of the Mayan language family (as detailed in chapter ,
building on the results of chapter ).
This was then extended (in chapter ) to show that defective intervention (the disruption
of ϕ-agreement by dative nominals) is itself an instance of failed agreement—in this case,
triggered by the case-discrimination property of ϕ-agreement observed and formalized by
Bobaljik (). This approach to defective intervention was shown to handle a part of the
empirical picture that competing accounts were ill-suited to handle—namely, under which
circumstances defective intervention causes outright ungrammaticality, and under which
circumstances it merely results in the appearance of “default” agreement morphology (§..).
This cross-linguistic typology of defective intervention, juxtaposed with the typology
of quirky-subject/non-quirky-subject languages, provided an argument for movement to
canonical subject position—in a non-quirky-subject language—depending on ϕ-agreement to
identify the noun-phrase that will be moved (§.).
Given the fundamentally syntactic nature of movement to subject position, its dependence
on ϕ-agreement constitutes an argument that ϕ-agreement must be thought of as a syntactic
operation proper, contra Bobaljik’s  claim in the very same paper (an argument explored
in detail in chapter ).
Coupled with case-discrimination being sensitive to the morphologically-observable case
borne by a noun-phrase (rather than its abstract case or grammatical function, as Icelandic
crucially demonstrates), this furnished an argument that so-called “morphological case”
(Marantz )—including the logic of case-competition (which is necessary to predict the
distribution of dependent case), as well as the disjunctive case hierarchy—must be computed
within syntax (contra Marantz’s  own assertion). Additional support for this conclusion
was provided from Baker and Vinokurova’s () analysis of Sakha (Turkic), which illustrates
that case-competition is a necessary part of the calculus of case even in a non-quirky-subject
language (though contra Baker and Vinokurova’s claim, Sakha was shown to provide no
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particular evidence in favor of the assignment of case by functional heads, as in Chomsky
, ; §..).
A syntactic reimplementation of the calculus that leads to morphologically-observable case
was then proposed (§..). This system was shown to generate equivalent results to the one
proposed by Marantz , with the added benefit of potentially deriving the disjunctive case
hierarchy itself from properties of how arguments are introduced into syntactic structure—
along with the idea that syntactic case features, like their ϕ-feature counterparts, do not
necessarily need to be valued for a derivation to be well-formed. On this view, “unmarked
case” (such as nominative or absolutive in the clausal domain, or genitive in the nominal
domain) is simply the morphological expression of case features that have not been valued
in the course of the derivation—much like “rd-person singular” agreement morphology was
shown in earlier chapters to simply be the morphological expression of ϕ-features that had not
been valued in the course of the derivation.
Finally, it was shown that the behavior of agreement in Basque provides independent
support for the central premise of this obligatory operations approach to ϕ-agreement—
namely, that there are instances where agreement has demonstrably failed in an utterance that
is nonetheless grammatical (chapter ). In this case, it was demonstrated that only an account
that takes Basque unergatives to involve failed agreement per se can successfully account for
all three types of unergative constructions in Basque: the light-verb construction, simplex
(non-periphrastic) unergatives, and unergatives in the iterative/repetitive construction (where
the open-class predicate is introduced by an adposition).
The picture that emerges is therefore the following: case-marking (the property we had
previously referred to as “morphological case”) is computed within syntax, according to the
mechanism outlined in §., giving rise to results that are descriptively identical to the
disjunctive case hierarchy ofMarantz . These case-markings can then form the input to case-
discrimination, which causes ϕ-agreement (when it happens upon a nominal with the wrong
case-marking) to fail.
Another way in which ϕ-agreement can fail is if a target with the necessary featural content
is simply absent from the derivation entirely—as was the case with Kichean Agent-Focus
clauses that lack a st/nd-person argument, or Basque unergatives (which lack an absolutive
agreement target altogether). This failure of ϕ-agreement, unto itself, results only in the lack
of valuation on the ϕ-probe; crucially, a ϕ-probe that has not been valued is not ill-formed or
directly problematic to the syntactic computation.
The only way failed ϕ-agreement can give rise to actual ill-formedness is if an operation
that depends on successful ϕ-agreement is subsequently instantiated. The case in point
involves sentences in non-quirky-subject languages where the only possible parse is one in
which movement to canonical subject position has taken place—but where ϕ-agreement has
been intervened with—as was shown to be the case in instances of defective intervention
coupled with subject raising (e.g. in French), which do lead to ungrammaticality.
The essential components of the account are repeated below:
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() a simplified ϕ-feature geometry [=()]
[ϕ]
[number]
[plural]
[person]
[participant]
[author]
[following Harley and Ritter , McGinnis , and Béjar and Rezac ]
() findϕ(f ): given an unvalued feature f on a head H0, find an XP bearing a valued
instance of f . If such an XP is found, check whether its case is allowed by
case-discrimination— [=()]
yes→ assign the found value to H0
no → abort.
() theMoravcsik Hierarchy, second (and final) revision (Bobaljik )
unmarked case≫ dependent case≫ lexical/oblique case [=()]
() movement to canonical subject position (MtoCSP):
two typological variations – revised version [=()]
a. in a quirky-subject language (e.g. Icelandic)
MtoCSPQSL: Move(DP)
b. in a non-quirky-subject language (e.g. English, French)
MtoCSPNQSL: Move(XP targeted by findϕ)
.. Extensions: The logic of ϕ-agreement as an exemplar of syntactic
computation
The results of the previous chapters, as surveyed in §., show us that the logic of ϕ-agreement
is the logic of obligatory operations: the invocation of the ϕ-agreement operation (findϕ(f ),
in the current implementation) must be enforced by the grammar in a way that cannot be
reduced to the representations it operates upon, or those which it leaves behind (as detailed in
chapter , in particular).
There is an inherent tension between these results, and what many contemporary
approaches to syntax take the logic of syntactic computation to be. For concreteness, I will
concentrate here on approaches that fall within purview of theMinimalist Program (henceforth,
MP; Chomsky b, et seq.), though I believe the same tension exists with respect to other
approaches as well (including unification-based approaches, such as HPSG and LFG).
In most MP-based accounts, syntactic computation is driven by the features borne by
lexical items, and the operations (Agree, Move) are neither “obligatory” nor “optional” in any
meaningful sense—they are simply deployed by the system in order to ultimately reach a
well-formed end-of-the-derivation structure (see §.A, for a historical review of the shifting
of explanatory burden in syntax away from operations and onto representations; and see
§.. for a concrete treatment of ϕ-agreement in these terms). A given operation in a given
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derivation may be “obligatory”—but this obligatoriness is only derivative, a side-eﬀect of the
nature of the features that it operates upon.
At first glance, then, it may seem that this thesis has the unfortunate consequence of
making ϕ-agreement out to be a complete outlier in the landscape of syntactic phenomena.
One possible move that could be taken to address this tension would be to argue that
ϕ-agreement is an outlier in the landscape of syntax because it does not belong in that
landscape—in other words, that it is part of a diﬀerent computational module. The approach
taken by Bobaljik () in arguing that ϕ-agreement is a post-syntactic phenomenon is an
example of such a move (though these were not Bobaljik’s motivations for that proposal; see
§. for a review). However, the results of chapter  show that such a move is not available:
ϕ-agreement operates on the basis of case, and informs movement to subject position. Thus,
relegating ϕ-agreement into a diﬀerent computational module is impossible.
Instead, in this section, I will show that the logic of ϕ-agreement (as argued for in this
thesis) is not an outlier at all: once we know what we are looking for, syntactic phenomena that
exhibit the same operations-like logic are actually quite common. This will be demonstrated
based on the behavior of: Object Shift (§..); the Definiteness Eﬀect (§..); and finally, long-
distance wh-movement (§..).
... Object Shift
This sub-section deals with the phenomenon of Object Shift. The literature on Object Shift is
vast (see Collins and Thráinsson , Diesing , , Diesing and Jelinek , Fox and
Pesetsky , Holmberg , , Rackowski , Richards , Sells , Svenonius
, among many others), and one sub-section in a thesis devoted to a diﬀerent topic cannot
do it justice. Instead, in the context of this sub-section, I will treat Object Shift largely as
a given, focusing instead on the logic that relates its application or inapplication to other
properties of the utterance—namely, specificity, and grammaticality/ungrammaticality.
There is a well-established correlation between whether a noun-phrase has undergone
Object Shift (in languages where it is possible) and whether it is interpreted as specific (Diesing
, , Diesing and Jelinek ):
() a. Ég
I
las1
read(past)
[þrjár
three
bækur]2
books
aldrei
never
[VP t1 t2 ] (Icelandic)
‘There are three books that I never read.’
(4 specific reading of ‘three books’ / 7 non-specific reading of ‘three books’)
b. Ég
I
las1
read(past)
aldrei
never
[VP t1 þrjár
three
bækur
books
]
‘I never read three books.’
(4 non-specific reading of ‘three books’ / ? specific reading of ‘three books’)
[Thráinsson :]
However, as Diesing () and Vikner () observe, this correlation is not perfect; in
particular, it breaks down when Object Shift is syntactically impossible.
In Icelandic, for example, Object Shift depends on verb-movement—an eﬀect known as
Holmberg’s Generalization (Holmberg , and much subsequent work). Regardless of what
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the correct explanation of Holmberg’s Generalization is (see the works cited above, and
references therein), what is clear is that an immobile verb “traps” the object within the VP.
Crucially, a specific interpretation is then freely available for a “trapped” object of this sort, in
apparent violation of the aforementioned correlation of Object Shift with specificity:
() verb-movement→ specificity co-varies with Object Shift
a. þau
they
sýna1
show
[viðtöl
interviews
við
with
Blair]2
Blair
alltaf
always
[VP t1 t2 ] klukkan
clock
ellefu.
eleven
~ ‘Whenever there are interviews with Blair, they are always shown at  o’clock.’
(generic reading)
b. þau
they
sýna1
show
alltaf
always
[VP t1 [viðtöl
interviews
við
with
Blair]
Blair
] klukkan
clock
ellefu.
eleven
~ ‘It is always the case that they show interviews with Blair at  o’clock.’
(existential reading)
() immobile verb→ specificity-in-situ possible for “trapped” object
a. * þau
they
hafa
have
[viðtöl
interviews
við
with
Blair]2
Blair
alltaf
always
[VP sýnt
shown
t2 ] klukkan
clock
ellefu.
eleven
b. þau
they
hafa
have
alltaf
always
[VP sýnt
shown
[viðtöl
interviews
við
with
Blair]
Blair
] klukkan
clock
ellefu.
eleven
‘They have always shown interviews with Blair at  o’clock.’ (ambiguous)
[Thráinsson :; examples modeled after Vikner ]
In (), the lexical verb is not the highest verbal element in its clause—due to the presence
of an auxiliary verb—ruling out verb-movement. Crucially, a specific reading of the object in
(b) is freely available (cf. (b), as well as (b), above).
Tagalog exhibits very similar behavior, modulo the particular structural conditions on
Object Shift—as shown by Rackowski (). Since word order is rather free in Tagalog (which
Rackowski explains in terms of Richards’  A-bar scrambling analysis), word order is not
a reliable indicator of whether Object Shift has or has not occurred. On the other hand,
Rackowski shows, Object Shift in Tagalog determines which argument will be agreed with
by the verb (cf. the discussion of “positional” accounts of omnivorous agreement, in §...).
In an example like (), on Rackowski’s account, the object remains within VP, does
not control agreement on the verb, and crucially, receives a non-specific interpretation; in an
example like (), the object has shifted out of the VP—and as a result, it controls agreement
on the verb, and receives a specific interpretation:
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() M-aglu-luto
nom-asp-cook
ang
ang
lalaki
man
ng
case
adobo.
adobo
(Tagalog)
‘The man will cook adobo.’ (non-specific reading of ‘adobo’)
() Lu-lutu-in
asp-cook-acc
ng
case
lalaki
man
ang
ang
adobo.
adobo
‘The man will cook the adobo.’ (specific reading of ‘adobo’)
[Rackowski and Richards :–]
The structural conditions on Object Shift in Tagalog are quite simple: in order to undergo
Object Shift, the noun-phrase in question must be the structurally highest argument within
the VP. This much, in fact, is also true of Icelandic:
() a. ?* Ég
I
lánat1
lend
bækurnar2
books.acc
ekki
not
[VP t1 Maríu
Maria.dat
t2].
b. Ég
I
lána1
lend
Maríu2
Maria.dat
ekki
not
[VP t1 t2 bækurnar].
books.acc
‘I do not lend the books to Maria.’
[Collins and Thráinsson ]
Returning to Tagalog, if we use a non-prepositional benefactive—which as Rackowski argues,
forces a high-applicative structure (Pylkkänen )—then only the benefactive argument can
undergo Object Shift:
() a. * Ni-luto-Ø
asp-cook-acc
ni
case
Romeo
Romeo
ng
case
babae
woman
ang
ang
adobo.
adobo
b. I-p.in.agluto
obl-asp.cook
ni
case
Romeo
romeo
ng
case
adobo
adobo
ang
ang
babae.
woman
‘Romeo cooked (the) adobo for the woman.’
(specific reading of ‘woman’, specific/non-specific reading of ‘adobo’)
[Rackowski and Richards :–]
As expected, this forces a specific reading of “babae” (‘woman’); but what is of interest here is
the fate of “adobo”: it can now receive either a specific or a non-specific reading. This contrasts
with the fate of the same Patient argument, of the same verb stem (“luto” ‘cook’), in ():
there, this Patient argument did not undergo Object Shift either, but crucially could have (as
demonstrated by ()); and there, it could only receive a non-specific reading.
As noted above, the conditions under which Object Shift is possible or impossible are
subject to cross-linguistic variation. In Tagalog, Object Shift is possible when a noun-phrase
is the highest argument in the VP; in Icelandic, this condition is still operative, but there is
the added condition of verb-movement (Holmberg’s Generalization). However, if we abstract
away from the language-particular conditions on Object Shift, the following consistent pattern
emerges (as already highlighted by Vikner ):
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() Object Shiftpossible
Object Shift
impossible
non-shifted
noun-phrase non-specific
ambiguous
(specific/non-specific)
shifted
noun-phrase specific N/A
Crucially, this pattern lends itself remarkably well to an obligatory operations model. The
idea is that Object Shift, like ϕ-agreement—or more accurately, findϕ(f )—is an operation, that
can culminate successfully or unsuccessfully, depending on relevant structural conditions.
On this view, invoking Object Shift when it is impossible—for example, on a noun-phrase
that is not the highest argument in VP, or in Icelandic, when the lexical verb has not moved—
will result in the failure of the Object Shift operation; but just as with findϕ(f ), the only result
of this failure will be the absence of the eﬀects that the successful culmination of the operation
would bring about (in the case of ϕ-agreement, the eﬀect in question is feature valuation; in
the case of Object Shift, the eﬀect is the argument vacating the VP).
Suppose that specificity of a given noun-phrase obligatorily triggers the application of the
Object Shift operation on that noun-phrase:
() an obligatory operations model of Object Shift
x[+specific]→ Shift(x)
where Shift is the operation that causes a noun-phrase to vacate the VP, subject to the
structural conditions on “Object Shift” in the language in question
Thus, Shift(x) will be invoked for every [+specific] noun-phrase in the derivation. Take, for
example, the sub-case of the Tagalog (b), above, where all arguments are specific (‘Romeo
cooked the adobo for the woman’): given (), Shift(x) will be invoked on the Patient (‘the
adobo’) and on the benefactive applicative argument (‘the woman’) (as well as potentially on
the subject, ‘Romeo’, though the application of Shift(x) on the subject will be vacuous, as it is
already outside of the VP). Given the structural conditions on Object Shift in Tagalog, Shift(x)
will only successfully apply to the benefactive, since the Patient is not the highest argument
within the VP; this means that the benefactive will be the one to vacate the VP, even though
both internal arguments will have a specific reading.
To summarize, the result is exactly as shown in (): in configurations where Object Shift
is possible, its application will co-vary with specificity; in configurations where it is impossible,
specificity seems to come “for free”—it is possible in the absence of (successful) Object Shift.
This mirrors precisely what we have seen regarding ϕ-agreement, in earlier chapters: in
configurations where ϕ-agreement is possible, its application co-varies with grammaticality;
but precisely in those configurations where ϕ-agreement is impossible (for example, due to the
outright absence of an appropriate target in the derivation, or due to defective intervention),
grammaticality is possible without ϕ-agreement.
This is not meant to suggest that an obligatory operations approach of the sort discussed
here is the only possible account of the pattern in (); Diesing () and Vikner () oﬀer
diﬀerent accounts, based on covert movement and violable constraints, respectively.
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The point of the current discussion, as outlined in the beginning of the section, is merely
to show that the logic of obligatory operations exhibited by ϕ-agreement is far from a solitary
case in the landscape of syntactic phenomena, and thus there is no argument to be had from
“exceptionality” against the results of earlier chapters.
... The Definiteness Eﬀect
TheDefiniteness Eﬀect (Milsark , and much subsequent work) furnishes a very similar case
to that of Object Shift (§..), in support of the existence of other syntactic phenomena that
are amenable to an obligatory operations logic.
Broadly speaking, theDefiniteness Eﬀect is a prohibition against “strong” determiners (such
as “the”) heading noun-phrases that fail to move to subject position:1
() a. The boy/a boy seems to be playing in the garden.
b. There seems to be a boy/*the boy playing in the garden.
However, this restriction is crucially lifted when it comes to noun-phrases that cannot move
to subject position. For example, a dative experiencer can be freely added to (), even if it is
definite:
() a. The boy/a boy seems to the girls to be playing in the garden.
b. There seems to the girls to be a boy/*the boy playing in the garden.
One could imagine that the relevant factor in the suspension of the Definiteness Eﬀect for
“the girls” in (a–b) is its thematic role, its obliqueness, or some other property—rather
than its inability to move to subject position, necessarily. However, quirky-subject languages
demonstrate quite vividly that what is at stake is indeed the ability to move to subject position.
In the Icelandic counterpart of (), it is the dative experiencer—not the nominative subject
of the embedded predicate—to which the Definiteness Eﬀect applies (Sigurðsson ):
() a. * það
expl
virtist
seemed
[dómurunum]dat
judges.the.dat
[kona/konan]
woman.nom/woman.the.nom
hafa
have.inf
skrifað
written
bókina.
book.the.acc
‘It seemed to the judges that a/the woman had written the book.’
b. ? það
expl
virtist
seemed
[bara
just
tveim
two
af
of
dómurunum]dat
judges.the.dat
[kona/konan]
woman.nom/woman.the.nom
hafa
have.inf
skrifað
written
bókina.
book.the.acc
‘It seemed to only two of the judges that a/the woman had written the book.’
[Halldór Ármann Sigurðsson, p.c.]
Crucially, in Icelandic dative experiencer constructions like (), it is the dative argument—
rather than the nominative subject of the embedded non-finite clause—that moves to subject
1Note that the empirical patterns surveyed in this sub-section—and in fact, in all of §.—are highly
reminiscent of Bobaljik and Wurmbrand’s (to appear) “/ signature” eﬀects. A detailed comparison of the
two empirical domains would take us too far afield, in the current context, and is therefore left for another day.
CONCLUSIONS, EXTENSIONS, AND OUTLOOK 
position of the matrix clause in the absence of an expletive (note that despite their English
translations, the embedded clauses in (–) are indeed non-finite):
() [Dómurunum]dat
judges.the.dat
virtist
seemed
t1 [kona/konan]
woman.nom/woman.the.nom
hafa
have.inf
skrifað
written
bókina.
book.the.acc
‘It seemed to the judges that a/the woman had written the book.’
Just as with nominatives moving into subject position in English, movement of this dative into
subject position in () alleviates the Definiteness Eﬀect (cf. (a)).
In contrast, when the closest DP to the matrix subject position is indeed nominative (unlike
in (–)), Icelandic reverts to the English behavior—i.e., the Definiteness Eﬀect applies to
the nominative argument—confirming that the ability to move to subject position is indeed
the crucial factor:2
() a. Konan
woman.the.nom
hefur
has
skrifað
written
bókina.
book.the.acc
‘The woman has written the book.’
b. * það
expl
hefur
has
konan
woman.the.nom
skrifað
written
bókina.
book.the.acc
() a. ?? Kona
woman.nom
hefur
has
skrifað
written
bókina.
book.the.acc
‘A woman has written the book.’
b. ? það
expl
hefur
has
kona
woman.nom
skrifað
written
bókina.
book.the.acc
‘A woman has written the book.’
[adapted from Hrafnbjargarson :]
We thus have a very similar state of aﬀairs to the one involving Object Shift (§..):
() MtoCSPpossible
MtoCSP
impossible
non-subject
noun-phrase indefinite only
both possible
(definite/indefinite)
subject
noun-phrase
definite
(but see below) N/A
(cf. ())
(MtoCSP = movement to canonical subject position)
As with Object Shift, the conditions on MtoCSP (movement to canonical subject position) are
subject to cross-linguistic variation—an issue discussed extensively, for MtoCSP, in chapter .
Crucially, however, once we abstract away from the language-specific conditions on MtoCSP, a
familiar picture emerges: with noun-phrases for which MtoCSP is possible (the closest noun-
2Note also that (–) are run-of-the-mill transitives—highlighting that the Definiteness Eﬀect is not
necessarily restricted, cross-linguistically, to what are traditionally thought of as existential constructions.
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phrase to subject position in Icelandic, or the nominative noun-phrase in English), definiteness
forces MtoCSP; but when MtoCSP is impossible, definiteness appears to come “for free”,
available to a noun-phrase in-situ.
We can therefore capture this behavior in terms of an obligatory operation, along the same
lines proposed for Object Shift in §... Suppose that MtoCSP is itself an operation, much
like ϕ-agreement/findϕ ; and that the conditions formulated in chapter  (and repeated in
(), below) for quirky-subject languages (QSL) and non-quirky-subject languages (NQSL),
respectively, represent the structural conditions on its successful culmination:
() movement to canonical subject position (MtoCSP):
two typological variations – revised version [=()]
a. in a quirky-subject language (e.g. Icelandic)
MtoCSPQSL: Move(DP)
b. in a non-quirky-subject language (e.g. English, French)
MtoCSPNQSL: Move(XP targeted by findϕ)
In other words, the structural conditions on the application of MtoCSP in a quirky-subject
language (like Icelandic) are that its target must be the closest DP to the landing site; and in
a non-quirky-subject language (like English or French), the conditions are that its target must
be the noun-phrase targeted by ϕ-agreement/findϕ .
Suppose, then, that the definiteness of a noun-phrase invariably triggers the application
of MtoCSP on that noun-phrase—as in (), below—and that the insertion of an expletive
to occupy an otherwise empty canonical subject position occurs in the morpho-phonological
component, to satisfy what is essentially a morpho-phonological requirement (see Bobaljik
, Landau , and references therein).
() an obligatory operations model of the Definiteness Effect – first version
x[+definite]→MtoCSP(x)
where MtoCSP will fail if the relevant condition in (a–b) is not met
Thus, in a structure like () below, MtoCSP will be invoked for both the dative experiencer
and the embedded nominative, since both are definite:
() a. * There seems to the girls to be the boy playing in the garden.
b. The boy1 seems to the girls to be t1 playing in the garden.
MtoCSPwill succeedwhen applied to the embedded nominative in (), since this nominative
has been successfully targeted by ϕ-agreement/findϕ—in compliance with the structural
conditions on MtoCSP in English, as given in (b) (see also the discussion at the end of §.,
regarding the somewhat exceptional properties of agreement in English dative experiencer
constructions). If the invocation of MtoCSP on the [+definite] nominative is obligatory, and its
structural conditions are met, there will simply be no derivation that leads to (a) (and to
the insertion of an expletive).
Crucially, MtoCSP will fail when applied to the dative experiencer, since that argument is
not targeted by ϕ-agreement/findϕ , in violation of (b); given the logic of the obligatory
operations model, this failure will not result in ill-formedness, but simply in the absence of the
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eﬀects that successful culmination of the operation would have brought about—in this case,
movement of the dative experiencer to subject position.
It is important to note that this does not conflict with the proposal in chapter —where
it was argued that MtoCSP can give rise to outright ungrammaticality, when it has applied
to a noun-phrase that has not been targeted by ϕ-agreement/findϕ (in a non-quirky-subject
language). The crucial distinction is that there, we were looking at strings whose only parse
was one where MtoCSP had applied successfully, even though the structural conditions on the
application of MtoCSP had not been met:
() ?* Jean1
Jean
semble
seems
[à
to
Marie]dat
Marie
[ t1 avoir
have.inf
du
of
talent
talent
].
‘Jean seems to Marie to have talent.’ [=()] [McGinnis :]
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In (), the subject is to the left of the finite verb; the only parse is therefore one
where MtoCSP has successfully applied to “Jean”. However, as discussed in chapter ,
minimality/Closest prevents ϕ-agreement/findϕ from targeting this subject. In fact, the
ungrammaticality of () does have a counterpart in the empirical domain under discussion
here: it is the ungrammaticality of (), where we have a string whose only parse is one where
MtoCSP has successfully applied to the dative experiencer of English “seem” (cf. (a–b)).
() * To the girls1 seems t1 a boy to be playing in the garden.
In both () and (), the string forces a parse where MtoCSP has applied to a noun-phrase
that its structural conditions prevent it from applying to—in both cases, due to the fact that
ϕ-agreement has not successfully targeted the noun-phrase in question. Thus, there is no
derivation that leads to these strings—and they are therefore ruled out just like violations of
minimality/Closest, or cases of “gratuitous non-agreement” (see the discussion in §.).
To summarize, a sentence that violates the Definiteness Eﬀect—like (a), above—is ruled
out as follows: the embedded nominative is [+definite], therefore MtoCSP will be obligatorily
invoked; the structural conditions for MtoCSP are met, and it will therefore succeed, moving
the nominative to the matrix subject position and bleeding morpho-phonological insertion of
the expletive. In other words, (a) is ruled out because there is again no derivation that leads
to that string.
Crucially, nothing that has been said so far—including the idea that MtoCSP is obligatorily
triggered for any [+definite] noun-phrase in the derivation—rules out that MtoCSP could be
triggered in other ways, as well. This seems to be a genuine point of variation between English
and Icelandic: in English, MtoCSP is also triggered for any External Argument, regardless
of its definiteness; in Icelandic, it is not. This is the equivalent, in the current system, of
the typological observation that Icelandic has a Transitive Expletive Construction (as in (b),
above, for example), but English does not—a point of cross-linguistic variation that needs to
be captured one way or another. In the current system, it can be captured as follows:
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() an obligatory operations model of the Definiteness Effect – second (and
final) version
a. x[+definite]→MtoCSP(x) (universal)
b. x[Ext. Arg.]→MtoCSP(x) (parametrized; active in English, but not in Icelandic)
This derives the contrast between the Icelandic (a–b)—repeated below—and their English
counterparts, given in (a–b):
() a. ?? Kona
woman.nom
hefur
has
skrifað
written
bókina.
book.the.acc
‘A woman has written the book.’
b. ? það
expl
hefur
has
kona
woman.nom
skrifað
written
bókina.
book.the.acc
‘A woman has written the book.’
[adapted from Hrafnbjargarson :]
() a. A woman has written the book.
b. * There has a woman written the book.
Note too that on the current approach, MtoCSP is also triggered for “bókina” (‘book.the.acc’)
in () and “the book” in ()—failing in both cases, because the noun-phrases in question
do not meet the structural conditions for the application of MtoCSP in either language (it is
neither the closest noun-phrase to canonical subject position, as required in Icelandic, nor the
noun-phrase targeted by ϕ-agreement/findϕ , as required in English). As before, this failure
results merely in the lack of movement of “bókina”/“the book” to subject position—rather
than in ill-formedness.
Finally, if we allow the MtoCSP operation in English to optionally apply to any argument
(regardless of its definiteness)—or perhaps, to be triggered by particular discourse properties
of any given argument—we derive the behavior of derived subjects with respect to definiteness:
() a. Aman has arrived.
b. There has arrived a man.
() a. The man has arrived.
b. * There has arrived the man.
In (), the [+definite] noun-phrase “the man” triggers obligatory application of MtoCSP,
rendering the variant in (b) ungrammatical (where “the man” has not moved, and an
expletive has been inserted in canonical subject position). In (), on the other hand, there
is no [+definite] noun-phrase—nor is “a man” an External Argument—meaning MtoCSP can
apply optionally, yielding the observed pattern.
Recall also that allowing MtoCSP to apply freely to noun-phrases that are unable to move
to subject position (e.g. direct objects of transitives, etc.) is harmless in such a system, since
the failure of MtoCSP in such cases will have no adverse eﬀects on the derivation (as with
“bókina”/“the book”, in (, ) above).
CONCLUSIONS, EXTENSIONS, AND OUTLOOK 
As in the discussion of Object Shift in §.., the point here is not that there are no other
conceivable accounts of these Definiteness Eﬀect facts. Rather, the point is that the behavior of
the Definiteness Eﬀect is, at the very least, entirely compatible with an obligatory operations
logic (where operations are obligatorily triggered that may or may not culminate successfully,
and whose failure does not result in ungrammaticality).
In particular, the fact that the Definiteness Eﬀect is active precisely when movement to
subject position is possible, and suspended elsewhere, can be accounted for straightforwardly
if movement to subject position is the consequence, not the cause, of the Definiteness Eﬀect—
and movement to subject position is attempted wherever definiteness arises, succeeding only
where structural conditions permit.
We therefore have another illustration that ϕ-agreement is not unique in the landscape of
syntactic phenomena in the obligatory operations logic that it exhibits.
... Long-distance wh-movement
In §., I discussed the conventional MP treatment of long-distance wh-movement, as in
the accounts of Chomsky (, ) and McCloskey (). The relevant question is how
movement of a wh-phrase that completely exits a clause, such as the movement of “what” in
an example like (), is driven:
() What did Mary say [twhat [C0 that]<+wh> John wanted twhat]?
I will assume here that the wh-phrase has an intermediate landing site at the periphery of the
embedded clause, as schematized in () (see McCloskey  for a review of the relevant
evidence). Let us focus on that particular step of wh-movement, which lands at the periphery
of the embedded clause. This step of wh-movement cannot be the result of the matrix C0
being interrogative. First, it is not the matrix landing site that we are concerned with, here;
presumably, movement as a response to features of the matrix C0 would land in the periphery
of the matrix clause. Second, assuming syntactic structure is built incrementally from the
bottom up—and given some form or other of cyclicity—movement of “what” to the embedded
clausal periphery cannot occur after further structure has been built; therefore, by the time the
interrogative matrix C0 is merged, it is too late for movement to the periphery of the embedded
clause to take place.
Thus, if we maintain that wh-movement is feature-driven, then the embedded declarative
C0 in an example like () must carry a feature—call it <wh>—that attracts the wh-phrase to
the periphery of its own clause.
There is a problem, however, with this logic—a problem whose general form should by
now be familiar: wh-movement is obligatory when possible, but when it is impossible, its
absence is tolerated. What looks like the very same declarative C0 has clearly failed to attract
a wh-phrase (because there is no wh-phrase to attract) in an example like (), yet the result
is well-formed:
() Mary said [ [C0 that] John wanted an armadillo].
Chomsky and McCloskey hold constant that features that drive movement are uninterpretable
(in the terms of the this thesis, that they are derivational time-bombs). This forces them to
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assume that the embedded declarative C0 in an example like () is not the same lexical item
as the one in an example like (): the former comes with the aforementioned <wh> feature,
while the latter does not.
McCloskey () takes the behavior of the Irish declarative complementizer system as
support for the existence of these two, featurally-distinct variants of declarative C0 (as is well-
known, the Irish declarative complementizer takes a diﬀerent form depending on whether or
not wh-movement has crossed it; see Adger and Ramchand , Duﬃeld , Harlow ,
McCloskey , , , , Noonan , Sells , among others). It seems to me,
however, that these facts about Irish do not actually bear directly on the question of whether
there are one or two kinds of declarative C0, in terms of featural content. Suppose for amoment
that there was independent reason to assume that there is exactly one kind of declarative C0
in Irish, feature-wise; the diﬀerent forms that the declarative complementizer takes could just
as well be the result of context-sensitive spellout of C0. In particular, the “aL” form would
be the spellout of a C0 whose specifier is filled (by movement), and the “go” form would be
the spellout of a C0 whose specifier is empty.3 If context-sensitive spellout of terminals is an
independently necessary component of the syntax/morphology interface—and it seems to be
(Halle and Marantz , among others)—then there is nothing about the morphology of Irish
complementizers that necessarily favors an account involving two featurally-distinct lexical
entries for declarative C0.
A treatment of Irish declarative complementizers as a featurally homogeneous class, of
course, resurrects the problem caused by the obligatoriness of wh-movement in an example
like (), given the absence of such movement in an example like (); below, I sketch an
account of this eﬀect within an obligatory operations model. The point here is merely that the
morphology of Irish complementizers does not, in fact, constitute an argument in favor of one
of these approaches over the other.
More important for the current purposes, however, is the observation that the issue raised
by cases like (–) is actually not restricted to declaratives, in the first place. In languages
where wh-movement out of interrogatives is possible (i.e., languages that tolerate violations of
the wh-Island Condition, such as Italian, Hebrew, and under certain circumstances, English; see
Rizzi , Reinhart , Pesetsky ), the same issue arises with respect to wh-movement
out of an interrogative clause:
() ma2
what
Dina
Dina
šaxex-a
forgot-sg.F
[ t2 le-mi1
dat-who
Dan
Dan
natan
gave
t1 t2 ]? (Hebrew)
‘What did Dina forget to whom Dan gave?’ [Preminger b:]
(≡‘What is the thingi such that Dina forgot who Dan gave that thingi to?’)
() Dina
Dina
šaxex-a
forgot-sg.F
[ le-mi1
dat-who
Dan
Dan
natan
gave
t1 et
acc
ha-matana
the-gift
].
‘Dina forgot to whom Dan gave the gift.’
3The caveat that “aL” is only inserted when the periphery is filled by movement is necessary to distinguish it
from the “aN” form, associated with peripheries hosting base-generated operators (McCloskey ). One can
avoid making direct reference to movement vs. base-generation in the morphological component by assuming
that the context relevant to “aL” is merely a non-empty periphery (without direct reference to movement or
lack thereof), but that “aN” is a more specific form whose insertion is triggered by specific types of operators,
and that “aL” is simply the elsewhere form.
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In both () and (), the embedded clause is interrogative; but as in the English examples
involving an embedded declarative, we have obligatory (secondary) wh-movement in (),
juxtaposed with the tolerated absence of (secondary) wh-movement in ().
The feature-driven account of long-distance wh-movement would thus have to posit that
there are two featurally-distinct variants of the interrogative complementizer, as well as the
declarative one (at least for languages of this sort).
The obligatory operations logic oﬀers a rather appealing alternative to this feature-based
account: suppose that just like a ϕ-probe triggers obligatory invocation of findϕ(f ) when it is
merged, a complementizer—be it declarative or interrogative—triggers obligatory invocation
of an operation that displaces a wh-phrase to the clausal periphery:4
() an obligatory operations approach towh-movement
C0 → Displace(wh)
It is not clear that the landing site even needs to be specified in (), since cyclicity
considerations will mandate that () be invoked upon the merger of C0 (and no later), and
the same considerations will mandate that the landing site will be the root of the structure (i.e.,
the CP level). Similarly, minimality/Closest need not be specified, either (see the discussion of
minimality/Closest with respect to MtoCSP, in §.).
Crucially, given the obligatory operations logic, invokingDisplace(wh) on a structure where
there is no availablewh-phrase is akin to invoking findϕ(f ) on a structure that lacks f -bearing
noun-phrases (as is the case, for example, in Kichean clauses that lack st/nd-person or plural
arguments, as shown in chapter ; or in Basque unergatives, which as detailed in chapter ,
lack an absolutive agreement target); the operation will simply fail. As with findϕ(f ), this
failure will result not in any kind of ill-formedness, but merely in the absence of the eﬀects
that the successful culmination of the operation would have brought about—in this case, the
displacement of a wh-phrase.
Thus, in both () and () (repeated below), merging the embedded C0 will result in
the invocation of Displace(wh):
() What did Mary say [twhat [C0 that]<+wh> John wanted twhat]?
() Mary said [ [C0 that] John wanted an armadillo].
While the operationDisplace(wh) will succeed in (), it will fail in (), due to the absence of
an appropriate target. Both derivations will proceed unhindered, however; and in both cases,
when the matrix C0 is merged, Displace(wh) will again be invoked. As before, the operation
will find a suitable target in () (where “what” is now at the edge of the embedded clause),
and displace it to the periphery of the matrix clause; but it will find no such target in (),
again merely resulting in the absence of wh-displacement in that case.
I assume here that in pair-list/tuple-list questions (e.g. “Who did you think ate what?”),
all wh-phrases undergo (at least covert) movement into the matrix clause (see in particular
Nissenbaum , for evidence supporting such an analysis); and that in English, it is the case
4I avoid using a term like “Move(wh)”, here, to prevent confusion with the Government and Binding
(Chomsky ) notion with the same name—which is crucially diﬀerent, in that its application was assumed
to be “free”, rather than obligatory and triggered by specific lexical items.
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that the morpho-phonological component chooses to pronounce the highest/leftmost of these
wh-chains at the head of the chain, and all other wh-chains at the foot of the chain (but not in
Bulgarian, for example; see Richards , Rudin ).
If any C0—be it declarative or interrogative—triggers the application of Displace(wh), then
we must ask why the matrix C0 in an example like (), below, fails to displace the wh-phrase
at the periphery of the embedded interrogative:
() John investigated [who C0 the money was sent to twho].
Note, however, that any theory ofwh-movement needs to say something about whywh-phrases
that are interpreted in the scope of an interrogative are unable to move further. This is equally
necessary in the feature-driven approach to wh-movement: suppose that the <wh>-equipped
version of declarative C0 is chosen to head thematrix clause in () (or if root declaratives lack
a CP layer, an essentially parallel example can be constructed by using () as the complement
to a declarative-embedding verb); without further stipulation, this declarative C0 should be
able to attract “who” out of the embedded interrogative.
The same issue is raised by the Hebrew example given in (), and repeated here:
() ma2
what
Dina
Dina
šaxex-a
forgot-sg.F
[ t2 le-mi1
dat-who
Dan
Dan
natan
gave
t1 t2 ]? (Hebrew)
‘What did Dina forget to whom Dan gave?’ [Preminger b:]
(≡‘What is the thingi such that Dina forgot who Dan gave that thingi to?’)
In Preminger b, I argued that a wh-phrase like “le-mi” (‘dat-who’) in () is not located
in [Spec,CP] of the embedded interrogative, but rather in a lower position in the left periphery;
there must then be something that prevents the embedded C0 in () from targeting this very
wh-phrase for further movement, instead of the lower wh-phrase “ma” (‘what’).
Examples like () demonstrate that wh-movement is in principle capable of escaping an
interrogative clause, but that it still cannot do so when thewh-phrase in question is interpreted
within the scope of the embedded interrogative.5
Perhaps the logic of activity and inactivation (which was shown in §.. to be problematic
when it comes to ϕ-agreement) can be successfully applied to this domain; alternatively, one
could pursue a more structurally-based approach—where the scope positions of wh-phrases
are by their very nature terminal positions, inaccessible for further movement (as in Rizzi and
Shlonsky’s  Criterial Freezing proposal, for example; see also Den Dikken ).
Since this issue arises in both an obligatory operations approach to wh-movement and in a
feature-driven one—and thus, does not favor one approach over the other—I will not speculate
on it further here.
Crucially, given that a wh-phrase interpreted in the scope of an embedded interrogative is
unable to undergo further movement, Displace(wh)—invoked when the matrix C0 is merged,
in an example like ()—will simply fail to find a movable wh-phrase. This is comparable
to (), above, where Displace(wh) is invoked in the absence of any wh-phrases whatsoever
(and to the cases cited earlier, where findϕ(f ) is invoked on a structure lacking any f -bearing
targets).
5Thanks to Bronwyn Bjorkman for helpful commentary on this issue.
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Let us now turn to the ungrammaticality of a case like ():
() * [interrogative Mary said [ [C0 that]<Ø> John wanted what] ]
Under the feature-driven approach, locality considerations prevent the matrix C0 in ()
from displacing awh-phrase in the embedded clause that has not been previously moved to the
edge of that clause. This causes a “crash”: the matrix periphery hosts a <wh>-feature which
constitutes a derivational time-bomb (e.g. because it is uninterpretable); the failure to locate an
accessible wh-phrase means that this derivational time-bomb cannot be tended to, resulting in
ungrammaticality.
Under the obligatory operations approach, Displace(wh) is obligatorily invoked upon the
merger of C0 in the embedded clause.6 Thus, an example like () is ruled out because there
is no derivation that leads to that structure—akin to how violations of minimality/Closest are
ruled out, as well as cases of “gratuitous non-agreement” (see §. for discussion).
Thus, under the obligatory operations approach, there do not have to be two variants of the
declarative complementizer, and two variants of the interrogative complementizer (moreover,
while there might still be diﬀerent complementizers for declarative and interrogative clauses,
even these need not diﬀer from one another in their featural content, at least as far as attracting
wh-phrases is concerned).
This highlights a particular way in which the two approaches diﬀer. On the feature-driven
approach, long-distance wh-movement involves a choice of complementizer (namely, between
<wh>-bearing C0 and “plain” C0); and the correctness of a given choice cannot be evaluated
until the matrix periphery is reached (since that, on the feature-driven account, is where the
ill-formedness of a case like () arises).
The feature-driven approach therefore requires computational lookahead—or equivalently,
overgeneration-followed-by-filtration, as implicated by Chomsky’s (b) assertion that only
derivations that are ultimately convergent are considered by the computational system. As
discussed by Frampton and Gutmann (), this drives an unnecessary wedge between
theories of competence and performance, since choosing the correct kind of C0 for a given
derivation requires knowledge of which one will ultimately lead to a “crash”, and which will
not. Indeed, this very issue has given rise to various attempts to refine the feature-based
approach so that a decision regarding the fate of a derivation like () can already be made
during the derivation of the embedded clause itself (see, for example, Bošković , Heck
and Müller ).
On the obligatory operations account, no such refinements are necessary: this approach
is intrinsically crash-proof, since obligatorily-invoked operations constitute a “recipe” for how
the derivation is to proceed—and crucially, when these operations fail, no ungrammaticality
(or “crash”) arises.
At the risk of seeming like a broken record, I will point out again that the point of this
discussion is not necessarily to provide a decisive argument in favor of an obligatory operations
approach to wh-movement, but rather, to demonstrate that one is eminently possible. In
6As in many other accounts, I assume here that echo-questions (e.g. “You ate what?!”) involve a distinct
kind of wh-element (as suggested by the unique stress/intonation contour on these particular wh-elements),
and that these “echo wh-elements” do not constitute viable targets for Displace(wh).
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particular, wh-movement exhibits the familiar operations-like footprint (it is obligatory when
possible, but when impossible, its absence is tolerated), which makes it very well suited for
such an account.
We therefore have yet another example of a phenomenon other than ϕ-agreement that
adheres to the same obligatory operations logic.
.. Outlook: What is left for uninterpretable features?
In §..–§.. I surveyed three empirical domains—Object Shift, the Definiteness Eﬀect, and
long-distance wh-movement—that proved to be quite amenable to an account along the lines
of the obligatory operations account of ϕ-agreement, argued for in previous chapters. This
survey was undertaken primarily to demonstrate that the results of previous chapters do not,
in fact, cast ϕ-agreement as a unique phenomenon in the landscape of syntax, whose logic
resembles no other syntactic phenomena.
These observations might, however, lead one to wonder about the prospects for a uniform
theory of syntactic obligatoriness. As demonstrated extensively in chapters –, as well as
in chapter , the obligatoriness of ϕ-agreement cannot be handled in terms of derivational
time-bombs or uninterpretable features; and as demonstrated in chapters –, ϕ-agreement
is indeed part of syntax proper. Therefore, any syntactic approach that employs a device
like uninterpretable features somewhere in the theory cannot hope to attain uniformity in the
enforcement of obligatoriness in syntax.
We have seen, in §.., that another exemplar case of using uninterpretable features
to enforce obligatoriness—namely, in wh-movement—is actually not a particularly good
fit, either (at least, no better than its alternatives). We might therefore consider the
converse possibility—that building on the results of §..–§.., a theory of syntax where
obligatoriness is uniformly a matter of obligatory operations would be possible.
Surveying the totality of syntactic theory to evaluate the prospects of replacing any such
use of uninterpretable features or other derivational time-bombs is a task whose enormity is far
beyond what I could hope to achieve within the confines of this thesis. Instead, I will merely
oﬀer some speculation on a couple of cases that strike me as potentially the most recalcitrant
to a treatment of the sort put forth here (both of which are, not coincidentally, among the filters
of Chomsky and Lasnik’s  Filters and Control).
One such case, already touched upon briefly in §.., is the (narrowly defined) EPP—that
is, the requirement that clauses (perhaps any clauses, or perhaps only finite ones) in a language
like English must have a subject. If expletives are base-generated in subject position, then the
EPP is a requirement that can be satisfied in at least two relatively disparate ways, making it
particularly well suited for a representational filter along the lines of derivational time-bombs
or uninterpretable features, and less amenable to an obligatory operations treatment.
On this front, it seems that there are two possible courses to pursue. First, there are
numerous proposals in the literature that take expletives not to be inserted in their surface
position, but rather to originate within, or alongside, their associates (Hartmann , Hazout
, Hoekstra and Mulder , Kayne , Moro , , , Williams , among
others). Insofar as such an analysis of expletives can be maintained, then all satisfaction of
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the EPP is ultimately an instance of MtoCSP, and the variation in which element undergoes
this operation is a matter of the structural conditions on MtoCSP and their interaction with
diﬀerent structural configurations, as already discussed in detail in chapter .
A second approach one could take is the onementioned in §.., that the EPP is essentially
a morpho-phonological requirement (Bobaljik , Landau , among others), and that
following Bobaljik (), expletives are inserted as a last-resort by the morpho-phonological
component to satisfy this requirement in syntactically subject-less clauses.
This last possibility is particularly intriguing in light of the following dynamic:
in chapter , I discussed—and ultimately, argued against—the possibility of relegating
ϕ-agreement to a non-syntactic component of the grammar. The appeal of such a move would
have been, among other things, to maintain the uniformity of syntactic computation—the
implication being that syntax followed the logic of derivational time-bombs, and therefore
phenomena that did not adhere to that logic belonged elsewhere in the grammar. We saw
in chapter , however, that such a move was not possible, and that ϕ-agreement is part of
syntax proper. Thus, its incompatibility with a derivational time-bombs logic led to the current
reexamination of the nature of syntactic computation. It is therefore interesting that the EPP,
potentially a bastion of actual ungrammaticality-inducing filtration, might actually belong
outside of syntax.
The other case I will discuss here is the licensing of noun-phrases. If nominals require
licensing beyond their thematic roles (i.e., licensing that cannot be reduced to an interpretive
requirement, as in the abstract case proposal of Chomsky and Lasnik ), then such licensing
also seems to resist a reimplementation in terms of obligatory operations. Indeed, in Chomsky
b, this licensing is implemented in terms of a bona fide derivational time-bomb—an
uninterpretable case-feature on the nominal.
However, it is not at all clear what the fate of nominal licensing is in contemporary
syntactic theory. Recent advances in the understanding of Control (e.g. Bobaljik and
Landau , Landau ) have led to a decoupling of the distribution of null subjects of
control infinitives from the theory of case, a conclusion already motivated to some extent
by the observations of Marantz () regarding the lack of correlation between licensing
and morphologically-observable case-markings in a quirky-subject language. This, in turn,
removes a very significant portion of the argument (from Chomsky and Lasnik ) that
there is such a thing as nominal licensing at play in the grammar, in the first place.7
A diﬀerent kind of licensing, one which featured extensively in the account of the Kichean
Agent-Focus construction in chapters –, is the Person Licensing Condition (PLC), proposed by
Béjar and Rezac (), and repeated here:
() Person Licensing Condition (PLC) [=()]
Interpretable st/nd-person features must be licensed by entering into an Agree
relation with an appropriate functional category. [Béjar and Rezac ]
7Onemight wonder regarding another empirical domain where nominal licensing appears to be relevant—
the complementation possibilities of adjectives. It seems plausible to me, however, that statements such as
“adjectives do not take nominal complements” can be reinterpreted as “adjectives do not take complements
with unmarked case” (taking English “of”, for example, to be an oblique case marker), in which case the
complementation of adjectives is a case-theoretic issue, not one of nominal licensing.
 OUTLOOK: WHAT IS LEFT FOR UNINTERPRETABLE FEATURES?
The PLC seems to constitute a bona fide filter on admissible and inadmissible configurations
involving st/nd-person arguments. It would therefore appear that enforcing the PLC in
syntax requires st/nd-person arguments to bear the equivalent of derivational time-bombs.
Having established that the obligatoriness of ϕ-agreement cannot be enforced in terms of
derivational time-bombs (chapters –), this might seem to all but eliminate the possibility of
a uniform treatment of obligatoriness in syntax (recall that an account for the obligatoriness of
ϕ-agreement that is based exclusively on derivational time-bombs borne by the noun-phrases
themselves was shown to be untenable, as well; see §.).
Given that ϕ-agreement cannot be relegated to a component of the grammar other than
syntax (chapter ), it seems that the most promising avenue to pursue here would be to explore
the possibility of relegating the PLC to a diﬀerent component of the grammar. It does not
seem out of the question that the distribution of indexical expressions such as st/nd-person
pronouns is ultimately regulated by the interpretive component. The central challenge posed
by such an approach is how the interpretive component would be able to discern whether
a given st/nd-person argument has or has not entered into a ϕ-agreement relation in the
course of the syntactic computation (given the necessarily syntactic nature of ϕ-agreement).
Insofar as this challenge can be met, then, a uniform treatment of obligatoriness in syntax
(one that does not make use of derivational time-bombs, at all) might be within sight.
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